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1. 
Verschiliende voedselcategorieën worden in geval van een hoog voedselbudget als 
noodzakelijke of inférieure goederen beschouwd, en bij een lager voedselbudget als luxe 
goederen. Een dergelijk patroon kan niet worden gevonden bij gebruik van de traditionele 
Working-Leser Engelcurves. 
(dit proefschrift) 
2. 
Door de wens van veel Nederlandse ouders voor zowel een zoon als een dochter (de 
zogeheten 'rijkeluiswens'), zal de mogelijkheid van geslachtskeuze bij het krijgen van 
kinderen noch de sekse-ratio bij de geboorte verstoren, noch de bevolkingsomvang doen 
afnemen. 
(dit proefschrift) 
3. 
Bij de organisatie van frnanciën binnen huishoudens in het Verenigd Koninkrijk lijkt het 
verwerven van invloed op het bestedingspatroon een grotere roi te spelen dan overwegingen 
met betrekking tot een efficiente verdeling van taken. 
(dit proefschrift) 
4. 
Akerlof s conclusie in "The market for lemons' dat er geen handel plaatsvindt op markten met 
asymmetrische informatie is afhankelijk van de veronderstellingen van zijn model. Indien er 
voldoende grote verschillen bestaan tussen nutsfunkties van potentiele kopers en verkopers 
is wel degelijk handel mogelijk. 
G. Akerlof (1970), "The market for lemons: quality, uncertainty, and the market mechanism.' Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 84: 488-500. 
5. 
Voor de betrouwbaarheid van de overheid is het wenselijk dat zij zoveel mogelijk het door 
haar aangekondigde beleid uitvoert, ook al is dat op korte termijn niet altijd optimaal. 
S. Fischer (1980), 'Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation and the benevolent dissembling government.' Journal 
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2: 93-107. 
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6. 
2 
Bij veel huishoudleden blijkt een verschil te bestaan tussen het gewenste aantal arbeidsuren 
en het werkelijk aantal arbeidsuren. In een bepaalde tak van de economische literatuur wordt 
dit verschil toegeschreven aan marktrestricties, in een andere tak aan verschillende 
preferenties van partners in een huishouden. De waarheid ligt waarschijnlijk in het midden. 
W.T. Dickens en S.J. Lundberg (1993), 'Hours restrictions and labor supply.' International Economic Review, 
34(1): 169-192. 
P. Kooreman en A. Kapteyn (1990), 'On the empirical implementation of some game theoretic models of 
household labor supply.' Journal of Human Resources, 25(4): 585-598. 
7. 
In het licht van het toegenomen aantal tweeverdieners kan de term 'kostwinnaar' aan de 
Nederlandse woordenschat worden toegevoegd. 
8. 
De voordelen van werken op projectbasis worden met name verkondigd door personen met 
een vast contract. 
9. 
Don't mind your make-up, you'd better make your mind up. 
(F. Zappa) 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Why study intrahousehold allocation of resources? 
For a long time microeconomic theory has considered the household as synonymous with the 
individual. In models of household behaviour the family was treated as a homogeneous unit, 
and no attention was paid to the division of household resources between members. However, 
over the past decades a growing body of literature has begun to question whether resources 
within households are distributed equally over various members. 
Research into the intrahousehold allocation of resources concerns the question of how 
commodities are allocated between different members of the same household. Various studies 
have demonstrated the weakness of the assumption of an equal intrahousehold distribution, 
presenting evidence on intrahousehold, sex- and age-biased differences in food consumption, 
undernutrition, and mortality, and in the distribution of resources such as health care, money 
and time. Most studies in the literature on intrahousehold allocation concentrate on the 
assessment of intrahousehold inequality in developing countries, and its possible implications 
for foreign aid programmes. Haddad and Kanbur (1990) show, using calorie adequacy ratios 
as a measure of individual well-being, that ignoring intrahousehold inequality could lead to 
errors of about 30 per cent or more in assessing levels of inequality and poverty in the rural 
Philippines. In most of these countries, the position of women and girls is of particular 
concern. Using a rural south Indian sample, Behrman and Deolalikar (1990) find that the 
nutritional burden of rising food prices falls disproportionately on female household members. 
Senauer, Garcia and Jacinto (1988) conclude that girls in the rural Philippines receive a 
significantly smaller relative calorie allocation than boys. Their empirical results also show 
that the relative calorie allocation to children decreases with a rise in their father's wage, in 
contrast with the significantly positive effect of the mother's wage rate. Another link with 
income under each parent's control is presented by Thomas (1990), who finds that in Brazil 
unearned income in hands of the mother has an (about) twenty times bigger effect on child 
survival probabilities than income attributed to the father. 
In literature, two possible explanations for the observed (unequal) resource flows within 
the household are suggested. Firstly, inequality may result from discrimination, for instance 
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if parents prefer one child to the other. Thomas (1990) finds some evidence that mothers 
prefer to devote resources to daughters and fathers to sons. Secondly, inequality may be 
caused by efficiency considerations. Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) conclude that the 
allocation of resources to rural Indian children responds to changes in their expected earnings 
opportunities as adults. Better economic opportunities for girls increase the share of family 
resources allocated to them. A similar conclusion, based on data from Bangladesh, is found 
in Pitt, Rosenzweig and Hassan (1990). However, they suggest that the higher participation 
of men in energy-intensive activities is responsible for the higher level of calorie consumption 
by adult men compared to adult women. Consequently, they claim that possible benefits of 
better labour-force opportunities for women will be tempered by the increased level of 
energy-intensive activity associated with the greater calorie consumption. 
While empirical studies on intrahousehold allocation in developing countries mainly 
concentrate on calorie consumption and survival probabilities of various household members, 
for developed nations evidence of intrahousehold inequality is principally found in the division 
of labour and economic responsibilities, and in the distribution of income. For instance, 
Antonides and Hagenaars (1992) use a Dutch dataset to show that the intrafamily distribution 
of welfare depends on perceived resources of the individual members, particularly working 
hours, education and personal income of the wife. Charles and Kerr (1987) is one of the few 
studies that analyze 'who gets what' for a developed country. They find gender and age 
differences in food consumption in Britain. 
The social importance of studying intrahousehold allocation of resources is demonstrated 
by its policy implications, both in developed and developing countries. For instance, in 
developed countries, the debate on whether child benefit should be paid to the mother or to 
the father has basically been about the perceived allocation of intrahousehold resources (e.g. 
Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). And in developing countries, the discussion about supplementary 
feeding programs for specific individuals who are at high nutritional risk, such as children 
and pregnant and lactating women, essentially concentrates on whether or not extra calories 
at the feeding station means fewer calories received by the individual at home. 
While most studies on intrahousehold allocation discuss the measurement of possible 
intrahousehold inequality and its implications for economic policy, others explicitly focus on 
methodological issues, such as identification and testing of models of household decision 
making. In the next section we will discuss the development of microeconomic models of 
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household behaviour, and more specifically the neoclassical versus the bargaining approach 
to analyzing household decision making. Furthermore, in section 1.3 the increased data 
requirements of empirical intrahousehold research are considered, as the specification of more 
advanced models requires more specific information on households to be gathered. 
In this thesis we have chosen to elaborate on various aspects of intrahousehold 
allocation. We investigate possible boy-girl discrimination in the intrahousehold allocation of 
food in Peru, we examine parental preferences for the sex of their children in the 
Netherlands, and we analyze how partners organize and divide household finances in Great 
Britain. The emphasis in these studies is on the empirical implementation of models of 
intrahousehold allocation and related issues; various models will be estimated and various 
types of data will be used. In section 1.4 we briefly discuss the issues addressed in the 
following chapters of this thesis, and how they relate to the present state of affairs in the 
modelling of intrahousehold decision making. 
1.2 The evolution of models of household behaviour 
Most models in microeconomic theory deal with individual consumers making decisions on 
how to allocate their time and money so as to maximize their utility subject to budget 
constraints. The question of what happens in households with two or more individuals trying 
to maximize their utility jointly is not easy to answer. Two aspects of intrahousehold decision 
making deserve attention: 'who decides?', as there may be more than one decision maker, 
and 'who gets what to consume?' (e.g. Engel, Blackwell and Miniard, 1987). 
In the last decades, economists have gradually opened the 'black box' of the household. 
In the first place, with the development of the 'New Home Economies', intrahousehold 
production and consumption were analysed. For instance, attention was paid to time allocation 
patterns of individual household members (Becker, 1965 and 1981; Gronau, 1973 and 1977), 
human capital investments of individuals in the family (Mincer and Polachek, 1974), theories 
of marriage using individual utilities (Becker, 1973 and 1974), and the demand for 'quality' 
and 'quantity' of children in combination with the labour supply of wives (Willis, 1974). Still, 
in all these studies the household is considered as a unique decision unit: household members' 
resources are pooled, all commodities, either produced within the household or purchased in 
the marketplace, are jointly consumed, and a joint household utility function is maximized. 
This approach is often referred to as the 'neoclassical' model, the 'common preference' 
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model, or simply the 'household utility function' model. 
Samuelson (1956) is one of the first studies that elaborate on the existence of a common 
household utility function. He specifies the household's utility function as a social welfare 
function, having the utility functions of all individual members as its arguments. He shows 
that under certain conditions this social welfare function has the same properties as an 
individual utility function. Several years later, Becker (1974 and 1981) states that a household 
can be treated as a single utility maximizing unit if one altruistic individual controls the 
distribution of resources within the household (a benevolent dictator). 
An alternative approach was suggested by Manser and Brown (1980) and by McElroy 
and Homey (1981). They model intrahousehold allocation of resources within a bargaining 
framework. The bargaining approach explicitly considers the individual household members 
and their possibly heterogeneous preferences. Gains to being part of a household exist if 
individuals can attain higher welfare levels within a household than remaining single. The 
welfare level that is finally realized by the household depends on the behaviour of the 
individual members. Some researchers assume non-cooperative behaviour between partners, 
while others state that household members are likely to behave cooperatively. A crucial 
assumption of non-cooperative games is that the players are unable to make binding 
agreements. In a household environment this may raise some questions, as gains to being part 
of a household normally require some kind of cooperative behaviour. The main problem of 
non-cooperative games is that the resulting equilibrium points are generally not Pareto 
optimal, so both partners can gain by making agreements. For this reason, Manser and Brown 
(1980) argue that a cooperative game approach seems more appropriate. 
Cooperative games yield Pareto-optimal outcomes and provide an internal distribution 
which depends on the bargaining power of the household members. The game is described 
by the set of all feasible payoffs to members and by the outcome in case of disagreement, the 
so-called threat point. As the player who would loose more in case of disagreement is more 
likely to make concessions, disagreement can be used as a 'threat' in the bargaining process 
in order to gain the most favourable distribution. It is not totally clear which outcome should 
be used as a threat point. McElroy and Homey (1981) define the threat point as the utility 
vector resulting if both partners would be single. Others suggest to use a non-cooperative 
equilibrium within marriage as a threat point (e.g. Lundberg and Pollak, 1993; Kooreman and 
Kapteyn, 1990). 
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A number of studies have concentrated on testing the cooperative game theoretic model 
against the neoclassical model. Manser and Brown (1980) remark that Becker's altruist model 
is actually a bargaining game, with a very restrictive bargaining rule: the household members 
all agree on the fact that only the altruist's utility function is maximized. McElroy (1990) 
mentions two issues that separate neoclassical from cooperative bargaining models. The first 
is the treatment of income; while in neoclassical models only pooled household income 
matters, in the bargaining framework the question who has control over the various income 
sources is important. Consequently, some studies have suggested to use the equality of 
coefficients of non-labour income of both spouses as a test on the neoclassical model (Horney 
and McElroy, 1988; Thomas, 1990; Schultz, 1990). The second issue is the opportunity cost 
of cooperation, which is equal to the utility a member can achieve behaving non-
cooperatively. This so-called threat point matters for the intrahousehold distribution of 
resources and therefore for the household demands in the bargaining model; in the 
neoclassical model it does not matter. McElroy (1990) mentions several variables that may 
shift the threat points in the bargaining model, such as competitiveness in the marriage 
market, parents' wealth, and tax changes due to leaving the household, and may help to 
discrirninate between the neoclassical and the cooperative game theoretic model. Kapteyn and 
Kooreman (1992) discuss the various tests applied in literature to distinguish between both 
models. They conclude that the models are empirically indistinguishable from each other as 
long as one only uses data on household consumption, household non-labour income, and 
wages and hours worked by family members. Extra information on both players' preferences 
is needed to discriminate between both models. The possibilities of using subjective 
information, in particular about both spouses' desired labour supply, are explored in 
Kooreman and Kapteyn (1990). 
1.3 Data requirements 
The evolution of the models used to analyze household decision making also had its 
consequences for the data requirements in empirical household research. Naturally, as long 
as households were viewed as homogeneous decision and consumption units, available data 
on the household level were sufficient. Only when researchers started to investigate 
intrahousehold issues, the gathering of data on consumption of individual family members 
became important. Several years later, the introduction of bargaining models of household 
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decision making required even more detailed information on households, for instance on the 
resources under each partner's control, and on the preferences of individual members. 
A serious problem of empirical research into intrahousehold allocation is, that many of 
the available sets of data only report expenditure and consumption at the household level and 
not how these expenditures are allocated to the individual members. Moreover, it will always 
remain difficult to observe who gets what in the household, because a number of goods and 
services are consumed jointly. Some empirical studies on intrahousehold allocation have 
concentrated on individual time use data (Becker, 1965; Gronau, 1977) and on expenditures 
on goods that can be ascribed to certain members in the household, for instance 'adult goods' 
like alcohol and tobacco (Deaton, 1989; Gronau, 1991). Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) use 
sex-specific child survival data to investigate the allocation of (unobserved) household 
resources between children. Others have used individual food consumption data, collected by 
24-hour recalls by the mother (Haddad and Kanbur, 1990) or by using a food-weighing 
method (Senauer et al., 1988). Data on food consumption are also used in combination with 
anthropometric measures of the nutritional status of individual household members, such as 
weight conditional on height and height conditional on age (Pitt et al., 1990). In other studies, 
however, the lack of information at the individual level leads to identification problems; see 
Kooreman and Kapteyn (1990) for a discussion. 
In addition to the distinction between household and individual level data, another 
dichotomy in information on intrahousehold allocation is discussed by Smith (1991). He states 
that 'empirical evidence on the extent to which the household can be regarded as a single unit 
may be obtained from two sources. "Process evidence" relates to the way in which 
households make decisions, and describes the processes or transactions between household 
members. "Outcome evidence" is concerned with the effects that different underlying 
processes or behavioural patterns within the household might be expected to have on 
observable outcomes (expenditures, labour supply decisions, etc.) and tries to infer from the 
observed outcomes the nature of the intrahousehold processes which generated them.' 
Although process information may provide more specific information on each of the 
members' roles in the household, most economic studies of intrahousehold allocation are 
based on outcome evidence. An application of process evidence is a study by Pahl (1989), 
who describes various systems used by couples in managing individual and family 
expenditures. 
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1.4 Issues addressed in this thesis 
As may have become clear from the previous sections, the research field of intrahousehold 
allocation of resources covers a whole range of research topics. In this thesis we have chosen 
to elaborate on various aspects of modelling intrahousehold allocation and related issues. The 
emphasis will be on the empirical estimation and testing of models. As the various issues 
studied require specific data, we have used three datasets from three different countries, Peru, 
the Netherlands, and Great Britain. Therefore, the results presented in the various chapters 
and their possible policy implications should be interpreted taking the social and cultural 
background of the country involved into account. 
We will briefly summarize the topics addressed in the following chapters, and indicate 
how they relate to the present state of affairs in the modelling of intrahousehold decision 
making. In chapter 2, intrahousehold allocation to children is discussed, and particularly 
allocation of foods. For our study we use a dataset of Peru, which contains household 
expenditures on 30 different food categories. A difficulty with this dataset is that it only 
reports household expenditures and not how these expenditures are allocated to the individuals 
in the household. However, following a procedure set forth in Deaton (1989) the data can 
nevertheless be used to investigate the effect of the presence of children on household 
expenditures, and in particular the question 'do boys have a different effect than girls?'. 
Central in this procedure are expenditures on goods that are not consumed by children, so-
called 'adult goods'. 
In the chapters 3 and 4 we investigate if parents have a preference for the sex of their 
children, by studying fertility behaviour of couples. Sex preferences and intrahousehold 
allocation are logically connected with each other, since the existence of parental sex 
preferences could provide an explanation for boy-girl differences in the allocation of goods 
within households (e.g. Chen, Huq and D'Souza, 1981; Kishor, 1993). Moreover, if sex 
preferences affect family size, they partly determine the number of persons over which the 
household's resources have to be shared. In spite of the varied and extensive literature on the 
effects of sex preferences on fertility behaviour of couples, there is still a lot to improve on 
current methods. We will discuss several methods of testing for sex preferences, using 
various types of information, and apply them to a Dutch data set. Chapter 3 presents an 
adapted version of the Parity Progression Ratio (PPR) method, reduced form Probit and 2SLS 
equations of the decision to have a sterilization, and a hazard analysis of birth intervals. By 
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including various dummy variables representing the sex composition of the household we test 
for various kind of sex preferences. Next, in chapter 4, a structural model of parental 
preferences for the number and sex of their children is formulated and estimated. 
Chapters 5 and 6 present a study of how couples manage individual and family 
expenditures. Information on how partners organize household money is an example of what 
Smith (1991) called "process evidence" of household decision making. It may give us some 
insight in each of the members' roles in the household, and the extent to which the household 
can be regarded as a single unit. To investigate this, we use the typology of household 
financial management systems introduced by Pahl (1989). The systems differ in how authority 
over household money is divided between partners, varying from totally separate to joint 
spheres of decision making. For our study we use data from the British Household Panel 
Survey. In chapter 5 we first discuss respondents' reports on how household finances are 
organized, and how Pahl's management systems are linked to other parts of household 
financial decision making. Moreover, as most questions are answered by both partners 
separately, we address the problem of non-corresponding partners' answers. In chapter 6, we 
then concentrate on theoretical models that can explain the type of financial management used 
by households. On the one hand, we formulate a (neoclassical) household production model, 
in which the type of financial management results from efficiency considerations. On the 
other hand, we present a bargaining model of household decision making, in which the 
financial management reflects the relative bargaining positions of both partners. The different 
effects various socio-economic variables should theoretically have in both models enable us 
to test the models empirically, and help us to interprète the various systems of financial 
management in households. 
In chapter 7 the results presented in this thesis are summarized and evaluated. 
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2 Inter- and intra-household allocation of food: 
a case study of Peru 
2.1 Introduction 
While analyzing consumption patterns across households has been the central theme of 
demand analysis for many decades, it is the allocation of expenditures within the household 
that has recently received a considerable amount of interest. Especially for food, obtaining 
insight into intrahousehold allocation is not only of academic, but also of social importance. 
For example, there is some evidence that an inappropriate allocation of food within the 
household may exacerbate the effect of an inadequate household food supply on certain 
household members. For South Asia evidence has been found that boys tend to be favoured 
over girls in the intrahousehold distribution of nutrients: e.g. Senauer, Garcia, and Jacinto 
(1988) for the Philippines, Behrman and Deolalikar (1990) for India, and Chen, Huq, and 
D'Souza (1981) for Bangladesh. Thomas (1990) finds evidence for gender bias in Brazil, in 
the sense that mothers prefer to devote resources to daughters and fathers to sons. For a more 
extensive survey of examples see Behrman (1990). 
Efforts to investigate intrahousehold allocation of resources encounter the difficulty that 
most of the available sets of data only report household expenditures and not how these 
expenditures are allocated to the individuals in the household. Moreover, it will always be 
extremely difficult to observe who gets what in the household, both because direct obser-
vation is likely to affect the behaviour of the observed household, and because a number of 
goods and services are consumed jointly. However, applying certain methods even household 
level data can inform us on the intrahousehold allocation. Deaton (1989) presents a procedure 
to investigate boy-girl discrimination based on household-level expenditure data. Starting point 
are expenditures on goods that are not consumed by children, so-called 'adult goods'. The 
presence of children will only have a negative 'income' effect on the expenses on these 
goods. If, for example, an additional boy induces a larger decrease in expenditures on adult 
goods than an additional girl, this could point at discrimination against girls. 
In the present chapter, we investigate the allocation of food expenditures over various 
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food categories. In particular, we want to study the effects of household characteristics like 
demographic composition, education, age, and type of residence on expenditures on various 
food categories. We use a dataset of Peru, which contains household expenditures on 30 
different food categories during a certain number of days between July 1985 and July 1986. 
To investigate the effect of the presence of children on household expenditures, and in par-
ticular the question 'do boys have a different effect than girls', we follow the procedure set 
forth in Deaton (1989). 
Although our paper is similar in spirit to the one by Deaton, it is at the same time 
different in a number of respects. First of all, we explicitly deal with a distinguishing 
characteristic of detailed expenditure data, which is that a large number of households make 
no purchases at all in certain categories. It is well-known that in case of a substantial 
proportion of zero expenditures applying OLS to all observations, as in Deaton (1989), 
generally yields biased and inconsistent estimates. We therefore use censored regression 
methods. Secondly, we want to allow for sufficient flexibility of the demand system. Most 
popular models of demand are of rank two, i.e. have expenditure share Engel curves that are 
linear in the logarithm of total expenditure. In recent years, however, a number of empirical 
studies have suggested that a more flexible specification for expenditures is required (see e.g. 
Banks et al., 1992). This permits a good to be a necessity at some expenditure levels and a 
luxury or inferior good at others. In our expenditure share equations we include a quadratic 
logarithmic expenditure term, which allows for a rank three Engel curve. In the third place, 
the present paper focuses on the allocation of food conditional on a predetermined food 
budget. Although this requires a separability assumption, it allows us to take a much more 
detailed look at food allocation and to distinguish a much larger number of food categories 
than is usually done in demand analysis. 
In the following section, we discuss the data. In the third section, we briefly describe 
our method of analysis. The main empirical results are presented in section four. And finally, 
in the fifth section, we give a summary of our conclusions. 
2.2 Data: the Peruvian Living Standards Survey 
The data used in this study are drawn from the 1985 Peruvian Living Standards Survey 
(PLSS). This survey provides detailed s^cio-economic information on over 5,000 households 
and 27,000 individuals. 
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For our analysis we used the section of the PLSS concerning food expert ' : v_h household 
has reported its expenditures on or the value of self-supply of 30 different food categories, 
e.g. rice, flour, meats, fruits, vegetables, etcetera. From these expenditures we derived for 
each household the shares of the various food categories in total food expenditures of the 
household, which were used to estimate an expenditure share system. For the estimations we 
used 4794 observations of the PLSS. 
Table 2.1: Household food expenditures 
Food Category percentage of mean share 
observations of category 
> 0 
1. Rice 85.6 0.093 
2. Corn, Maize 34.4 0.016 
3. Wheat 37.2 0.016 
4. Barley 14.0 0.006 
5. Quinua 19.3 0.005 
6. Bread 91.7 0.095 
7. Cookies, cakes, etc. 38.8 0.011 
8. Noodles 81.0 0.067 
9. Red meats 55.4 0.077 
10. Poultry meats 46.8 0.045 
11. Meat's by-products 16.4 0.005 
12. Fish and sea food 60.7 0.037 
13. Milk 55.3 0.042 
14. Yogourt, butter, cheese, etc. 48.0 0.016 
15. Eggs 52.8 0.018 
16. Oils, margarine, etc. 86.6 0.079 
17. Seasonings 83.9 0.026 
18. Tubercles & roots 68.8 0.050 
19. Dried vegetables 48.8 0.021 
20. Fresh vegetables 77.7 0.051 
21. Fresh fruits 70.3 0.041 
22. Frozen, canned vegetables 1.0 0.000 
23. Frozen, dried, canned fruits 6.7 0.002 
24. Sugar 90.8 0.062 
25. Coffee, tea, cacao, herbs 68.4 0.023 
26. Candies, honey, etc. 28.2 0.007 
27. Ready to serve food 17.1 0.016 
28. Alcoholic beverages 26.0 0.035 
29. Soft drinks 45.6 0.018 
30. Other food 58.3 0.022 
Table 2.1 presents for each food category the percentage of households reporting expenditures 
on that category, and the average share of the category in total food expenditures. As can be 
seen, on 8 categories expenditures were reported by less than 30 percent of the households, 
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two of which even by less than 7 percent. Appendix 2A reports some sample statistics of the 
explanatory variables used in our estimations. 
It should be noted that Peru is in various respects a very heterogeneous country. Social 
inequality becomes visible in the numerous economic, political, social and cultural patterns 
in Peru, which are deeply rooted in the historical and geographic dimensions of the country. 
According to a study by Amat y Leon and Curonisy (1987), consumption patterns in Peru can 
differ considerably, according to type of residence and social status. Habit and tradition on 
the one hand, and level of income and type of occupation on the other are important factors 
that influence patterns of expenditures and demand. Therefore, studies into these patterns 
should take these variations and differences between the various regions into account. Other 
factors that can influence consumption of households, according to Amat y Leon and 
Curonisy, are household size and composition with respect to age and sex, and education. 
2.3 Methodology 
For our analysis we used the following specification: 
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where w, is the share of food category i in total food expenditures of the household, x is total 
household food expenditure per day, n is the number of household members, z is a vector of 
other household characteristics, and ut is an error term. The variables which denote the 
number of children in a certain age and sex category, characterize the demographic 
composition of the household. Ten demographic child categories are distinguished: the 
number of boys and girls in each of the five age groups, younger than 1 year, 1-3 years, 4-6 
years, 7-12 years, and 13-17 years. 
By choosing specification (2.1), making W j dependent on food expenditures and not on 
total expenditures or income, we assume that food expenditures are weakly separable from 
other expenditures. This means that the conditional ordering of various food categories in the 
'foods group' is independent of consumption levels outside the 'foods group'. 
We explicitly deal with the problem of the large number of zero records in our data by 
using Tobit censored regressions for estimation. The interpretation of the zero records is a 
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bit complicated, however. On the one hand they can be the result of a household's decision 
not to consume a certain category, but on the other hand they can be caused by the 
occurrence of infrequency of purchase. In the latter case, the category is regularly consumed 
by the household, but is not bought in the period covered by the survey. The same holds, of 
course, also for non-zero records; it is possible that the expenditures recorded in a certain 
period are higher or lower than average expenditures of a household. We expect that the 
longer the period a household has reported its expenditures, the larger the share of 
infrequently purchased food categories will be.1 To investigate this hypothesis we added the 
length of the survey period as an explanatory variable in our share equations. The period over 
which households reported their expenditures varies from 6 to 68 days, but the most frequent 
period length is 15 days. 
The coefficients 6 # give us the effect of a child in category j on household expenditures 
on food category i. An additional child can have a negative income-like effect on the 
consumption of other household members, as adding people means that there is less for each. 
But there will also be a positive substitution-like effect, because the additional children also 
have a demand for food. It is possible, therefore, that we can not find a significant coefficient 
for a certain category, because the 'substitution' effect is compensated by the 'income' effect. 
It can also be that we find equal coefficients for boys and girls, while the separate 'income' 
and 'substitution' components for both sexes differ. So, although the effects of additional 
children on individual consumption can be much larger than the estimated coefficients show, 
we can determine if expenditures on a certain food category are influenced by the presence 
Let p be the probability that on an arbitrary day a household spends some fixed amount x on an 
infrequently purchased food category. Let d denote the number of days of observation of the household, y 0 the 
frequent per day expenditures. Let k be the number of days at which the food category has been purchased. Thus 
k follows a binomial distribution with parameters d and p. Then k.x is the amount purchased of the considered 
food category in d days. The expected budget share of this category after d days of observation is given by: 
E(wn) = E 
Since g(k) is concave, Jensen's inequality implies that: 
= E(g(k)) 
E(g(k)) = E kjc 
d.y0+kjc 
x.E(k) x.p 
d.y0+x.E(k) y0+x.p 
8(E(k)) 
because E(k) = d.p. As g(k) becomes 'less concave' with increasing d, E(g(k)) approaches g(E(k)) if d 
increases. This makes it plausible that Ew„ increases with d. 
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and gender of children. 
However, if a good is consumed by adults only, an additional child will only have a 
negative income-like effect on the consumption of this good. In this case, comparison of the 
coefficients for boys and girls, or dimension-less 7r-ratios as Deaton (1989) calculated, clearly 
shows us if there is any boy-girl discrimination. In the present data set, the only good that 
can safely be assumed to be an adult good is alcoholic beverages. 
2.4 Empirical Results 
For each food category we estimated the share equations as specified in equation (2.1). Some 
variables describing characteristics of the head of the household, like sex, age, and years of 
schooling, were added. Dummy variables for location (department and type of residence) and 
month of interrogation, and interaction terms of sex of the head of the household and the ten 
child categories were also included. And, as already mentioned before, we also added a 
variable for the length of the survey period. 
Appendix 2B reports all the estimation results. For almost all 30 food categories we find 
significant coefficients for the quadratic logarithmic expenditure terms. Most categories 
appear to be luxuries at relatively low expenditure levels and necessities at higher levels. This 
illustrates the importance of allowing for more flexibility in total expenditure, since such a 
pattern is not possible with the traditional Working/Leser Engel curves. The budget 
elasticities can be calculated by: 
e = h + ^Ii . m x + i (2.2) 
To facilitate the interpretation of our estimation results, we have drawn Engel curves for all 
categories. Appendix 2C presents figures for an average household. For these figures we 
calculated q^ by:2 
Please note that q' should be interpreted as a latent utility-maximizing amount of expenditures on food 
category i. If q,* is negative, the observed amount of expenditure q( is zero. 
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with z, n, and n, being the mean values of z, n, and n, respectively in the sample. The range 
of x considered in these figures excludes 0.13 percent of outliers in the right tail of the 
distribution of x. 
According to these figures four categories can be considered as necessary goods at low 
values of x: 'Rice', 'Bread', 'Oils, margarine, etc.', and 'Sugar'. The first three of these 
become inferior goods for higher expenditure levels. Some categories appear to be luxuries 
over the whole range of x: 'Red meats', 'Fish and sea food', 'Yogourt, cheese, etc.', 'Eggs', 
'Seasonings', 'Fresh fruits' and 'Soft drinks'. Others show to be luxuries at lower total 
expenditure levels, and become necessary or even inferior goods at higher expenditure levels: 
'Noodles', 'Poultry meats', 'Milk', 'Tubercles & roots', 'Dried vegetables', 'Fresh 
vegetables' and 'Coffee, tea, cacao, herbs'. Yet another group of categories, 'Corn, maize', 
'Cookies, cakes, etc.', 'Candies, etc.', 'Alcoholic beverages', and 'Other food', are luxury 
goods showing positive expenditures only for higher values of total expenditure. Seven 
categories show negative expenditures for all total expenditure levels; these are apparently not 
consumed by an average household. 
The coefficient of the period length is significantly positive for half the number of categories, 
and significantly negative for only three categories, namely 'Bread', 'Oils', and 'Sugar'. It 
is striking that these three categories are all considered as necessary or inferior goods. This 
indicates that luxury goods are bought less frequently than necessary and inferior goods. 
The age of the head of the household has hardly any impact on expenditures Education, 
however, shows a significant coefficient for most categories. Households with a more 
educated head spend more on 'Bread', 'Cookies, etc.', meats, milk and milk products, eggs, 
fruits, 'Candies, etc.', and 'Soft drinks'. It should be noted, however, that to the extent that 
education acts as a proxy for total household income, these results may simply reflect that 
these categories are luxuries. 
The sex of the household head also seems to influence household food expenditures. 
Female heads of household cause their households to spend more on 'Wheat', 'Meats', 
'Eggs', 'Seasonings', 'Tubercles and roots', and 'Vegetables', but less on 'Alcohol', 'Soft 
drinks' and 'Other food categories'. 
In rural areas, more is spent on 'Rice', 'Noodles', 'Oils', 'Seasonings', 'Sugar', and 
'Alcohol'. This is probably caused by the worse economic situation of rural households, and 
by some food categories being less available in remote rural villages. 
The various child categories show to have an effect on some food expenditures. The 
coefficients differ in all cases for boys and girls, except for the category 'Milk', where the 
two youngest age categories of both sexes have a positive effect. Also the interaction terms 
of the child categories with female household heads are significant for a number of categories, 
and of different size for boys and girls. To see whether these differences between boys and 
girls are significant, we have performed a Likelihood Ratio test. For only two food 
categories, namely 'Meat's by-products' and 'Candies', we find significant differences 
between the effects of boys and girls3. As explained before, the interpretation of the 
differences is a bit complicated in the case of non-adult goods. For example, for the category 
'Candies' we find a positive coefficient for girls of four to six years old, and a negative 
coefficient for boys under one as well as for boys older than twelve years. We could conclude 
from this that girls are given more candies than boys (which would mean discrimination of 
boys), but we could also conclude that parents are more prepared to economize on their own 
candy consumption for sons than for daughters, e.g. to be able to buy other foods or goods 
for their sons and daughters (which would mean discrimination of girls). 
For the only adult good, 'Alcoholic beverages', we find no significant differences 
between the effects of boys and girls on consumption. The result remains unchanged if we 
take all five child-age categories together. The coefficients for both boys and girls have the 
expected negative sign in this case, while their joint effect is significantly different from zero, 
as expected. Thus we conclude that the present data do not show any evidence of boy-girl 
discrimination. 
2.5 Conclusions 
In this paper we investigated the allocation of food expenditures over various food categories. 
One of our goals was to examine the impact of additional children of different sex and age 
3 Value of LR: 19.76 (cat 11) and 19.63 (cat 26) 
Value of 5.99 (a=0.10) or 18.31 (a=0.05) 
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groups on food expenditures. It appears that for the only adult-good in our data set, alcoholic 
beverages, the effect of boys on expenditures is not significantly different from the effect of 
girls. This implies that the present data show no evidence of boy-girl discrimination. 
Another purpose of our research was to investigate a more flexible specification for 
food expenditures than the traditional Working/Leser curves, by including a quadratic 
logarithmic expenditure term. This term appears to be significant for all but five food 
categories. At higher total food expenditure levels much more categories are considered 
necessary or inferior goods than at lower expenditure levels, a pattern that is excluded a 
priori when the traditional Working-Leser Engel curves are used. 
The department in which the household lives and the month in which it is interrogated 
significantly affect the budget shares of almost all categories. This points at a varying 
availability of the different food categories over regions and seasons. 
17 
18 
Appendix 2A: Variables used in regressions 
Definition of variables used in regressions 
Variable name: Definition: 
lnscatpd logarithm of total household food expenditures per day 
lnscatsq (lnscatpd)2 
daysbtw number of days over which household reported expenditures 
Inhhsize logarithm of number of household members 
agehhhyr age of head of household 
agehhhsq (agehhhyr)2 
yrschhh years of schooling of head of household 
resid type of residence (1 = rural, 0=urban) 
femhhh sex of head of household (1 =female, 0=male) 
chldctf 1 number of female children of 0 years old 
chldctf2 number of female children between 1 and 3 years old 
chldctfi number of female children between 4 and 6 years old 
chldctf4 number of female children between 7 and 12 years old 
chldctf5 number of female children between 13 and 17 years old 
chldctml number of male children of 0 years old 
chldctm2 number of male children between 1 and 3 years old 
chldctm3 number of male children between 4 and 6 years old 
chldctm4 number of male childrenbetween 7 and 12 years old 
chldctm5 number of male children between 13 and 17 years old 
fhchf 1,..., fhchf5 femhhh * chldctf 1,..., femhhh * chldctf5 
fhchml,..., fhchm5 femhhh * chldctml femhhh * chldctm5 
Appendix 2A, continued 
Table 2A1: Sample statistics of explanatory variables 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
lnscatpd 3.062 1.128 -2.639 6.533 
daysbtw 15.449 2.933 6 68 
lnhhsize 1.498 0.580 0 3.178 
agehhhyr 47.361 14.472 14 99 
yrschhh 5.399 4.430 0 19 
resid 0.443 0.497 0 1 
femhhh 0.172 0.377 0 1 
chldctfl 0.063 0.247 0 2 
chldctf2 0.201 0.447 0 3 
chldctf3 0.201 0.446 0 3 
chldctf4 0.419 0.680 0 4 
chldctf5 0.311 0.592 0 4 
chldctml 0.069 0.256 0 2 
chldctm2 0.202 0.438 0 3 
chldctm3 0.221 0.460 0 3 
chldctm4 0.443 0.697 0 5 
chldctm5 0.308 0.587 0 4 
fhchfl 0.004 0.064 0 1 
fhchf2 0.021 0.151 0 2 
fhchf3 0.019 0.153 0 3 
fhchf4 0.051 0.264 0 3 
fhchf5 0.047 0.245 0 3 
fhchml 0.006 0.080 0 1 
fhchm2 0.019 0.149 0 2 
fhchm3 0.020 0.151 0 2 
fhchm4 0.052 0.265 0 4 
fhchm3 0.049 0.249 0 2 
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Appendix 2B: Estimation results 
Tabel 2B1: Estimated coefficients for category 1 to 5 (t-values in parentheses) 
Rice Corn, Maize Wheat Barley Quinua 
Constant 
Inscatpd 
lnscatsq 
daysbtw 
lnhhsize 
0.046 ( 1.92) 
0.041 ( 8.30) 
-0.009 (-9.67) 
-0.000 (-1.75) 
0.032 ( 6.42) 
-0.285 (-7.89) 
0.079 ( 7.39) 
-0.005 (-3.12) 
0.002 ( 3.18) 
-0.010 (-1.49) 
-0.349 (-9.97) 
0.084 ( 8.45) 
-0.008 (-5.23) 
0.002 ( 2.99) 
-0.002 (-0.25) 
-0.485 (-7.48) 
0.090 ( 5.74) 
-0.007 (-3.01) 
-0.000 (-0.01) 
-0.022 (-2.48) 
-0.317 (-8.30) 
0.071 ( 6.52) 
-0.006 (-3.89) 
0.001 ( 3.15) 
-0.011 (-2.23) 
agehhhyr 
agehhhsq 
yrschhh 
resid 
femhhh 
-0.000 (-0.79) 
0.000 ( 0.51) 
-0.002 (-4.84) 
0.026 ( 5.71) 
0.008 ( 1.30) 
-0.001 (-0.83) 
0.000 ( 0.55) 
-0.001 (-2.61) 
-0.003 (-0.45) 
0.013 ( 1.64) 
0.001 (1.13) 
-0.000 (-0.86) 
-0.001 (-1.33) 
0.006 ( 1.02) 
0.017 ( 2.22) 
0.003 ( 2.61) 
-0.000 (-2.48) 
-0.003 (-3.64) 
0.011 ( 1.35) 
0.006 ( 0.61) 
0.002 ( 2.20) 
-0.000 (-2.52) 
-0.001 (-1.39) 
-0.023 (-5.13) 
0.004 ( 0.61) 
chldctfl 
chldctf2 
chldctO 
chldctf4 
chldctf5 
0.002 ( 0.34) 
-0.004 (-0.93) 
-0.002 (-0.61) 
0.004 ( 1.73) 
0.001 ( 0.45) 
0.006 ( 0.72) 
-0.000 (-0.03) 
0.006 ( 1.21) 
0.001 ( 0.26) 
0.002 ( 0.52) 
-0.013 (-1.56) 
0.003 ( 0.68) 
0.001 (0.18) 
0.001 (0.20) 
0.002 ( 0.48) 
0.009 ( 0.77) 
-0.002 (-0.27) 
0.011 ( 1.72) 
0.008 ( 1.87) 
-0.009 (-1.62) 
0.010 ( 1.65) 
-0.000 (-0.02) 
-0.002 (-0.45) 
0.001 ( 0.42) 
-0.000 (-0.14) 
chldctml 
chldctm2 
chldctm3 
chldctm4 
chldctmS 
-0.003 (-0.42) 
-0.010 (-2.58) 
0.004 ( 1.10) 
-0.001 (-0.40) 
-0.004 (-1.45) 
0.009 ( 1.13) 
0.003 ( 0.63) 
0.007 ( 1.43) 
-0.005 (-1.47) 
-0.000 (-0.12) 
0.013 ( 1.77) 
0.008 ( 1.75) 
-0.003 (-0.67) 
-0.000 (-0.12) 
0.002 ( 0.64) 
-0.002 (-0.21) 
0.007 ( 1.08) 
0.010 ( 1.53) 
0.001 ( 0.23) 
-0.008 (-1.47) 
0.000 ( 0.07) 
0.003 ( 0.86) 
0.002 ( 0.54) 
-0.002 (-0.91) 
-0.001 (-0.37) 
fhchfl 
fhchf2 
fhchf3 
Ihchf4 
fhchf5 
-0.002 (-0.07) 
-0.002 (-0.21) 
-0.030 (-2.60) 
0.003 ( 0.49) 
-0.002 (-0.24) 
-0.071 (-2.00) 
0.020 ( 1.41) 
-0.002 (-0.17) 
0.001 ( 0.07) 
-0.001 (-0.07) 
-0.027 (-0.79) 
-0.002 (-0.15) 
0.006 ( 0.41) 
-0.003 (-0.34) 
-0.006 (-0.70) 
-0.002 (-0.05) 
0.019 ( 1.01) 
-0.060 (-2.47) 
0.013 ( 1.09) 
0.009 ( 0.67) 
0.020 ( 0.92) 
0.006 ( 0.61) 
0.007 ( 0.68) 
0.002 ( 0.31) 
-0.004 (-0.59) 
fhchml 
fhchm2 
fhchm3 
fhchm4 
fhchm5 
-0.004 (-0.18) 
-0.003 (-0.28) 
-0.023 (-2.01) 
0.005 ( 0.67) 
0.006 ( 0.87) 
0.048 ( 2.05) 
0.005 ( 0.37) 
-0.003 (-0.24) 
-0.007 (-0.78) 
0.002 ( 0.19) 
-0.005 (-0.21) 
0.015 ( 1.10) 
-0.012 (-0.81) 
-0.005 (-0.59) 
-0.014 (-1,56) 
-0.003 (-0.09) 
-0.009 (-0.42) 
0.008 ( 0.43) 
-0.000 (-0.03) 
0.006 ( 0.50) 
0.004 ( 0.20) 
-0.025 (-1.79) 
0.014 ( 1.29) 
-0.001 (-0.22) 
-0.006 (-0.84) 
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Appendix 2B, continued 
Table 2B2: Estimated coefficients for category 6 to 10 (t-values in parentheses) 
Bread Cookies, 
cakes, etc. 
Noodles Red meats Poultry meats 
Constant 
lnscatpd 
lnscatsq 
daysbtw 
lnhhsize 
0.184 ( 8.83) 
-0.016 (-4.16) 
-0.002 (-2.53) 
-0.001 (-3.03) 
0.007 ( 1.56) 
-0.032 ( 2.14) 
0.007 ( 1.92) 
0.001 ( 2.26) 
0.001 (2.43) 
-0.013 (-4.44) 
-0.002 (-0.10) 
0.077 (15.95) 
-0.012(-14.51) 
-0.000 (-0.06) 
0.011 (2.73) 
-0.490(41.58) 
0.208 (12.69) 
-0.018 (-7.33) 
0.004 ( 4.91) 
-0.023 (-3.37) 
-0.395(-10.73) 
0.189 (12.72) 
-0.020 (-9.51) 
0.001 (2.31) 
-0.010 (-1.90) 
agehhhyr 
agehhhsq 
yrschhh 
resid 
femhhh 
-0.001 (-0.98) 
0.000 ( 1.67) 
0.001 ( 2.44) 
-0.032 (-8.22) 
-0.004 (-0.79) 
-0.001 (-1.63) 
0.000 ( 0.55) 
0.001 ( 3.96) 
0.002 ( 0.57) 
-0.006 (-1.48) 
-0.001 (-2.32) 
0.000 ( 2.29) 
-0.002 (-6.74) 
0.033 ( 9.24) 
0.008 ( 1.68) 
0.001 ( 0.74) 
-0.000 (-0.20) 
0.003 ( 4.36) 
-0.029 (-4.81) 
0.017 ( 2.05) 
-0.002 (-2.16) 
0.000 (2.15) 
0.001 ( 2.35) 
-0.048(-10.48) 
0.017 (2.73) 
chldctfl 
chldctf2 
chldctf3 
chldctf4 
chldctf5 
-0.005 (-0.84) 
-0.002 (-0.47) 
0.004 ( 1.11) 
0.002 ( 0.90) 
0.004 ( 1.34) 
0.006 ( 1.61) 
0.003 ( 1.21) 
0.001 ( 0.34) 
-0.001 (-0.37) 
-0.003 (-1.80) 
0.005 ( 0.89) 
0.001 ( 0.36) 
0.000 ( 0.06) 
-0.000 (-0.02) 
0.004 ( 1.86) 
-0.021 (-2.26) 
-0.005 (-0.98) 
0.003 ( 0.61) 
-0.006 (-1.78) 
-0.003 (-0.87) 
-0.013 (-1.91) 
-0.002 (-0.57) 
-0.006 (-1.57) 
0.001 ( 0.20) 
-0.003 (-0.93) 
chldctml 
chldctm2 
chldctm3 
chldctm4 
chldctm5 
0.004 ( 0.76) 
0.003 ( 0.75) 
0.003 ( 0.78) 
0.002 ( 0.99) 
0.010 ( 3.77) 
0.005 ( 1.27) 
0.004 ( 1.48) 
0.001 ( 0.56) 
-0.002 (-1.11) 
-0.002 (-0.99) 
-0.007 (-1.39) 
0.001 ( 0.45) 
0.000 ( 0.09) 
0.001 ( 0.73) 
-0.002 (-0.69) 
-0.012 (-1.39) 
-0.004 (-0.66) 
0.001 ( 0.20) 
0.004 ( 1.06) 
-0.004 (-1.01) 
0.001 (0.14) 
-0.010 (-2.35) 
-0.009 (-2.41) 
-0.002 (-0.64) 
-0.007 (-2.29) 
fhchfl 
fhchf2 
fhchO 
fhchf4 
fhchf5 
0.011 ( 0.53) 
-0.010 (-0.96) 
0.005 ( 0.46) 
-0.007 (-1.11) 
0.004 ( 0.58) 
-0.019 (-1.17) 
0.009 ( 1.24) 
0.006 ( 0.93) 
-0.003 (-0.57) 
0.004 ( 0.99) 
-0.006 (-0.32) 
-0.005 (-0.52) 
-0.008 (-0.85) 
0.001 ( 0.25) 
-0.008 (-1.31) 
0.040 ( 1.19) 
0.011 ( 0.70) 
-0.011 (-0.68) 
0.008 ( 0.84) 
-0.005 (-0.48) 
0.002 ( 0.09) 
0.003 ( 0.28) 
0.021 ( 1.92) 
-0.013 (-1.79) 
-0.011 (-1.48) 
flichml 
fhchm2 
fhchm3 
fhchm4 
fhchm5 
0.005 ( 0.30) 
-0.004 (-0.44) 
0.016 ( 1.61) 
0.011 ( 1.76) 
0.004 ( 0.59) 
0.012 ( 1.01) 
0.011 ( 1.58) 
0.014 ( 2.03) 
0.004 ( 1.04) 
-0.002 (-0.42) 
0.007 ( 0.41) 
0.009 ( 1.00) 
-0.016 (-1.71) 
-0.015 (-2.61) 
-0.002 (-0.41) 
-0.013 (-0.48) 
-0.007 (-0.45) 
-0.025 (-1.57) 
-0.011 (-1.10) 
-0.005 (-0.49) 
-0.000 (-0.00) 
0.008 ( 0.66) 
0.020 ( 1.69) 
-0.005 (-0.65) 
-0.004 (-0.50) 
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Table 2B3: Estimated coefficients for category 11 to 15 (t-values in parentheses) 
Meat's by-
products 
Fish and sea 
food 
Milk Yogourt, butter, 
etc. 
Eggs 
Constant 
lnscatpd 
lnscatsq 
daysbtw 
lnhhsize 
-0.402 (-0.21) 
0.010 ( 1.08) 
0.003 ( 2.58) 
0.002 ( 4.80) 
-0.014 (-2.72) 
-0.110 (-5.46) 
0.039 ( 7.85) 
-0.003 (-3.83) 
0.000 ( 1.01) 
0.005 ( 1.19) 
-0.083 (-3.56) 
0.074 ( 9.88) 
-0.008 (-6.87) 
0.001 ( 1.20) 
-0.018 (-4.21) 
-O.050 (-3.24) 
0.009 ( 2.55) 
0.001 ( 1.82) 
0.001 ( 2.78) 
-0.013 (-4.36) 
-O.063 (-5.59) 
0.026 ( 7.94) 
-0.002 (-4.38) 
0.001 ( 3.50) 
-0.008 (-4.07) 
agehhhyr 
agehhhsq 
yrschhh 
resid 
femhhh 
0.001 ( 1.29) 
-O.000 (-1.50) 
0.002 ( 5.19) 
-0.026 (-4.50) 
-0.004 (-0.62) 
0.001 ( 1.92) 
-0.000 (-1.93) 
-0.000 (-0.18) 
-0.007 (-1.96) 
-0.000 (-O.03) 
-0.001 (-2.18) 
0.000 ( 1.93) 
0.003 ( 9.21) 
-0.053(-13.74) 
0.005 ( 0.96) 
-0.000 (-0.76) 
0.000 ( 0.74) 
0.001 ( 5.06) 
-0.024 (-9.06) 
0.006 ( 1.73) 
0.000 ( 0.68) 
-0.000 (-0.86) 
0.001 ( 4.97) 
-O.026(-13.84) 
0.006 ( 2.58) 
chldctfl 
chldctf2 
chldctf3 
chldctf4 
chldctf5 
-0.004 (-0.52) 
-0.014 (-3.25) 
-0.006 (-1.37) 
0.001 ( 0.21) 
-0.001 (-0.46) 
-0.002 (-0.37) 
-0.002 (-0.80) 
-0.006 (-1.84) 
0.001 ( 0.49) 
-0.004 (-1.59) 
0.027 ( 4.83) 
0.010 (3.18) 
-0.002 (-0.63) 
-0.003 (-1.19) 
-0.002 (-0.76) 
-0.004 (-0.86) 
-0.001 (-0.43) 
-0.001 (-0.58) 
0.000 ( 0.30) 
0.002 ( 0.92) 
-0.003 (-0.93) 
0.000 ( 0.16) 
-0.000 (-0.29) 
0.000 ( 0.28) 
-0.001 (-0.44) 
chldctml 
chldctm2 
chldctm3 
chldctm4 
chldctm5 
-0.010 (-1.28) 
0.001 ( 0.25) 
-0.003 (-0.82) 
-O.006 (-2.36) 
-0.001 (-0.44) 
0.001 ( 0.26) 
-0.002 (-0.51) 
-0.003 (-1.05) 
0.003 ( 1.42) 
-0.002 (-0.95) 
0.032 ( 5.90) 
0.011 (3.11) 
0.000 (0.13) 
-0.004 (-1.94) 
-0.001 (-0.45) 
-0.001 (-0.16) 
0.001 (0.21) 
-0.005 (-2.11) 
0.000 (0.17) 
0.001 ( 0.62) 
0.002 ( 0.82) 
-0.001 (-0.42) 
-0.003 (-1.83) 
0.001 ( 0.62) 
-0.001 (-0.71) 
fhchfl 
fhchf2 
fhchfl 
fhchf4 
fhchf5 
-0.030 (-0.74) 
0.020 ( 1.52) 
0.005 ( 0.39) 
0.004 ( 0.45) 
-0.001 (-0.14) 
-0.016 (-0.82) 
-0.001 (-0.07) 
-0.002 (-0.19) 
-0.002 (-0.41) 
0.005 ( 0.80) 
0.045 ( 2.22) 
0.004 ( 0.41) 
-0.008 (-0.81) 
-0.007 (-1.18) 
0.002 ( 0.32) 
0.013 ( 0.89) 
-0.015 (-1.96) 
0.002 ( 0.35) 
-0.002 (-0.57) 
0.001 (0.16) 
0.023 ( 2.29) 
-0.001 (-0.21) 
-0.003 (-0.51) 
-0.004 (-1.41) 
0.003 ( 1.04) 
fhchml 
fhchm2 
fhchm3 
fhchm4 
fhchm5 
0.045 ( 2.11) 
-0.011 (-0.73) 
-0.009 (-0.56) 
-0.004 (-0.42) 
-0.023 (-2.35) 
-0.010 (-0.63) 
0.005 ( 0.56) 
-0.008 (-0.89) 
0.004 ( 0.64) 
0.002 ( 0.34) 
0.006 ( 0.34) 
0.021 ( 2.06) 
0.007 ( 0.69) 
-0.001 (-0.18) 
-0.004 (-0.62) 
0.001 ( 0.07) 
-0.010 (-1.33) 
0.011 ( 1.63) 
-0.004 (-0.85) 
-0.003 (-0.61) 
-0.010 (-1.12) 
-0.005 ( 1.11) 
-O.001 (-0.19) 
-0.001 (-0.22) 
-0.001 (-0.29) 
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Table 2B4: Estimated coefficients for category 16 to 20 (t-values in parentheses) 
Oils, margari-
ne, etc. 
Seasonings Tubercles & 
roots 
Dried vegeta-
bles 
Fresh vegeta-
bles 
Constant 
lnscatpd 
Inscatsq 
daysbtw 
lnhhsize 
0.099 ( 4.37) 
0.002 ( 0.36) 
-0.004 (-4.56) 
-0.002 (-3.02) 
0.015 ( 3.26) 
0.067 ( 6.05) 
-0.037C-17.89) 
0.006 (15.65) 
-0.000 (-1.62) 
0.010 ( 4.42) 
-0.037 (-1.76) 
0.071 (12.54) 
-0.008 (-8.45) 
0.001 ( 1.97) 
-0.009 (-2.20) 
-0.167 (-8.66) 
0.089 (12.07) 
-0.009 (-8.58) 
0.001 ( 1.68) 
0.007 ( 2.11) 
-0.035 (-2.57) 
0.033 (10.05) 
-0.004 (-6.36) 
-0.001 (-1.75) 
0.010 ( 3.69) 
agehhhyr 
agehhhsq 
yrschhh 
resid 
femhhh 
0.001 ( 1.94) 
-0.000 (-1.57) 
-0.001 (-2.13) 
0.035 ( 8.25) 
-0.002 (-0.37) 
-0.000 (-0.01) 
-0.000 (-0.56) 
-0.001 (-3.22) 
0.010 ( 4.51) 
0.006 ( 2.03) 
-0.000 (-0.37) 
0.000 ( 0.60) 
-0.002 (-6.14) 
-0.034 (-9.13) 
0.011 (2.08) 
0.000 ( 0.32) 
-0.000 (-0.35) 
-0.000 (-0.77) 
-0.008 (-2.67) 
0.004 ( 1.05) 
0.000 (0.12) 
0.000 (0.15) 
0.000 ( 0.87) 
-0.015 (-6.17) 
0.006 ( 1.91) 
chldctfl 
chldctf2 
chldctf3 
chldctf4 
chldctfS 
-0.000 (-0.03) 
-0.003 (-0.93) 
-0.001 (-0.33) 
-0.001 (-0.25) 
-0.004 (-1.53) 
-0.005 (-1.67) 
-0.000 (-0.24) 
0.000 ( 0.14) 
-0.002 (-1.93) 
0.000 ( 0.21) 
0.007 ( 1.27) 
0.005 ( 1.58) 
0.001 ( 0.24) 
0.001 ( 0.46) 
0.003 ( 1.14) 
-0.007 (-1.66) 
-0.001 (-0.28) 
0.000 ( 0.01) 
-0.000 (-0.29) 
-0.001 (-0.42) 
-0.003 (-0.79) 
0.001 (0.41) 
-0.004 (-1.83) 
-0.002 (-1.66) 
-0.003 (-1.84) 
chldctml 
chldctm2 
chldctm3 
chldctm4 
chldctm5 
-0.013 (-2.07) 
-0.001 (-0.17) 
-0.001 (-0.32) 
-0.001 (-0.22) 
-0.005 (-1.59) 
-0.003 (-0.98) 
-0.003 (-1.15) 
-0.003 (-1.82) 
-0.002 (-1.66) 
-0.001 ( 0.94) 
-0.001 (-0.16) 
0.006 ( 1.86) 
0.003 ( 0.97) 
0.002 ( 1.00) 
0.006 ( 2.51) 
-0.002 (-0.52) 
0.001 (0.25) 
-0.002 (-0.97) 
-0.000 (-0.23) 
-0.001 (-0.51) 
-0.003 (-0.88) 
-0.000 (-0.07) 
-0.006 (-2.98) 
-0.000 (-0.31) 
-0.003 (-1.68) 
fhchfl 
fhchf2 
fhchf3 
fhchf4 
fhchf5 
0.014 ( 0.62) 
-0.003 (-0.29) 
0.006 ( 0.57) 
-0.002 (-0.31) 
0.009 ( 1.25) 
-0.001 (-0.05) 
0.003 ( 0.62) 
-0.003 (-0.57) 
-0.006 (-1.88) 
-0.002 (-0.56) 
-0.014 (-0.67) 
-0.001 (-0.09) 
0.012 ( 1.25) 
-0.006 (-0.94) 
-0.010 (-1.55) 
-0.005 (-0.31) 
0.003 ( 0.43) 
-0.005 (-0.67) 
0.003 ( 0.63) 
-0.004 (-0.80) 
-0.000 (-0.01) 
0.003 ( 0.48) 
-0.005 (-0.74) 
-0.001 (-0.24) 
0.004 ( 1.08) 
fhchml 
fhchm2 
fhchm3 
fhchm4 
fhchm5 
-0.018 (-0.92) 
-0.018 (-1.64) 
-0.002 (-0.18) 
-0.007 (-1.10) 
0.002 ( 0.24) 
-0.005 (-0.52) 
0.005 ( 0.94) 
0.006 ( 1.14) 
-0.004 (-1.22) 
-0.001 (-0.41) 
-0.027 (-1.53) 
-0.006 (-0.59) 
-0.002 (-0.17) 
0.004 ( 0.69) 
-0.005 (-0.77) 
-0.016 (-1.23) 
-0.005 (-0.70) 
-0.000 (-0.06) 
-0.003 (-0.60) 
-0.003 (-0.66) 
-0.025 (-2.09) 
-0.003 (-0.39) 
0.003 ( 0.48) 
-0.002 (-0.49) 
0.000 (0.11) 
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Table 2B5: Estimated coefficients for category 21 to 25 (t-values in parentheses) 
Fresh fruits Frozen, canned 
vegetables 
Frozen, dried, 
canned fruits 
Sugar Coffee, tea, 
cacao, herbs 
Constant 
lnscatpd 
lnscatsq 
daysbtw 
lnhhsize 
-0.070 (-4.24) 
0.009 ( 2.65) 
0.001 ( 0.83) 
0.001 (3.11) 
-0.007 (-2.18) 
-0.510 (-0.23) 
0.047 ( 1.15) 
-O.000 (-O.02) 
0.003 ( 2.99) 
0.039 (2.08) 
-0.405 (-0.28) 
0.054 ( 2.90) 
-0.002 (-0.88) 
0.002 ( 4.47) 
-0.014 (-2.74) 
0.133 (7.67) 
-0.054(-17.05) 
0.004 ( 7.09) 
-0.001 (-2.58) 
0.016 ( 4.53) 
-O.014 (-1.22) 
0.024 ( 8.53) 
-0.003 (-6.43) 
0.001 ( 2.71) 
-0.005 (-2.21) 
agehhhyr 
agehhhsq 
yrschhb 
resid 
femhhh 
0.001 ( 1.58) 
-0.000 (-2.20) 
0.002 ( 5.70) 
-0.019 (-6.39) 
-0.000 (-0.07) 
-0.003 (-1.30) 
0.000 ( 0.67) 
0.001 ( 0.66) 
-0.015 (-0.99) 
0.044 ( 2.11) 
-0.000 (-0.64) 
0.000 ( 0.80) 
0.002 ( 4.15) 
0.010 (0.17) 
0.014 (2.25) 
0.001 ( 2.30) 
-0.000 (-2.26) 
-0.001 (-2.45) 
0.014 ( 4.20) 
0.006 ( 1.28) 
-0.000 (-1.55) 
0.000 ( 2.21) 
0.000 ( 0.77) 
-0.007 (-3.26) 
0.001 ( 0.31) 
chldctfl 
chldctf2 
chldctf3 
chldctf4 
chldctf5 
-0.004 (-0.92) 
0.003 ( 1.39) 
-0.002 (-0.87) 
-0.002 (-0.93) 
0.001 ( 0.37) 
0.013 ( 0.82) 
-0.038 (-2.37) 
0.001 ( 0.07) 
-0.017 (-1.88) 
-0.004 (-0.45) 
-0.001 (-0.15) 
0.001 (0.15) 
0.000 ( 0.06) 
-0.007 (-2.29) 
0.000 ( 0.08) 
0.006 ( 1.23) 
-0.000 (-0.13) 
0.004 ( 1.34) 
-0.001 (-0.29) 
-0.000 (-0.12) 
-0.001 (-0.36) 
-0.001 (-0.75) 
-0.001 (-0.33) 
0.000 ( 0.29) 
0.001 ( 0.70) 
chldctml 
chldctm2 
chldctm3 
chldctm4 
chldctm5 
0.001 ( 0.30) 
-0.000 (-0.03) 
0.000 (0.15) 
0.000 ( 0.06) 
-0.005 (-2.36) 
-0.026 (-1.14) 
-0.015 (-1.17) 
-0.018 (-1.47) 
0.001 (0.11) 
-0.012 (-1.24) 
-0.000 (-0.04) 
-0.004 (-0.87) 
0.001 ( 0.21) 
0.003 ( 1.23) 
-0.001 (-0.34) 
-0.005 (-1.16) 
-0.003 (-0.99) 
0.008 ( 2.80) 
-0.001 (-0.55) 
0.001 (0.31) 
0.004 ( 1.26) 
-0.001 (-0.66) 
0.002 ( 1.10) 
-0.000 (-0.19) 
0.001 ( 0.82) 
fhchfl 
fhchf2 
fhchß 
fhchf4 
fhchfS 
-0.010 (-0.63) 
-O.000 (-0.04) 
0.013 ( 1.80) 
-0.000 (-0.08) 
-0.001 (-0.20) 
-0.218 (-0.05) 
0.060 ( 1.59) 
-0.042 (-0.77) 
0.032 ( 1.34) 
-0.060 (-1.47) 
-0.006 (-0.21) 
-0.013 (-0.86) 
-0.018 (-1.07) 
-0.002 (-0.23) 
0.003 ( 0.45) 
-0.031 (-1.73) 
-0.007 (-0.81) 
-0.003 (-0.35) 
0.002 ( 0.36) 
-0.001 (-0.22) 
0.003 ( 0.24) 
0.005 ( 0.90) 
0.004 ( 0.83) 
0.003 ( 0.86) 
-0.000 (-0.11) 
fhchml 
fhchm2 
fhchm3 
fhchm4 
fhchm5 
0.010 ( 0.72) 
0.014 ( 1.88) 
-0.005 (-0.67) 
0.003 ( 0.55) 
0.003 ( 0.68) 
-0.175 (-0.05) 
-0.209 (-0.11) 
-0.014 (-0.36) 
-0.270 (-0.25) 
-0.029 (-0.91) 
-0.163 (-0.07) 
0.009 ( 0.71) 
0.018 ( 1.56) 
-0.009 (-1.14) 
-0.004 (-0.51) 
0.026 ( 1.73) 
-0.008 (-1.01) 
-0.011 (-1.32) 
-0.001 (-0.15) 
-0.007 (-1.24) 
0.007 ( 0.74) 
0.000 ( 0.09) 
-0.004 (-0.78) 
-0.006 (-1.68) 
-O.001 (-0.39) 
25 
Appendix 2B, continued 
Table 2B6: Estimated coefficients for category 26 to 30 (t-values in parentheses) 
Candies, 
honey, etc. 
Ready to serve 
food 
Alcoholic 
beverages 
Soft drinks Other food 
Constant 
Inscatpd 
Inscatsq 
daysbtw 
Inhhsize 
-0.011 (-0.70) 
0.007 ( 1.73) 
0.002 ( 2.32) 
0.001 ( 1.71) 
-0.002 (-0.47) 
-0.408 (-3.84) 
0.028 ( 1.07) 
0.013 ( 3.10) 
0.004 ( 2.44) 
-0.075 (-4.42) 
-0.321 (-4.76) 
0.000 ( 0.03) 
0.010 ( 4.03) 
0.006 ( 4.00) 
-0.022 (-1.58) 
-0.063 (-3.24) 
0.021 ( 4.38) 
-0.000 (-0.01) 
0.000 ( 0.98) 
-0.011 (-3.03) 
0.009 ( 0.51) 
-0.012 (-3.47) 
0.002 ( 3.31) 
-0.000 (-0.12) 
-0.001 (-0.24) 
agehhhyr 
agehhhsq 
yrschhh 
resid 
femhhh 
-0.001 (-2.04) 
0.000 ( 1.51) 
0.001 ( 2.50) 
-0.004 (-1.43) 
-0.002 (-0.56) 
-0.003 (-1.04) 
0.000 ( 0.62) 
-0.001 (-0.40) 
-0.141 (-8.06) 
0.033 ( 1.60) 
-0.001 (-0.79) 
0.000 ( 0.26) 
-0.001 (-0.47) 
0.082 ( 6.41) 
-0.179 (-8.49) 
-0.001 (-1.37) 
0.000 ( 0.42) 
0.001 ( 2.93) 
-0.015 (-4.67) 
-0.013 (-2.70) 
-0.000 (-0.49) 
0.000 ( 0.72) 
-0.001 (-1.57) 
0.004 ( 1.08) 
-0.012 (-2.58) 
chldctfl 
chldctf2 
chldctO 
chldctf4 
chldctf5 
-0.006 (-1.47) 
0.003 ( 1.30) 
0.005 ( 2.09) 
0.001 ( 0.34) 
-0.001 (-0.47) 
-0.002 (-0.08) 
-0.028 (-1.94) 
-0.004 (-0.27) 
0.011 ( 1.18) 
0.004 ( 0.43) 
0.004 ( 0.26) 
-0.000 (-0.04) 
-0.010 (-0.98) 
-0.011 (-1.55) 
-0.001 (-0.07) 
0.004 ( 0.86) 
-0.002 (-0.67) 
-0.003 (-1.14) 
-0.005 (-2.56) 
0.000 ( 0.10) 
0.001 (0.12) 
0.002 ( 0.64) 
-0.000 (-0.08) 
0.001 (0.71) 
-0.000 (-0.02) 
chldctml 
chldctm2 
chldctm3 
chldctm4 
chldctm5 
-0.012 (-2.69) 
0.000 (0.10) 
0.002 ( 0.73) 
0.003 ( 1.66) 
-0.007 (-3.39) 
0.013 ( 0.53) 
0.008 ( 0.56) 
-0.002 (-0.18) 
-0.003 (-0.33) 
0.000 ( 0.04) 
0.016 ( 0.99) 
-0.009 (-0.87) 
0.007 ( 0.71) 
-0.006 (-0.92) 
-0.008 (-1.00) 
-0.003 (-0.53) 
-0.003 (-0.98) 
-0.006 (-2.23) 
-0.003 (-1.50) 
0.002 ( 1.01) 
-0.001 (-0.28) 
-0.000 (-0.16) 
0.000 ( 0.03) 
0.001 ( 0.34) 
0.003 ( 1.10) 
fhchfl 
fhchf2 
fhchf3 
fhchf4 
fhchf5 
-0.004 (-0.25) 
0.000 ( 0.04) 
-0.006 (-0.75) 
0.006 ( 1.32) 
0.007 ( 1.37) 
-0.068 (-0.68) 
0.039 ( 0.97) 
-0.002 (-0.06) 
-0.003 (-0.15) 
-0.007 (-0.29) 
0.088 ( 1.25) 
0.052 ( 1.50) 
-0.022 (-0.57) 
0.031 ( 1.39) 
0.016 ( 0.63) 
0.006 ( 0.30) 
-0.001 (-0.09) 
0.009 ( 1.02) 
-0.003 (-0.61) 
0.007 ( 1.34) 
-0.019 (-0.97) 
0.002 ( 0.26) 
0.007 ( 0.78) 
0.007 ( 1.17) 
0.005 ( 0.79) 
fhchml 
fhchm2 
fhchm3 
fhchm4 
fhchm5 
0.014 ( 1.02) 
-0.006 (-0.73) 
-0.008 (-0.95) 
0.005 ( 1.07) 
-0.008 (-1.49) 
0.019 ( 0.29) 
-0.002 (-0.05) 
-0.013 (-0.31) 
0.024 ( 1.06) 
0.019 ( 0.79) 
0.023 ( 0.37) 
0.034 ( 0.94) 
0.001 ( 0.04) 
-0.008 (-0.33) 
0.053 ( 2.28) 
0.029 ( 2.00) 
0.003 ( 0.36) 
0.013 ( 1.48) 
0.003 ( 0.58) 
-0.005 (-0.84) 
-0.012 (-0.73) 
0.014 ( 1.58) 
-0.005 (-0.50) 
-0.006 (-1.09) 
0.006 ( 1.07) 
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Engel curves for all 30 food categories, for 
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3 Parental sex preferences and fertility decisions 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, one of our goals was to examine boy-girl discrimination within the 
family. A question that may arise in this kind of research is if parents have an overall 
preference for the gender of their children. If they do, this preference may not only influence 
intrahousehold allocation of goods, but it may also affect fertility decisions of couples. 
Several studies have already concentrated on fertility behaviour of couples to investigate 
parental preferences for the gender of their children. In spite of the varied and extensive 
literature on this subject, however, there is still a lot to improve on current methods to 
investigate it. In this chapter we will discuss and apply various methods of testing for parental 
sex preferences. 
Analyses of sex preferences are motivated by various reasons. First, as we already 
mentioned, their existence could provide an explanation for boy-girl differences with regard 
to intrahousehold allocation of goods, morbidity and mortality (e.g. Chen, Huq and D'Souza 
(1981), and Kishor (1993)). Secondly, for policy makers it will be important to know whether 
sex preferences will influence the effectiveness of family planning programmes (e.g. Bairagi 
(1993)). Moreover, if sex preferences exist, the future availability of sex preselection techni-
ques may have a substantial impact on fertility. 
Most studies of parental sex preferences concentrate on developing countries, as issues 
like gender preferences and family planning programmes are considered most relevant for 
these countries. However, for a developed country like the Netherlands, where third and 
higher order births are of high importance for the current birth level of about 1.5 per woman, 
insight in preferences of parents for additional children is desirable as well. In our opinion, 
the possibility that sex preferences play a role in the decision for third and higher order births 
should not be ignored. Moreover, it is of interest to know how fertility will change if parents 
become able to select the sex of their children in the (near) future.1 The birth level per 
1 Recently, in the Netherlands a 'gender clinic' was opened, i.e. a clinic that treats parents to obtain a child 
of a certain sex. Although the technique used is scientifically still unproved, already 100 couples have applied. 
In a recent interview in a daily journal (Trouw, October 17th 1995) the chief executive of the clinic stated that 
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woman might decrease or increase, or the number of male births compared to female births 
might change. Even small changes in birth levels can have serious consequences for the 
demographic development of a country. The most likely consequences of introducing sex 
preselection techniques will become clear as soon as we know how parental sex preferences 
influence fertility (e.g. Leung (1994)). The central question we will address in this chapter 
is, therefore, whether sex preferences play a role in the decision for children in the 
Netherlands. 
Before we can test for sex preferences, we have to define precisely what kind of 
preference we are interested in. For example, a vague indication like 'son preference' is 
insufficient, as it cannot differentiate between preferences for 'only sons', 'at least one son', 
or 'more sons than daughters'. In our study for the Netherlands we will concentrate on three 
possible sex preferences: 'at least one son', 'at least one daughter', and 'a mixture of sexes, 
i.e. at least one of each sex'. To test for these preferences we include dummy variables for 
the presence of 'at least one son (MBk)', 'at least one daughter (MGk)', and 'a mixture of 
sexes (MSk)' after birth k, in our estimations. If the estimated coefficients of these dummies 
appear to be significant in explaining birth k+1 , we conclude that the corresponding 
preferences influence fertility decisions. Note that these dummies cannot be included all three 
simultaneously, because of a linear dependency between them in case of at least one child, 
namely: MBk + MGk - 1 = MSk. This linear relationship implies a simple test for a 'mixture 
of sexes' preference. If there is a preference for a 'mixture of sexes', then the coefficients 
of MB and MG should be equal and nonzero. 
In this chapter, we analyze parental sex preferences from various angles using three 
different reduced form methods. Unlike most fertility studies, we will not only use data on 
past births, but also information about sterilization. We interpret the decision to have oneself 
or one's partner sterilized as a preference for no more children. The first method we present 
is an adaptation of the conventional Parity Progression Ratio (PPR) method. While the 
conventional method only provides a lower boundary of the 'true PPR', we will also calculate 
an upper boundary. Secondly, we perform a test based on a hazard analysis of birth intervals. 
This method was suggested by Leung (1988), who included the number of boys in a hazard 
model of fertility to investigate son preference in Malaysia. While Leung's emphasis on son 
most registered couples already have two sons and now want to have a daughter. The government has strongly 
criticized the clinic, and has resolved to "forbid it as soon as an urgent reason occurs". 
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preference was associated with the cultural setting of his analysis, we will also look at other 
forms of sex preferences by including various dummy variables representing the sex 
composition of the household. Finally, we estimate some reduced form equations of the 
decision for a sterilization, and use it as a test for sex preferences. Only in chapter 4 we will 
present a simple structural analysis of fertility decisions. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we review the role of sex 
preferences in the existing fertility literature. The data we use for our estimations are 
described in section 3. In section 4 we discuss the adapted PPR calculations; the estimation 
results of the reduced form models are presented in section 5 and 6, respectively. Section 7 
concludes. 
3.2 Review of some literature 
Recently, a number of authors have estimated econometric models of fertility; see e.g. 
Heckman, Hotz and Walker (1985), Heckman and Walker (1990), Hotz and Miller (1988), 
Wolpin (1984). These models have typically not included the sex of existing children as 
explanatory variables. An exception is the article by Leung (1988) who included the number 
of boys in a hazard model of fertility in Malaysia. 
In demographic literature, the relationship between sex preferences and fertility 
decisions has received ample attention. Williamson (1976) presents a survey of research on 
these preferences in various cultures. Sex preferences are shown to vary from strong son 
preference in rural Egypt, Algeria, Tunesia, and some regions in India, to strong daughter 
preference in specific societies of New Guinea and Peru, while parents in other regions have 
a preference for a balance of both sons and daughters. Preferences appear to be influenced 
by certain characteristics like social class, level of innovativeness, ethnic group, perceived 
cost of raising boys or girls, education, religion, and sex of the respondent. 
A major distinction between the various methods of investigating sex preferences is the 
type of information used. A first group of studies concentrates on stated preferences of 
parents for the sex of their children. For instance, in Coombs et al. (1975) respondents are 
asked to rank 16 possible family compositions (all combinations of 0 to 3 boys and 0 to 3 
girls) according to their preferences. These data are used to calculate individual preference 
scales for number and sex of children. In order to assess if size or sex dominates fertility 
decisions, McClelland (1979) proposes to combine the preference scales with a stopping rule 
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measure, i.e. ask respondents to indicate at which family compositions no additional children 
would be desired. Widmer et al. (1981) apply this method to stated preferences of university 
students in Colorado. They find that for 32% of (consistent) respondents sex preferences 
increase projected fertility relative to the first choice family size, and for 19% the net effect 
is to decrease fertility. Arnold and Kuo (1984) apply both preference scales, and respondents' 
opinion on the percentage of boys in an ideal family, to examine the degree of son preference 
in seven Asian countries and the United States. Both measures indicate some preference for 
sons in all countries; the strongest preference is found in Korea and Taiwan, the weakest in 
Indonesia and the Phillipines. 
A second group of studies, into which our present paper can be classified, searches for 
revealed sex preferences by comparing reproductive behaviour of couples with different 
family compositions. For instance, in Bairagi (1993) the use of contraceptives by women in 
Bangladesh is related to the sex of their children. The results show that the percentage of 
women within each parity using contraceptives was lowest for women who did not have any 
living son, and was usually highest for those women who had sons and a daughter. Using 
Indian data, Das (1987) shows that at all parities couples with no sons more often got an 
additional child than those who already had one or more sons, except when all living children 
are sons, and also that contraceptive use increased with the number of sons. 
The two alternative methods mentioned above may lead to different conclusions about 
sex preferences. For instance, if people are not able to control their fertility, they may state 
to have a certain sex preference but their preference cannot be revealed by their reproductive 
behaviour. For this reason Chowdhury and Bairagi (1990) suggest that the effect of sex 
preferences on fertility will be more pronounced in populations with a high use of 
contraceptives. Moreover, if sex preferences of various couples are very heterogeneous, their 
revealed effects on the 'average fertility' of a sample may be much smaller than their effects 
on individual reproductive behaviour. So sex preferences may be more difficult to discover 
using the second method than using the first. Alternatively, the information used by the 
second method may be more reliable. Respondents may be less able or willing to state their 
preferences regarding the sex of their children, than to provide information on facts like past 
births and contraceptive use. In the following study we focus exclusively on the investigation 
of revealed sex preferences. 
Some studies in literature have compared results of both methods of investigating sex 
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preferences. Coombs and Sun (1978) and Coombs (1979) show that stated preferences for 
number and sex of children correspond to past fertility behaviour, to current use of 
contraception, and to actual subsequent fertility of respondents in Taiwan. Cleland et al 
(1983) use both a stated preference, namely the preferred sex of the next child, and revealed 
preferences, like comparing the use of contraceptives and the rate of fertility of couples with 
various family compositions, to investigate sex preferences in 28 developing countries in 
Africa, Asia and America. Their study shows that the various types of information can 
suggest sex preferences of different strength. Overall they conclude that son preference is not 
universal in developing countries and is often tempered by the desire for at least one 
daughter. 
Although sex preferences are mostly associated with and typically investigated in 
developing countries, they appear to be present in European countries as well. In a study of 
Swedish women, Hoem (1993) finds that the absence of a son significantly increases the 
hazard of having a third birth. For the Netherlands Moors et al. (1980) find evidence of a 
preference for one child of each sex, using both stated attitudes and parity progression rates. 
3.3 Data: the Dutch ORTN survey 
The empirical analysis of this chapter is based on the Dutch ORIN survey ('Onderzoek 
Relatievorming in Nederland', i.e. Research into the formation of relationships in the 
Netherlands), which was held in 1984. It comprises 1600 respondents, both men and women 
between 18 and 54 years old, in various living arrangements. 
In contrast with most studies, we do not restrict our analysis to married respondents 
only. We include individuals living in various types of household structure, such as unmarried 
cohabitors, married and remarried persons, one-parent families and singles. It should be noted 
that we only use information on present type of household structure. The fact that a person 
lives as a single at present does not exclude the possibility that he/she has been married or 
living with a partner previously. So the household structure may define a more heterogeneous 
group than expected at first sight. We include dummies for the various types of household 
structure in the set of variables influencing fertility, because certain household structures may 
limit the number of children. For instance, the death of a parent may cause the surviving 
partner, now living in a one-parent household, to have no more children. Moreover, a person 
that wants to have children but prefers to raise them on his/her own may be inclined to 
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choose a smaller number of children than a two parent household. By including a dummy for 
one-parent households this reducing effect will be absorbed in the coefficient of this dummy 
and will not blur the coefficients of the other variables. Inclusion of the dummies may also 
raise some difficulties, as the household structure may not be exogenous. Certain living 
arrangements may simply reflect that the respondent has not yet gotten so far to have 
children. However, in the reduced form analyses of this chapter we consider only households 
with at least one child. So notwithstanding their present household structure all included 
respondents have had the opportunity to obtain at least one child. We therefore treat the 
dummies for household structure as exogenous explanatory variables in our estimations. 
For our research we excluded respondents with adopted, fostered or step-children, since 
in those cases it is unclear to what extent the gender and the number of the children is a 
choice variable. Respondents who have become sterile by an accident or illness and 
inconsistent observations were excluded as well. After this, about 1450 cases remain, of 
which about 650 with children. Moreover, for households with children from more than one 
marriage, we used information about the children from the first marriage only. The 
households in our sample have not all completed their fertilities. Particularly respondents in 
the 18-24 and 25-34 age groups, may continue (or start) childbearing after the moment of 
survey.2 In the next section we will discuss this problem of right censoring in the data. In 
appendix 3A some descriptive statistics of the variables used in our estimations are listed. 
3.4 Parity Progression Ratio's 
As a preliminary analysis of the fertility data we apply a widely used measure to test for sex 
preferences: the Parity Progression Ratio (PPR). The PPR-method calculates the proportion 
of couples of a given parity who go on to a higher parity. If couples with a certain sex 
composition are more likely to have additional children than other couples, the PPR will 
differ for households with various sex compositions. The problem with this method, however, 
is that it ignores right censoring in the data; couples with no additional children at the time 
of survey are assumed to stay at that parity, which is clearly a very strong assumption. As 
2 For instance, 12.7 per cent of the males between 25 and 34 years old and 10.2 per cent of the females 
of this age in our sample, report that they intend to have an additional child within two years after the moment 
of survey. 
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a result, the conventional PPR is just a lower boundary of the 'true PPR', i.e. the PPR that 
would result when using completed fertility spells (e.g. Leung, 1988). 
To analyze the biasing effect of censoring, we use information about the ability of 
couples to have additional children, for instance if they have had a sterilization or if they have 
passed the age of childbearing. This enables us to calculate an adapted PPR, namely the 
proportion of couples of a given parity who are still able to obtain an additional child. Note 
that this adapted PPR forms an upper boundary of the 'true PPR'. The PPR-boundaries 
calculated from our data are listed in the last two columns of table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Parity Progression Ratio's 
number number number number number number number Lower Upper 
of of boys of hhs of hhs of hhs of hhs of hhs boundary boundary 
children with at with at with with with PPR " p p R2) 
(k) least k least exactly exactly k exactly k 
children k+1 k children, children, 
children children no longer still 
fertile fertile. 
1 0 320 234 86 15 71 0.731 0.953 
1 334 239 95 13 82 0.716 0.961 
2 0 126 59 67 26 41 0.468 0.794 
1 224 76 148 64 84 0.339 0.714 
2 123 55 68 28 40 0.447 0.772 
3 0 23 9 14 9 5 0.391 0.609 
1 76 30 46 27 19 0.395 0.645 
2 63 23 40 22 18 0.365 0.651 
3 28 8 20 10 10 0.286 0.643 
4 0 5 2 3 1 2 0.400 0.800 
1 20 9 11 6 5 0.450 0.700 
2 30 12 18 6 12 0.400 0.800 
3 12 4 8 4 4 0.333 0.667 
4 3 2 1 1 0 0.667 0.667 
1) Lower boundary of PPR = (# hhs with at least k+1 children) / (# hhs with at least k children) 
2) Upper boundary of PPR = (# hhs still able to obtain (k+l)st child) / (# hhs with at least k children) 
As can be seen from the table, at parity 2 both colums show a lower PPR in case of a 
'mixture of sexes' in the household, compared with the PPRs of families with only sons and 
only daughters. We execute Chi-square tests for the hypothesis that the PPRs are independent 
of the sex composition of the children, i.e that the calculated PPRs for various number of 
boys are not significantly different from each other. At parity 2, a test based on the upper 
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boundary of the PPR does not reject the null hypothesis at a 10% significance level (p-value 
is 0.21), while a test based on the lower boundary of the PPR (i.e. the conventional PPR test) 
rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level (p-value is 0.03). At the other parities 
the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
So, the conventional PPR method (i.e. the lower boundary) suggests that there is some 
evidence for a 'mixture of sexes' preference at parity two. However, given the considerable 
gap between the lower and upper PPR bounds, we must conclude that they are umnformative 
about whether the true PPR varies with sex composition. 
3.5 Hazard analysis of birth intervals 
An alternative method to analyze parental sex preferences, suggested by Leung (1988), is by 
means of a hazard analysis of birth intervals. The idea of this method is that couples who are 
less satisfied at a certain parity, for instance because they have no 'mixture of sexes', will 
have a higher probability of leaving that parity, and thus will tend to have shorter subsequent 
birth intervals, than couples who are more satisfied. We choose a Cox proportional hazard 
model, which specifies the hazard rate3 as follows: 
= **M.exp(P/x a) (3-D 
where X j includes variables that can influence fertility decisions of parents, like education of 
parent, age, labour force participation, sex of present children, and importance of religion. 
To estimate Cox's proportional hazard at a certain parity, we include all couples that have 
once achieved that parity. For couples who have left to a higher parity we use the closed birth 
intervals, and for couples who have not left (censored observations) we use the information 
that their birth interval will be longer than the time already spent in the present parity. The 
advantage of Cox's model is that it allows the hazard to change over time, without having to 
specify the time dependent part of the hazard rate X(t) for the estimation of B, i.e. the vector 
of coefficients of individual characteristics that influence the hazard rate. 
In table 3.2 estimation results for various parities are presented. For definitions of the 
variables used in our estimations, the reader is referred to the appendix of this chapter. 
3 The hazard rate denotes the probability that an individual i leaves parity k at time t, conditional on not 
having left the parity before t. 
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Table 3.2: Estimation results hazard analysis of birth intervals (t-values in parentheses) 
2 - 3 
(k = 2) 
3 - 4 
(k = 3) 
4 - 5 
(k = 4) 
2 - 3 
(k = 2) 
education of respondent -0.126 (-1.65) * -0.004 (-0.03) -0.025 (-0.10) -0.119 (-1.55) 
more than full time job -0.271 (-0.44) -0.156 (-0-19) -0.281 (-0.22) -0.304 (-0.49) 
full time job -0.234 (-0.99) -0.019 (-0.05) -2.238 (-2.29) " -0.233 (-0.98) 
part time job -0.303 (-1.37) -0.276 (-0.62) -0.081 (-0.11) -0.309 (-1.39) 
religion 'very important' 0.671 ( 3.36) " 0.639 ( 1.68) • -0.069 (-0.12) 0.686 ( 3.42) " 
religion 'not very important' 0.179 ( 0.93) 0.397 ( 1.03) 0.675 ( 1.18) 0.179 ( 0.93) 
votes 'right-wing' -0.149 (-0.68) 0.933 ( 2.81) " 0.714 ( 1.09) -0.160 (-0.73) 
votes 'left-wing' -0.059 (-0.34) 0.284 ( 0.84) 1.076 ( 1.97) " -0.064 (-0.37) 
male respondent, aged 18-24 -10.954 (-0.03) -10.935 (-0.03) 
female respondent, aged 18-24 -11.448 (-0.05) -11.457 (-0.05) 
male respondent, aged 25-34 -1.247 (-2.01) " 1.363 ( 1.21) -6.223 (-0.03) -1.197 (-1.92) ' 
female respondent, aged 25-34 -1.299 (-3.22) " -10.886 (-0.06) -1.313 (-3.26) " 
male respondent, aged 35-44 -0.303 (-1.09) -0.117 (-0.23) 1.862 (1.43) -0.312 (-1.12) 
female respondent, aged 35-44 -0.266 (-1.30) 0.062 (0.16) -0.008 (-0.01) -0.254 (-1.24) 
male respondent, aged 45-54 0.110 ( 0.45) 0.886 ( 2.31) " 1.463 ( 2.09) " 0.122 ( 0.50) 
mixture of sexes at parity k -0.295 (-1.94) ' 0.252 ( 0.84) -0.743 (-1.17) 
at least one boy at parity k -0.385 (-2.12) " 
at least one girl at parity k -0.211 (-1.16) 
= significant at 10% critical level 
= significant at 5% critical level 
We find evidence for a 'mixture of sexes' preference at parity two. The estimate presented 
in the first column implies that the presence of a mixture of sexes at parity two reduces the 
baseline hazard rate of the transition to parity three by one quarter. We also find that the 
dummy for 'great importance of religion' has a positive and education has a negative effect 
on the hazard for a third child. For the other variables we find no significant coefficients, 
except for two of the age-sex categories. Both male and female respondents in the youngest 
age category are less likely to leave parity two. Dummies for type of household structure of 
the respondent are all insignificant and not reported in table 3.2. 
For parity two, we also estimate an equation including dummies for 'at least one son' 
(MB2) and 'at least one daughter' (MG2) instead of the 'mixture of sexes'-dummy. Our 
estimation results (see column 4) show negative coefficients for both variables, although the 
MG-coefficient is not significantly different from zero. However, a Likelihood Ratio test on 
equality of both coefficients gives a test statistic of 0.762 (p-value is 0.38), so the hypothesis 
of equality is not rejected. Testing the hypothesis of both coefficients being zero results in 
a test statistic of 4.594 (p-value is 0.10), so it is just rejected at a 10% significance level. In 
addition we want to remark that a test on both coefficients being zero given both being equal, 
i.e. a test on MS 2=0, gives a test statistic of 3.832 (p-value is 0.05). All tests point to some 
extent at a preference for a 'mixture of sexes' at parity two. 
The estimation results for higher parities are presented in the second and third column. 
Male respondents in the age category of 45 to 54 appear to have a higher probability of 
leaving both parity three and four. Furthermore, having a full-time job significantly reduces 
the probability of having a fifth child. Voting behaviour also appears to have some influence 
in fertility behaviour. More importantly, the 'mixture of sexes'-dummy is not significant at 
both parities. 
Note that the variables for labour force participation (part time, full time, or more than 
full time), and for education of the respondent do not show a very strong influence at the 
various parities, while in other studies these variables appear to influence birth intervals (see 
e.g. Heckman, Hotz and Walker('85); Wolpin('84) and Ann ('94) include education only). 
We should note in this context that our sample of respondents contains both mothers and 
fathers, while the effects of the mentioned variables can be different for mothers than for 
fathers. However, if we estimate the same hazard equations based on the subsample of female 
respondents only, we do not find significant coefficients for the intended variables either. 
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Another possible explanation may be that labour force participation and education are 
endogenous, as a result of which our estimates of these coefficients can be obscured. 
3.6 Analysis of the decision for sterilization 
In our previous analysis we used birth intervals as a measure for the eagerness of couples to 
have additional children. Another variable in our dataset that could inform us on this, is if 
the couple has decided to have a sterilization. We can interpret the decision for a sterilization 
as a preference for no more children. But then, if parents have a preference for a mixture of 
sexes, couples who have achieved this desired sex composition will be more likely to have 
a sterilization than couples who have only sons or only daughters. 
To examine the influence of sex preferences on the decision to have oneself or one's 
partner sterilized, we perform a Probit analysis on a dummy for sterilization. We exclude 
households with no children at all, so that the linear dependency between MBk, MGk and MSk 
(see section 3.1) holds for all cases used. We include the same explanatory variables as in 
the hazard estimation, plus the number of children the couple already has. Note that this 
probit analysis only uses information available at the moment of survey; couples can have a 
sterilization or additional children after the moment of survey. The estimated coefficients are 
listed in the first two columns of table 3.3. 
Again we find some evidence for a 'mixture of sexes' preference: the estimated 
coefficient of the 'mixture of sexes'-dummy is positive, and has a t-ratio of 1.69 (p=0.09). 
Furthermore, we find significant coefficients for the dummy for 'great importance of 
religion', the dummy for having a full time job, and some of the age and sex dummies, all 
with plausible signs. The negative coefficient of education level may reflect the postponing 
of childbirths by higher educated persons. Alternatively, education may, as a proxy for 
income, increase the preferred number of children and therefore reduce the probability of 
having a sterilization. Some of the dummies for household structure appear significant as 
well. Respondents that are remarried, or are presently living as a single or in a one-parent 
family, are less likely to have chosen for a sterilization than married respondents4. 
4 The significantly negative coefficient for remarried respondents may be caused by our way of data 
selection. For remarried respondents, we chose to use information of the first marriage only. Consequently, of 
a remarried respondent a smaller part of 'history' is considered than for a married one, which may decrease 
his/her probability of being sterilized. 
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Table 3.3: Estimation results analysis of sterilization decision (t-values in parentheses) 
Results Probit Results 2SLS 
MSk included MBk & MGk MSk included MBk & MGk 
included included 
constant -0 381 (-1 26) -0 628 (-1 86) " 1 480 ( 2 53) " 0 895 ( 2 90) " 
education of respondent -0 117 (-1 83) " -0 118 (-1 83) * -0 073 (-2 l o - -0 073 (-2 11) " 
more than full time job 0 369 ( o 59) 0 363 ( o 58) 0 198 ( 0 ss) 0 199 ( 0 85) 
full time job 0 345 ( 1 79) " 0 345 ( 1 80) " -0 059 (-0 60) -0 059 (-0 60) 
part time job 0 217 ( 1 23) 0 220 ( 1 24) -0 088 (-0 92) -0 089 (-0 93) 
votes 'right-wing' -0 050 (-0 25) -0 052 (-0 25) 0 027 ( o 32) 0 026 ( o 32) 
votes 'left-wing' 0 039 ( 0 29) 0 041 ( 0 30) 0 045 ( 0 82) 0 044 ( 0 81) 
religion 'very important' -0 379 (-2 11)" -0 378 (-2 11) " 0 079 ( 0 68) 0 079 ( 0 69) 
religion 'not very important' -0 170 (-1 18) -0 169 (-1 17) 0 045 ( 0 61) 0 045 ( 0 62) 
remarried -0 973 (-4 65) " -0 973 (-4 64) " -0 195 (-2 18)" -0 196 (-2 18)" 
child in one-parent family -3 995 (-0 03) -3 997 (-0 03) -0 454 (-1 05) -0 452 (-1 04) 
head of one-parent family -0 569 (-3 73) " -0 571 (-3 73) " -0 122 (-1 86) " -0 122 (-1 86) " 
single -0 693 (-3 12)" -0 697 (-3 13)" -0 341 (-3 20) " -0 341 (-3 19)" 
unmarried cohabitation -0 120 (-0 44) -0 127 (-0 46) -0 040 (-0 31) -0 039 (-0 30) 
no steady partner 0 158 ( 0 20) 0 172 ( 0 22) 0 302 ( 0 72) 0 301 ( 0 71) 
male respondent, aged 18-24 -4 274 (-0 09) -4 281 (-0 09) -0 781 (-2 58) " -0 781 (-2 58) " 
female respondent, aged 18-24 -1 034 (-2 09) " -1 035 (-2 09) " -0 694 (-2 37) " -0 695 (-2 37) " 
male respondent, aged 25-34 -0 216 (-0 71) -0 218 (-0 72) -0 400 (-1 98) " -0 401 (-2 00) " 
female respondent, aged 25-34 -0 103 (-0 41) -0 102 (-0 41) -0 392 (-2 03) " -0 393 (-2 04) " 
male respondent, aged 35-44 0 322 ( 1 37) 0 322 ( 1 37) -0 027 (-0 27) -0 028 (-0 27) 
female respondent, aged 35-44 0 846 ( 4 49) " 0 845 ( 4 49) " 0 165 ( 1 87)" 0 165 ( 1 86) * 
male respondent, aged 45-54 -0 045 (-0 18) -0 045 (-0 19) 0 118 ( 1 03) 0 118 ( 1 03) 
number of children k -0 038 (-0 54) -0 039 (-0 54) -0 537 (-1 92)" -0 539 (-1 93) " 
mixture of sexes at parity k 0 245 ( 1 69) * - 0 587 ( 1 95)" -
at least one boy at parity k - 0 267 ( 1 53) - 0 586 ( 1 93)" 
at least one girl at parity k - 0 226 ( 1 35) - 0 592 ( 1 98) " 
= significant at 10% critical level = significant at 5% critical level 
We also estimated a specification with dummies for 'at least one son' and 'at least one 
daughter' included. Both coefficients have the expected sign but are not significant. A LR-test 
on equality of the coefficients of these two dummies does not reject equality (test-statistic is 
0.05, p-value is 0.82). The hypothesis that both coefficients are zero is not rejected (test-
statistic is 2.9042, p-value is 0.23), while the hypothesis that both coefficients are zero given 
both being equal is rejected at the 10% significance level (statistic is 2.85, p=0.09). 
We are somewhat surprised that the number of children appears to have no significant 
effect on the decision to have a sterilization. This result may be due to endogeneity of the 
number of children k: the number of children may influence the sterilization decision, but a 
sterilization also limits the number of children. To investigate this possibility, we apply an 
instrumental variable procedure (2SLS) to the same sterilization data. As instrumental 
variables we use the income class of both partners, because income is likely to be related to 
the number of children but not to the (costless) sterilization decision. The results of this 2SLS 
procedure are presented in the last two columns of table 3.3. 
The results now show a larger influence of number of children on the decision to have 
a sterilization. The significantly negative coefficient of k implies that especially couples with 
a small number of children choose to have a sterilization. Possibly, the strong preference for 
a small family of some couples causes them to have a sterilization. Other couples, who prefer 
to have larger families, may be less willing to limit their fertility by a definite measure like 
sterilization. Furthermore, we see that religion looses its importance and that more age-sex 
categories have become significantly negative: respondents under 35 are less likely to have 
had a sterilization than elder persons. More importantly, the coefficient for 'mixture of sexes' 
gains in significance and still has the expected sign. Estimation of a specification including 
dummies for 'at least one son' (MB,;) and 'at least one daughter' (MG^ (column four) gives 
very much the same results as the one including a dummy for a 'mixture of sexes' (column 
three). A Likelihood Ratio test on equality of the coefficients of MBk and MGk gives a test 
statistic of 1.137 (p-value is 0.29), so the hypothesis of equality is not rejected. Moreover, 
a test on the coefficient of MSk being zero results in a test statistic of 98.4 (p-value is about 
zero), so this hypothesis is strongly rejected.5 
Although the exact relation between number of children, sex preferences and the 
5 In the specification without any dummy for sex composition, the t-value of number of children is -1.78, 
so the coefficient is still significant at a 10% critical level. 
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sterilization decision remains very complicated, in our opinion the instrumental variable 
estimations provide evidence of the existence of a preference for a 'mixture of sexes' in the 
Netherlands. A more thorough examination of how sex preferences, number of children and 
sterilization successively influence each other requires structural modelling of the fertility 
behaviour of couples. In the next chapter, a simple structural model of parental preferences 
for the number and sex of their children will be presented. 
3.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter we investigated whether parental sex preferences play a role in fertility 
decisions of couples in the Netherlands. We applied various methods and used different types 
of data, in order to check the robustness of our results. The Parity Progression Ratio method 
was found to be less useful for the present purposes. For both other methods we obtained 
evidence of a parental preference for a mixture of sexes. The hazard analysis of birth 
intervals shows that, at parity two, couples with a son and a daughter are less likely to have 
an additional child than couples with only sons or only daughters. Furthermore, the 2SLS 
analysis shows that couples with children of both sexes are more likely to have a sterilization 
than other couples. 
An interesting issue for further research is to estimate how fertility will change if 
parents obtain the possibility of (costlessly) choosing the sex of their children. This would 
require estimation of preference parameters in a structural fertility model. Given the parental 
'mixture of sexes'-preference we found in the previous sections, we expect two opposite 
effects. On the one hand, couples with one child will be more likely to bear a second child 
in the new situation than in the old. This results from the fact that in the former case parents 
can achieve their desired sex composition (and the corresponding gain in utility) with certainty 
at parity two, while in the latter case this will only happen with a probability of one half. On 
the other hand, some couples that will bear more than two children in the old situation trying 
to obtain a mixture of sexes, can achieve this sex composition at a lower parity in the new 
situation. Whether the first or the second effect will dominate is an empirical matter. 
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Appendix 3A: Variables used in regressions 
Only respondents with at least one child included. Number of observations: 654 
Variable Meaning mean S.D. skew. kurt. min max 
K Number of (own) children of resp. 2.31 1.22 1.47 6.21 1 9 
EDUC Education level of resp. 2.61 1.03 0.26 2.71 1 5 
DOR: Dummies for type of household 
structure of respondent: 
DOR1 married, still together 0.34 0.48 0.66 1.44 0 1 
DOR2 remarried 0.15 0.35 2.00 4.98 0 1 
DOR3 child living at home 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 
DOR4 child living in 1-parent family 0.00 0.06 17.99 **** 0 1 
DOR5 head of one-parent family 0.34 0.47 0.69 1.47 0 1 
DOR6 single 0.12 0.32 2.35 6.51 0 1 
DOR7 unmarried cohabitation 0.05 0.21 4.34 19.82 0 1 
DOR8 not married, no steady partner 0.01 0.07 14.65 **** 0 1 
DMTJ Resp. more than full time employed 0.01 0.11 8.87 79.64 0 1 
DFTJ Resp. in full time employment 0.32 0.47 0.78 1.61 0 1 
DPTJ Resp. in part time employment 0.16 0.37 1.83 4.36 0 1 
DRG1 Religion is important in life of resp. 0.27 0.44 1.04 2.08 0 1 
DRG2 Religion not very important to resp. 0.32 0.47 0.77 1.59 0 1 
DVBR Resp. votes right wing 0.15 0.36 1.96 4.84 0 1 
(CDA, SGP, RPF, GPV) 
DVBL Resp. votes left wing 0.42 0.49 0.33 1.11 0 1 
(PvdA, PPR, PSP, CPN) 
DASC: Age and sex category of resp.: 
0 DASC1 men, aged 18-24 0.03 0.16 5.95 36.44 1 
DASC2 women, aged 18-24 0.06 0.24 3.66 14.39 0 1 
DASC3 men, aged 25-34 0.08 0.27 3.07 10.41 0 1 
DASC4 women, aged 25-34 0.11 0.31 2.49 7.20 0 1 
DASC5 men, aged 35-44 0.18 0.39 1.65 3.71 0 1 
DASC6 women, aged 35-44 0.19 0.39 1.60 3.54 0 1 
DASC7 men, aged 45-54 0.15 0.36 1.98 4.91 0 1 
DASC8 women, aged 45-54 0.20 0.40 1.47 3.17 0 1 
DSTER Resp. or partner has had a sterilization 0.20 0.40 1.50 3.24 0 1 
DMSk Presence 'mixture of sexes' at parity k 
DMBk Presence 'at least one boy' at parity k 
DMGk Presence 'at least one girl' at parity k 
In our estimations, the following dummy-categories are used as reference group: 
DOR1 Married DRG3 Religion has no importance in life of respondent 
DASC8 Women, aged 45-54 DVBO Votes for other party, neither right nor left wing 
DNJ Not employed 
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4 A structural analysis of parental sex preferences 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we used information on either birth intervals or sterilization decisions 
to investigate the satisfaction of parents with children of a certain number and sex. With the 
hazard analysis and the PPR-method we could only investigate if sex preferences play a role 
at a certain parity; Heckman and Walker ('90) demonstrate the dangers of the piecemeal 
approach. Our analyses of the sterilization decision also treat the interrelationship between 
number and sex of children in a very rough way. Actually, none of the reduced form methods 
clarifies how parents weigh a sex preference against a preferred parity. 
For example, suppose a couple wants to have three children, but also prefers to have 
a son. Then, only after three children sex preferences may become visible: if the desired sex 
composition is not achieved by then, the couple will have to decide whether the expected 
benefit from a more desired sex composition outweighs the costs of a less desired fourth 
child. Note that this implies that couples with equal sex preferences but a different number 
of desired children can face different fertility decisions. Moreover, estimated effects of sex 
preselection techniques on fertility will be different if one considers only sex preferences than 
if one considers sex preferences in combination with preferences for the number of children.1 
To investigate parental preferences for both the sex and the number of their children 
simultaneously, a structural approach is required. In this chapter a simple structural model 
of fertility decisions is presented and estimated using the same dataset as in the previous 
chapter. Given the cross-section nature of our data, the absence of information on (female) 
work histories and the absence of information on the use of contraceptives other than 
sterilization, the model is not meant to be a full structural representation of fertility decisions. 
Rather it allows us to analyze the interrelationship between desired number of children and 
desired sex composition in a relatively simple way. In view of the results of the previous 
chapter, in this chapter we exclusively concentrate on a parental preference for a mixture of 
1 For instance, assume that sex preselection techniques are introduced in a country where parents have a 
preference for a mixture of sexes. If preferences for the number of children are ignored, all couples will have 
exactly two children, one son and one daughter, and the sex of the second child will always be preselected. But 
if couples choose different numbers of children, only the last child will be preselected, iff the former children 
are all of the same sex. 
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sexes. Other possible forms of sex preferences are ignored. 
In the next section we present a structural model of fertility decisions of households. 
In section 4.3 we briefly discuss the implications of heterogeneity of parental sex preferences 
for our model. Next, in section 4.4, the empirical results of the model of section 4.2 are 
presented. And in section 4.5 we investigate how fertility will change if sex preselection 
techniques become available and parents can choose the sex of their children. Section 4.6 
concludes. 
4.2 A simple structural model of parental sex preferences 
Assuming sequential decision making of couples, the fact that a certain couple has three 
children, for example, tells us that they prefer one child over no children, two over one, and 
three over two children. We postulate that parents have the following utility function: 
where K denotes the number of children they have, and MSK is a dummy that takes the value 
1 if there is a 'mixture of sexes' after K children, and 0 if all K children are of the same sex. 
Note that this specification allows the influence of MSK to vary over K; in case of a negative 
(positive) c, MSK becomes less (more) important at higher parities, while for c equal to zero 
the influence of MSK is the same at all parities. Further note that the specification ensures that 
v(K,l)-v(K,0) has the same sign for all K>0. Equation (4.1) is neither a direct nor an 
indirect utility function, but rather a convenient hybrid. It can be thought of as a direct utility 
function with K, MSK and other goods as arguments, where the latter has been substituted out 
using the budget constraint. Thus income and prices (which are unobserved in the present data 
set), as well as other variables that affect utility, are absorbed in the parameters a, b, c, and 
d. It follows that: 
v(K,MSK) = a.K2 + b.K + dMS^expicK) (4.1) 
v(0,0) = 0 
v(l,0) = a + b 
v(n,MSn) = a.n2 + b.n + d.MSn.exp(c.ri) , n>l . 
(4.2) 
We assume that b varies across households as follows, 
(4.3) 
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where X j includes various household characteristics like we used in sections 3.5 and 3.6, and 
e i~N(0,o 2). Given the ordinal nature of (4.1), a normalization on the parameters is required. 
We choose to fix a at 1 (an alternative normalization is to fix a and estimate a). We further 
assume perfect birth control, i.e. all parents can achieve their desired number of children, and 
that the perceived probability of a male birth is Vi. Then, for a household with one child we 
know that: 
v,(0,0) < Vi(l.O), so « i > -a - B0 - x.'B, . 
In the same way we can derive that for a household with two children: 
v,(l,0) < EfyC.MISj)} = vAEJMSJ), so e, > -3.a -B 0 - x,'B, - %.d.exp(2c) . 
And for a household with n children: 
v.Cn-l.MS,,.,) < v,(n,E{MSn|MSD.,}), 
so e, > -(2n-l).a - B„ - x,'B, - V4.d.(l+MSt,).exp(c.n) + d.MSn.,.exp(c.(n-l)) . 
Based on this information on the present number of children in the household only, the 
likelihood contributions for households with 1 child or with n children respectively would be: 
I = <£ 
and 
I = $ 
a + p 0 + 
(4.4) 
(2«-l).a + p 0 + x /Pj + -d.{UMSn_x).ecn - d.MSn_vec^-l) 
It can be shown that the likelihood function based on (4.4) does not identify the model, since 
it only uses information on lower bounds of the e^s. We achieve identification by using extra 
information on the probability that households have already achieved their preferred number 
of children at the time of the survey. 
Let us define K* to be the number of children a respondent prefers to have, and let K 
denote the number of children present at the time of survey. As we assume that people only 
get 'wanted' children, we know that K*>K. Let us define P v as the probability that a 
respondent already has had the chance to realize its preferred number of children. If P v = l 
we know for certain that K will not increase anymore, so that K*=K. However, as long as 
P v < 1 K can still increase further, so we only know that K*^K. It seems plausible that P v 
depends on the age of the parent and on a possible sterilization of the respondent or his/her 
partner. We assume that P v increases linearly with age, from 0 at the age of 17 to 1 at the 
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age of 42. Moreover, for couples that have undergone a sterilization we set P v to 1 and thus 
K*=K, as we know with certainty that they do not want any additional children. In other 
words, P v is defined as: 
where D s i is a dummy that takes the value 1 if respondent i or his/her partner has had a 
sterilization, and 0 otherwise. Now, the probability that a respondent included in our sample 
has n children equals the probability that this individual's preferred number of children K*=n 
plus the probability that he/she will have additional children in the future, i.e. K*>n. In 
formula: 
P(K=ri) = P(K*=n) + (l-PJ.P(K*>n) C 4 - 6 ) 
We can now derive the likelihood contributions of households given their present number of 
children K, and their probability P v of having completed their fertility. For instance, the 
likelihood contribution of a respondent with no children (K=0) is: 
Pv = max [D r f , min[(ag<?-17)*0.04 , 1] ] (4.5) 
or: 
P(K=n) = Pv.P(K*=n) + (l-PJJP(K'in) (4.7) 
P(K=0) = Pv.P(K*=0) + (l-PJ.P(K**0) 
(4.8) 
for a respondent with 1 child (K=l) it is: 
P(£=l) = Pv.P{K*=V> + Çl-PJWïl) 
3.a * ß 0 + x/ß! + U.e 
(4.9) 
= « ( 
a + ß„ + x/ß, 
o a 
and for a respondent with K=n, with n> 1, it is: 
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P(K=ri) = Pv.P(K*=n) + (l-PJ.P(K*±n) 
(2n-l).a + P 0 + x/p, + ^d.{UMSn^).ecn - d.MSn_vec(-n-l) 
(4.10) 
(2n+l).a + P 0 + x /Pj + ^d.(l+MSl).ec<tt*l) - d.MSn.eCM 
In section 4.3 we estimate this model using a maximum likelihood procedure. 
4.3 Empirical results 
As expounded in the previous section we assume that the preferred number of children varies 
across households through the parameter b in the household's utility function. We specify b, 
in (4.3) as a function of various household characteristics like we used in our hazard and 
probit analyses in the previous chapter. In the vector X j we include education level of the 
respondent, dummies for voting behaviour, importance of religion, type of job, and age 
category. 
In sections 3.5 and 3.6 we also included dummies for type of household structure. The 
inclusion of these dummies in our structural model requires a bit more discussion. In section 
3.3 we already mentioned that the household structure may not be exogenous. For instance, 
a couple living in an unmarried cohabitation may decide to marry as soon as they feel ready 
to have children. In this case, the wish for children determines the household structure and 
not the other way round. Moreover, the type of household structure of the respondent, just 
like completed fertility, can depend on age. For instance, children living at home have 
probably not yet considered to have children. Note that both of these difficulties arise 
especially in our structural model. After all, in the reduced form analyses, we considered 
only households with children, so all included respondents have had the opportunity to obtain 
at least one child. However, for the estimation of our structural model we also include 
respondents with zero children. It does not seem realistic to lump together all childless 18-
year-old singles with childless married respondents of 50 years old. In order to meet these 
objections we chose to exclude some respondents from our analysis. As can be seen in the 
table in appendix 3A respondents without steady partner (dor8) and children living at home 
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(dor3 and dor4) very rarely report to have any children. In our estimations we therefore 
exclude respondents with dor3, dor4 or dor8 (1200 observations remain). For all other 
respondents we include dummies for their type of household structure, so that we can 
investigate their influence on the number of children obtained. 
In table 4.1 we present estimation results of a maximum likelihood procedure using the 
likelihood contributions presented in (4.8) to (4.10). The positive value for d implies that 
achieving a mixture of sexes raises parental utility, while the negative c indicates that this sex 
preference is less important at higher parities (in accordance with the results of the reduced 
form estimations in chapter 3). Although the coefficient d is not significant according to the 
t-statistic, a likelihood ratio test decisively rejects the hypothesis d=0, with x2(2>=62.30. The 
two degrees of freedom of this x2-statistic result from the fact that parameter c is not 
identified if d is zero. 
For the other variables in our specification a positive (negative) coefficient means that 
the preferred number of children increases (decreases) with an increase in this variable. We 
get a significant positive coefficient for the dummy for importance of religion, and significant 
negative coefficients for the dummy of having a full time or part time job. Note that having 
a full time job has a stronger negative effect on the number of children preferred than a part 
time job. We also find a negative coefficient for the respondent's level of education. So more 
religious respondents tend to have more children, while having a job and a higher education 
lower the preferred number of children. Furthermore, older generations appear to have a 
preference for more children than younger generations. This corresponds to the generally 
known fact that in the past decades the number of children per couple has declined 
considerably2, probably due to the emancipation of women, and secularization and 
individualization trends. We also find significantly negative effects for singles and unmarried 
cohabitants. Apparently, respondents in these type of households on average prefer less 
children or no children at all. 
2 In the Netherlands the total fertility rate (TFR) declined from 3.04 in 1965 to 1.66 in 1975. The TFR is 
the average number of children a woman will bear, if the age-specific fertility rates observed in a certain year 
apply during her entire life. (Source: Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics) 
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Table 4.1: Estimation results structural model 
Estimated coefficients 
(t-values in parentheses) 
Normalization: o=l 
constant 1.688 ( 3.85)" 
education of respondent -0.084 (- 2.02)" 
votes 'right-wing' 0.003 ( 0.02) 
votes 'left-wing' 0.071 ( 0.75) 
religion 'very important' 0.273 ( 2.42)" 
religion 'not very important' 0.018 ( 0.17) 
(more than) full time job -0.452 (- 4.46)" 
part time job -0.382 (- 2.70)" 
d 5.101 ( 1-39) 
c -1.160 (- 2.87)" 
a -0.382 (-30.27)" 
25-34 years 0.204 ( 0.45) 
35-44 years 0.601 ( 1.40) 
45-54 years 0.963 ( 2.25)" 
remarried -0.207 (- 1.40) 
head of one-parent family -0.050 (- 0.35) 
single -1.790 (-14.13)" 
unmarried cohabitation -1.575 (- 9.68)" 
loglikelihood -1021.142 
4.4 Predicting the effects of sex preselection techniques 
We can use the estimation results of the previous section to predict how fertility will change 
if parents obtain the possibility of (costlessly) choosing the sex of their children. For 
convenience, we call the case with sex preselection techniques available the new situation, 
and the case with no sex preselection techniques available the old situation. 
Let us first roughly sketch what we expect to be the impact of introducing sex 
preselection techniques, given the parental 'mixture of sexes'-preference we found in the 
previous section. On the one hand, couples with one child will be more likely to bear a 
second child in the new situation than in the old. This results from the fact that in the former 
case parents can achieve their desired sex composition (and the corresponding gain in utility) 
with certainty at parity two, while in the latter case this will only happen with a probability 
of one half. On the other hand, some couples that will bear more than two children in the old 
situation trying to obtain a mixture of sexes, can achieve this sex composition at a lower 
parity in the new situation. We therefore expect two effects of sex preselection techniques on 
fertility: more second order births, and less third and higher order births. The resulting total 
effect on fertility is ambiguous a priori. 
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We will now calculate the effect of introducing sex preselection techniques on completed 
fertilities of all respondents in our sample. Remember that we specified parental utility of 
children for household i as: 
v.(KMSK) = a.K2 + bvK + d.MSK.exp(c.K) ( 4 H ) 
= Po + VP i 
In the old situation, parents will choose an additional child given a certain parity n if and only 
if v(n+l,E{MS n +i |MS n}) - v(n,MS„) exceeds zero. For n=0, this becomes: 
v(l,0) - v(0,0) = a + b,= -0.382 + b, 
and for n>0 : 
v(n+l,E{MS n + l |MS n }) - v(n,MSn) = -0.382(2n+l) + V4d.(l+MS„).exp(c.(n+l)) - d.MS„.exp(c.n) + b, . 
The deterministic part of each household's bs can be calculated as x/p* with the 
estimated coefficients listed in table 4.1 (except for the estimates of d, c, and a). Making use 
of the assumption that the random part, e„ is normally distributed, the probability of having 
a certain number of children can then be derived. For instance, for household i the probability 
that having 1 child is optimal is: 
P { v 0 < v , < E ( V j ) } = P{0.38<b,<0.90} (Note: 0.90 = -3*a - 0.5*d*exp(2*c)) . 
The probability that bearing 2 children is optimal is: 
(P{E(Va)>v, A (E(v 3)<v 2 |MS 2=0)} * P{MS2=0}) + (P{E(v2)>v, A (E(v 3 )<v 2 |MS 2 =l)} * P{MSj=l}) 
= 1/ 2 .P{0.90<b l<1.91} + &.P{0.90<b,<2.25} . 
And the probability that bearing n children is optimal is: 
(P{(E(v n)>v,,|MS n.,=0) A (E(v n + 1)<v n |MS„=0)} * P{MS,,=0 A MS„=0}) 
+ (P{(E(v„)>vn.,[MS„4=0) A (E(v n + 1 )<v n |MS n =l)} * P{MS„.,=0 A MS„=1}) 
+ (P{(E(v n)>v,, |MS, 1 = l) A (E(v n + 1 )<vJMS n =l)} * P{MS,, = 1 A MS„=1}) . 
The predicted number of children for household i can be calculated by multiplying these 
probabilities with the corresponding number of children. These predicted completed fertilities 
for all households in our sample are listed (classified into intervals) in the first column of 
table 4.2. For this table we have assumed that an expected number of children between 1.5 
and 2.5 results in bearing 2 children, between 2.5 and 3.5 results in 3 children, etc. 
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Table 4.2: predicted number of children for households in our sample 
Predicted fertility 
(number of children) 
Number of households with 
predicted fertility, in case of no 
sex preselection techniques. 
Number of households with 
predicted fertility, with sex 
preselection techniques 
available. 
0 (0<;E(k)<0.5) 338 304 
1 (0.5SE(k)<1.5) 254 281 
2 (1.5SE(k)<2.5) 370 394 
3 (2.5£E(k)<3.5) 219 206 
4 (3.5<;E(k)<4.5) 19 15 
5 (4.5^E(k)<5.5) 0 0 
6 (5.5SE(k)<6.5) 0 0 
Total number of children 1727 1747 
In a similar way we can calculate the expected fertility in the new situation. In this case, 
parents no longer have to weigh the costs of a less desired extra child against a more 
preferred sex composition, as they can satisfy their sex preference with the last wanted child 
by selecting its sex (for all parities exceeding 2, that is). Consequently, we no longer need 
to use expected values of utility, as the uncertain argument of utility, the sex of children, can 
now be selected. The increase in utility resulting from an additional child at various parities 
is: 
For n=0: v(l,0) - v(0,0) = -0.382 + b. 
For n = l : v(2,l) - v(l,0) = -1.146 + d.exp(2c) + b, 
For n> 1: v(n+l , l ) - v(n,l) = -0.382(2n+l) + d.{exp(c.(n+l)) - exp(c.n)} + b, . 
Therefore, the probability that bearing 1 child is optimal for household i is: 
P{v 0 <v,<v 2 } = P(0.38<b,<0.65) . 
Bearing 2 children is optimal with probability: 
P{v,<v 2 <v 3 } = P(0.65<bi<2.25) . 
Note that this probability has increased in comparison with the old situation. In general, the 
probability that k children is optimal is: 
P{v k . ,<v k <v k + I } . 
In column 2 of table 4.2 we report the predicted completed fertilities of all couples in our 
sample in this case. 
Comparing the two columns of table 4.2, we see that introducing sex preselection 
techniques raises the number of households having two children, and lowers the number of 
parents bearing more than two children, just as we expected beforehand. The increase in the 
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number of households having one child and the decrease in the number of households having 
no children at all are also caused by a larger probability of obtaining two children. After all, 
introducing sex preselection techniques only raises the probability of bearing two children at 
the expense of having one or more than two children. The expected number of children of 
all couples therefore shifts to some extent in the direction of two children. If the shift is big 
enough, the couple will appear in another row of table 4.2 in column two than they were in 
column one. 
The predicted total number of children in our sample increases with 20 children, i.e. 
1.2 per cent. This result may be somewhat surprising as it is often argued that sex 
preselection techniques will reduce fertility. In this respect it should be noted that the increase 
in fertility results from the low number of children per couple in the Netherlands and from 
the specific preference for a mixture of sexes. In countries where parents choose third and 
higher order births more often, the same sex preference may very well lead to a decline in 
total fertility of a population. Moreover, a different sex preference, like 'only sons are 
wanted' or 'only daughters', may also cause a decrease in total fertility. For instance, Leung 
(1994) finds evidence for a son preference among the Chinese in Malaysia using a dynamic 
analysis. He shows that sex selection on the firstborn child could reduce fertility of this group 
by about 3 %. 
4.5 Conclusions 
In the previous chapter we investigated whether parental sex preferences play a role in 
fertility decisions of couples in the Netherlands. We applied various methods and used 
different types of data, in order to check the robustness of our results. Although we found 
repeated evidence of a parental preference, the methods applied did not allow us to investigate 
sex preferences simultaneously with preferences for the number of children. In this chapter 
we therefore specified a simple structural model to investigate how parents can weigh a sex 
preference against a preferred parity. This model (again) provides evidence in favour of a 
parental preference for a mixture of sexes, and also shows that this preference is less 
important at higher parities. 
Another purpose of our paper was to predict the impact of introducing sex preselection 
techniques on fertility. Based on the estimated structural model two opposite effects are 
found: an increase in first and second order births and a decrease in third and higher order 
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births. The total effect is an increase in total (completed) fertility of about 1 per cent. This 
increase results from the low average fertility in the Netherlands and from the specific sex 
preference found. In countries with more third and higher order births, or with a different 
sex preference, the introduction of sex preselection techniques may very well lead to a decline 
in total fertility of a population. 
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5 Financial management of households 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we will investigate how couples manage their household finances. The 
financial management of a household is a complex of necessary activities, required for the 
consistence of a household. It encompasses a variety of financial decisions the household has 
to deal with, such as payment of bills, budgeting, purchase of food, clothing and durables 
(e.g. car, housing), and saving decisions. We are especially interested in how responsibilities 
for various financial decisions are divided between both partners. Several studies on 
intrahousehold allocation of resources suggest that the way in which couples organize their 
finances reflects the distribution of power between spouses (e.g. Pahl (1983), Wilson (1987), 
Treas (1991), Blumberg (1991), Hertz (1992), Vogler and Pahl (1993, 1994), Woolley and 
Marshall (1994)). In case only one partner handles all household finances both partners' 
access to household income may be different than in case both partners consult each other on 
all financial decisions. 
Research into the relation between financial management and the division of power 
between partners suffers from two difficulties. The first is that the financial management of 
a household is hard to characterize in one variable or feature; it includes a diversity of 
decisions varying in importance, frequency, and amounts of money involved. In order to get 
a balanced insight in the financial management of households, we will have to examine 
various types of financial decisions and possibly also their interdependence. A second 
difficulty concerns the definition of power. Notwithstanding the considerable body of 
(sociological) research on money and power, the concept of 'power' is still not clearly 
defined. 
The latter difficulty will be discussed in the next chapter. We will show that a way to 
study and explicitly define the distribution of power within households is to analyse household 
decision making within a game theoretic framework. This approach allows that both partners 
differ in their preferences to spend available household income. The extent to which both 
partners' preferences are weighed in the final household decisions reflects the distribution of 
power between both partners. 
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In the present chapter we mainly concentrate on the first difficulty concerning the 
diversity of financial management. We will investigate how households manage their 
household finances by examining how various types of financial decisions are divided between 
partners. As a starting point we use a typology of household financial allocative systems 
introduced by Pahl (1983, 1989). The systems differ in how responsibilities for managing 
household money are divided between partners, varying from totally separate to joint spheres 
of decision making. Pahl identifies five basic systems of money management1: the female 
whole wage system, the male whole wage system, the housekeeping allowance system, the 
independent management system, and the pooling system. Note that while the first four all 
involve separate spheres of responsibilities, the last system involves joint responsibility for 
household finances. According to Vogler and Pahl (1994) systems of financial allocation in 
themselves tell us little about inequalities, either in financial decision making or in access to 
money as a resource. However, the systems '(...) may, through the way in which they are 
related to inequalities in power over financial decision making, facilitate inequalities in access 
to money as a resource, which may in turn culminate in differences in living standards 
between individuals in the same household.' To investigate these relations they distinguish 
between two types of decision-making authority: strategic control is described as making the 
important and infrequent decisions that determine the major characteristics and features of the 
family, while executive management stands for implementing unimportant and time-consuming 
decisions within the limitations set by crucial and pervasive decisions made by the powerful 
spouse.2 
A first question we will address in this chapter is how the financial allocative systems 
of Pahl are related to the division of various tasks in the financial management of households. 
We do this in a similar way as Vogler and Pahl (1994), by comparing the systems reported 
by partners with their answers to other questions on household finances. These questions 
concern responsibility for everyday household spending, regular household bills, big financial 
decisions, and personal spending money. They cover various levels of decision-making 
power: for instance, while 'final say in big financial decisions' is likely to represent strategic 
According to Pahl (1983) '(•••) In reality, the proposed typology represents points on a continuum of 
allocative systems, but previous research suggests that the typology has considerable validity both within Britain 
and in other parts of the world.' 
2 Safilios-Rothschild (1976) uses the terms orchestration power and implementation power, respectively. 
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control, 'handling everyday household spending' may be an example of executive 
management. Therefore, our comparison will inform us on which kind of decision making 
relates to the allocative system of the household. We then can decide if we want to use the 
allocative system as an indicator of the division of financial responsibilities between partners. 
Such an indicator would highly simplify our further research into the relation between money 
and power: we could then focus on this indicator in stead of studying several parts of 
financial management simultaneously. 
A second issue addressed in this chapter concerns the considerable differences we find 
between the reports of two partners on their financial allocative system. Why do partners 
provide different answers? A number of studies in this and related literature have ignored the 
problem of non-corresponding answers by collecting only one family member's perception. 
However, when both partners are interviewed considerable discrepancies have been reported 
(see Safilios-Rofhschild (1970) and this chapter). 
A priori several explanations for the discrepancies can be hypothesized. A first 
hypothesis is that the question asked may be ambiguous to respondents. To determine the 
financial allocative system of the household, respondents are asked to report who usually 
manages the household finances (the exact formulation of the question and the answering 
categories can be found in section 5.2). However, 'managing household finances' may cover 
various domains of financial decision making and at each domain both partners can play a 
different role. So depending on how respondents weigh the various components of 'managing 
household finances' they will choose the best fitting category. In this case, partners may 
perfectly agree on who is responsible for various parts of household finances but still report 
different types of allocative systems. Another explanation of the observed discrepancies may 
be that respondents are simply not aware of their authority. Olson and Rabunsky (1972) find 
that respondents can rather identify what decisions are made than who makes them. Mizan 
(1994) reviews some studies on discrepancies between self-report and observation. Feminist 
research has argued that men's and women's experiences may lead them to understand the 
world differently (Harding (1986)). Furthermore, respondents may be reluctant to admit or 
deny any authority over their partner (e.g. Turk and Bell (1972), Antonides and Hagenaars 
(1992)). This last suggestion would especially explain the large number of respondents in our 
sample reporting equal sharing of household finances. We will test a number of these 
hypotheses on our data. 
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In the next section we present the data on allocative systems used in our study. The data 
are drawn from the first wave (1991-1992) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). 
In section 5.3 we compare households' reports on financial allocative systems with their 
answers to questions about other aspects of household finances. For this we select a 
subsample of couples of which both partners agree on their allocative system. In section 5.4 
we will compare these results with the answers to these questions of partners that do not 
agree on their type of financial allocation. This enables us to test a number of the above 
mentioned explanations for the observed discrepancies between partners' reports on allocative 
systems. Section 5.5 summarizes our main conclusions. 
5.2 Data: the British Household Panel Survey 3 
In the British Household Panel Survey (1991-1992) couples were asked to point out which 
financial allocative system they use to organize their household finances. The question was 
formulated as follows (Taylor (1992)): 
People organise their household finances in different ways. Which of the methods on this card 
comes closest to the way you organise yours? It doesn't have to fit exactly - just choose the 
nearest one. You can just tell me which letter applies. 
A I look after all the household money except my partner's personal money 
B My partner looks after all the household's money except my personal spending money 
C I am given a housekeeping allowance. My partner looks after the rest of the money 
D My partner is given a housekeeping allowance. I look after the rest of the money 
E We share and manage our household finances jointly 
F We keep our finances completely separate 
G Some other arrangement 
The question was answered by both partners separately. We selected a subsample of couples 
of which we had available answers of both partners and some information on education, 
3 The data used in this and the following chapter were made available through the ESRC Data Archive. The 
data were originally collected by the ESRC Research Centre on Micro-social Change at the University of Essex. 
Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Archive bear any responsibility for the analyses or 
interpretations presented here. 
62 
current income etcetera. The next table shows the answers of both partners, with HFAS 
denoting the financial allocative system reported by the husband and WFAS the allocative 
system reported by the wife. We excluded categories F and G from our table, as these were 
chosen by only few couples and also raised some interpretation difficulties. The codes of 
HFAS and WFAS are defined as follows: 
1 Wife is given a household allowance 
2 Husband looks after all household money, except wife's personal spending money 
3 Both share and manage household finances jointly 
4 Wife looks after all household money, except husband's personal spending money 
5 Husband is given a household allowance 
In our opinion this ordering of the codes reflects a higher influence of the wife in higher 
codes: while the third system is associated with joint management, the first two are 'male 
managed', and the last two 'female managed' systems. One could argue, however, that the 
order of 1 and 2 is unclear and perhaps should be reversed, as well as the order of 4 and 5. 
But since the second and the fourth system explicitly exclude the partner's personal spending 
money from the household money looked after, we associate these with a more equal 
distribution of influence over partners than the first and fifth system. We will come back to 
this in section 6.5, but meanwhile we will assume that the financial allocative systems can 
be arranged as above. 
Table 5.1: Type of financial allocative system used according to husband and wife 
WFAS -
HFAS i 
1 2 3 4 5 Tot. 
1 170 28 33 13 3 247 
2 64 154 79 15 1 313 
3 80 81 1138 174 2 1475 
4 24 10 202 524 3 763 
5 4 1 2 4 2 13 
Tot. 342 274 1454 730 11 2811 
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The table shows that in roughly two-third of the cases both partners agree on which financial 
allocative system they use (diagonal cells). If one of the first four categories is reported by 
an individual, his/her partner mostly chooses the same category. The fifth category is 
reported by only few individuals (and usually by only one of both partners) so we have to 
interprete it carefully. We see that more than half of all respondents (1475 males and 1454 
females) report to manage household finances jointly, over a quarter reports that the wife 
looks after all household money, and the housekeeping allowance system and 'husband looks 
after all the money' are reported each by about 10 percent of all respondents. These figures 
correspond very well with a study of Vogler and Pahl (1994), which found percentages of 
respectively 50, 26, 12 and 10 using the various allocative systems. However, their findings 
were based on a dataset, the (British) Social Change and Economic Life Initiative from 1987, 
which did not include reports of both partners separately about the financial allocative system 
of the household. 
If both partners give non-corresponding answers, mostly one of them reports equal 
sharing of finances (the highest off-diagonal numbers are found either in the third row or in 
the third column). Also note that on average respondents ascribe less responsibility to 
themselves than their partners do: husbands more often choose higher categories than then-
wives. Consider, for instance, the column and row corresponding with allocation type 3: 
given that their partners choose this type, 204 husbands versus 176 wives choose a category 
with less male responsibility, while 112 husbands versus 161 wives choose a category with 
less female responsibility. The same holds for the other management types. 
In the following sections we will analyse various subsamples of the dataset presented 
above. In the next section we concentrate on partners that agree on using one of the first four 
types of financial allocative systems (all observations in the first four diagonal cells). 
Alternatively, in section 5.4 we include only couples of which one of the partners reported 
'joint management of household finances' while the other partner reported a different type of 
allocation. 
5.3 Financial allocative systems and household financial decision making 
In this section we will examine how the concept 'household financial allocative system' 
relates to both partners' influence in financial decision making. We do so by investigating the 
relation between the type of financial allocation reported by couples and their answers to 
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some questions about household financial decision making. The following questions from the 
BHPS concerning household finances will be examined: 
1 In your household who has the final say in big financial decisions? 
2 In your household who makes sure that regular household bills are paid, I mean things 
like the bills for the gas, electricity, telephone? 
3 And who is mainly responsible for handling your everyday household spending? I mean 
things like food, household necessities and other items of general housekeeping? 
4 If you buy something for yourself costing between £10 and £20 wouldyou usually: ask 
your partner if you could buy it; mention it to your partner; not mention it at all? 
Note that the questions concern various types of decision-making authority, varying from 
strategic control to executive management. A priori we can hypothesize various connections 
between these components and the financial allocative system of the household, based on our 
interpretation of the latter. For instance, we expect that in households with an allocative 
system with more responsibility for the husband, he will also have the final say in big 
financial decisions, and he is probably the one who makes sure that regular household bills 
are paid. Restrictions on the personal spending of both partners may also reflect the type of 
allocation used by the household. On the other hand, an issue like 'handling everyday 
household spending' may be less dominated by the 'authority balance' between partners, and 
is perhaps determined by efficiency considerations like who usually does the shopping. 
In order to investigate the various components of household finances in relation with 
the financial allocative system reported by the couple, we select a subsample of couples of 
which both partners agreed on the type of financial allocation. In this way we avoid problems 
related with non-corresponding partners' reports on allocative systems. We also excluded the 
two couples reporting a household allowance for the husband, so that 1986 observations 
remain. In the following we will present the answers of both partners to the questions 
mentioned above in various tables. In these tables the answers of wives are listed in the 
columns under 'w', and those of the husbands under 'h'. The types of financial allocation are 
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labelled FAS1 to FAS4, representing respectively 'wife gets household allowance', 'husband 
looks after', 'household finances managed jointly', and 'wife looks after'. Please note that 
in fasl and fas2 we expect the husband to have most influence, while in fas4 the wife 
probably has most influence in household decision making. The figures in the tables denote 
the percentage of wives and husbands reporting a certain financial allocative system that 
choose a particular answering category. For instance, table 5.2 shows that from the 170 
couples reporting 'wife is given a hh allowance', 4 percent of the wives respond that the wife 
has the final say in big financial decisions, 45 percent say the husband has, and 51 percent 
say both have an equal say. For the 170 husbands the corresponding figures are respectively 
3, 43 and 54 percent. Due to missings, rounding off, or respondents choosing an answering 
category 'other', the listed percentages may not sum up to 100 percent. 
Table 5.2: Who has final say in big financial decisions? (percentages) 
WIFE 
w h 
HUSBAND 
w h 
BOTH 
w h 
FAS 1: wife allowance (170 obs.) 4 3 45 43 51 54 
FAS2: husb looks after (154 obs.) 8 4 37 49 55 47 
FAS3: jointly (1138 obs.) 7 5 20 23 73 72 
FAS4: wife looks after (524 obs.) 20 16 11 13 70 71 
Total (1986 obs.) 10 8 21 24 69 68 
Table 5.2 shows that most respondents, notwithstanding their financial allocative system, 
respond that both partners have an equal say in big financial decisions. However, to some 
extent the answers of both partners correspond with the financial management system of the 
household. Households with an allocative system with less responsibility for the wife (fasl 
or fas2) more often report the husband to have the final say (e.g. consider fasl: according 
to 45% of females and 43% of males the husband has the final say, while 4% of females and 
3% of males report that the wife has). Households with fas4 more often report the wife to 
have the final say (e.g. 20% of females and 16% of males say 'the wife' and 11 % of females 
and 13% of males say 'the husband has final say'). 
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Table 5.3: Who makes sure that regular household bills are paid? (percentages) 
WIFE 
w h 
HUSBAND 
w h 
BOTH 
w h 
FAS1: wife allowance (170 obs.) 8 5 82 86 8 6 
FAS2: husb looks after (154 obs.) 7 2 82 91 10 7 
FAS3: jointly (1138 obs.) 38 34 33 37 28 28 
FAS4: wife looks after (524 obs.) 92 88 3 3 5 8 
Total (1986 obs.) 47 44 33 36 19 19 
The answers in table 5.3 clearly reflect the type of financial allocation of the household. 
According to both partners, in case of fasl and fas2 usually the husband handles the 
household bills, while in case of fas4 usually the wife takes care of them. In couples reporting 
to share household finances (fas3) wives are as likely as husbands to handle household bills, 
while a considerable number of couples report to share responsibility for the bills. Overall 
we may conclude that some respondents seem to 'over-value' their own responsibility, as both 
sexes are mentioned more often by themselves than by their partners as the responsible person 
for the bills (e.g. in the column 'WIFE' the percentages under 'w' exceed those under 'h', 
and in the column 'HUSBAND' the opposite case holds). 
Table 5.4: Who is mainly responsible for handling your everyday household spending? (percentages) 
WIFE 
w h 
HUSBAND 
w h 
BOTH 
w h 
FAS 1: wife allowance (170 obs.) 96 92 2 2 2 5 
FAS2: husb looks after (154 obs.) 44 38 41 45 15 17 
FAS3: jointly (1138 obs.) 70 67 5 5 25 28 
FAS4: wife looks after (524 obs.) 96 92 1 2 3 6 
Total (1986 obs.) 77 73 7 7 16 19 
It is likely, as a matter of efficiency, that the person who does the (daily) shopping, i.e. in 
most cases the wife, handles everyday household spending. This is probably most explicit in 
case of fasl, where she gets an allowance to cover everyday household expenditures while 
her husband takes care of other finances. We see that most respondents report that wives are 
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mainly responsible for everyday spending, except for category fas2 in which both partners 
are equally often reported to have responsibility. Only in category fas3 a considerable number 
of couples handle everyday household spending jointly. So the answers of couples on 
everyday household spending also reflect the type of financial allocation. 
Table 5.5: If you buy something for yourself costing between £10 and £20 would you usually: ask your 
partner if you could buy it; mention it to your partner; not mention it at all? (percentages) 
ASK 
w h 
TELL 
w h 
TELL NOTH. 
w h 
FAS1: wife allowance (170 obs.) 17 5 52 69 29 25 
FAS2: husb looks after (154 obs.) 17 8 47 54 32 34 
FAS3: jointly (1138 obs.) 15 16 55 62 27 19 
FAS4: wife looks after (524 obs.) 12 22 52 54 35 22 
Total (1986 obs.) 15 16 54 60 30 21 
Table 5.5 shows that more than half of all respondents mention a personal spending to their 
partner but do not ask for permission, while another 25 percent does not mention it to their 
partner at all. Although only few individuals report to ask permission, we typically find that 
in case of fasl or fas2 wives more often report to 'ask' than husbands, and in case of fas4 
husbands more often report to 'ask' than wives. Thus the person with the least responsibility 
in the allocative system reported is more likely to ask for permission for an expenditure than 
his/her partner. 
To sum up, it may be said that who handles regular household bills most clearly reflects the 
household's financial allocative system. To a lesser but still substantial degree it is also 
related to who has authority in big financial decisions, responsibility for everyday household 
spending, and personal spending of both partners. So the household's financial allocative 
system relates to the division of responsibilities between partners both in executive 
management and in strategic control. 
Please note that the previous tables, although they inform us not explicitly on 
disagreements between partners, do reveal that overall there are no substantial differences in 
the answers of both sexes. They thus provide no evidence of husbands or wives consistently 
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under- or overreporting their responsibilities. 
5.4 Non-corresponding partners' reports on financial allocative systems 
In the previous section we have only examined couples of which both partners agree on their 
allocative system. In this way we got round a number of problems related with non-
corresponding partners' answers like, for instance, determining the 'actual' allocation system. 
We will now investigate a number of possible explanations, interpretations and consequences 
of non-corresponding reports on allocative systems by partners. We do this by comparing 
both partners' answers to the four questions about household decision making with their 
report of the household's allocative system. We restrict our analysis to couples of which one 
of both partners has chosen fas3 and the other partner has chosen a different category, as 
these combinations of non-corresponding partners' reports are observed most frequently in 
our sample (see table 5.1). We distinguish four groups of disagreeing couples: wife reports 
fas3 ('jointly') while husband reports fasl ('wife allow.') or fas2 ('husb Iks a.'), wife reports 
fas3 while husband reports fas4 ('wife Iks a.'), husband reports fas3 while wife reports fasl 
or fas2, and husband reports fas3 while wife reports fas4. While couples in the first and the 
third group combine 'joint management' with a 'male managed' allocative system, couples 
in the second and the fourth group report a combination of 'joint management' and a 'female 
managed system'. The groups contain 112, 202, 161, and 174 couples, respectively. In the 
following, we will present the answers to the questions about household finances of these four 
groups in the same way as in the previous section. 
A priori we can formulate several hypotheses about expected outcomes from this 
exercise. For instance, we can hypothesize that partners report different allocative systems 
because they have different views on the distribution of responsibilities in the household (due 
to different expectations, interests, experiences, awareness, etc.). We would then expect that 
if the wife reports fasl while her husband reports fas3, that her answers concerning the four 
aspects of household finances are comparable with the answers of wives choosing fasl in 
tables 5.2 to 5.5, while her husband's answers are more related to the answers of husbands 
choosing fas3 in tables 5.2 to 5.5. Another possible hypothesis is that both partners agree on 
their financial decision making but that their allocative system is a mixture of two types listed 
in the questionnaire. Then accidentally they may report different systems while in fact both 
would like to report a type in between. If this holds true, we would expect to find a high 
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correspondence between couples reporting a certain combination of two allocation types, 
irrespective of which sex chooses which system. Alternatively, we may hypothesize that 
women are better able to assess the financial allocative system of their household than men 
(or vice versa). We would then expect only wives' answers to be comparable with those in 
the previous section, while husbands' answers will be different. In the following tables we 
will look for evidence of these hypotheses. 
Table 5.6: Who has final say in big financial decisions? (percentages) 
WIFE 
w h 
HUSBAND 
w h 
BOTH 
w h 
w: FAS3 & h: FAS1/2 (112 obs.) 5 5 37 37 58 57 
w: FAS3 & h: FAS4 (202 obs.) 10 10 17 21 73 68 
w: FAS1/2 & h: FAS3 (161 obs.) 6 6 35 40 58 54 
w: FAS4 & h: FAS3 (174 obs.) 16 13 17 21 67 67 
FAS1/2 = wife allowance or husb looks after; FAS3 = jointly; FAS4 = wife looks after 
This table clearly shows that the first and third row are very much alike and the second and 
fourth row too. So it appears that the answers to 'who has the final say' is more determined 
by the combination of both partners' choices of allocative systems than by which sex chooses 
a certain system. A second remark concerns a comparison between this table and table 5.2, 
i.e. the one if partners report corresponding types of financial allocative systems. The 
answering patterns of the first and the third row seem to be in between the answering patterns 
in table 5.2 of couples reporting fas3 and couples reporting fasl or fas2. In the same way the 
answers of couples in the second and fourth row seem to be midway between couples in table 
5.2 reporting fas3 and fas4. This agrees with our hypothesis that partners disagreeing about 
the type of financial allocation represent a mixture of both allocation types reported. 
We also want to point at a small difference between the second and the fourth row. 
Wives of couples in the fourth row report somewhat more often to have the final say in stead 
of both than wives in the second row, which corresponds with the larger responsibility they 
ascribe to themselves in the household allocative system. Apparently, respondents' views on 
who has the final say in big financial decisions have some influence in their answers about 
allocative systems. Note, however, that if this influence was substantial we would expect 
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partners' answers to differ by a lot more here than they did in table 5.2 (as here they choose 
different allocative systems), which is surely not the case. Now let us continue to the next 
table. 
Table 5.7: Who makes sure that regular household bills are paid? (percentages) 
WIFE 
w h 
HUSBAND 
w h 
BOTH 
w h 
w: FAS3 & h: FAS1/2 (112 obs.) 12 6 69 81 19 13 
w: FAS3 & h: FAS4 (202 obs.) 80 83 6 6 13 10 
w: FAS1/2 & h: FAS3 (161 obs.) 12 12 73 70 14 17 
w: FAS4 & h: FAS3 (174 obs.) 84 76 6 10 9 13 
FAS1/2 = wife allowance or husb looks after; FAS3 = jointly; FAS4 = wife looks after 
In table 5.7 we again find a large resemblance between the first and the third row and 
between the second and the fourth. And again the answering patterns of these rows seem to 
be midway between the corresponding rows in table 5.3, i.e. the case when partners agree 
on their allocative system. If we compare the first row with the third we find that in the 
former case the husband more often than his wife responds that he handles the bills in stead 
of her or both, while in the latter case she more often reports that her husband handles them 
in stead of both. A comparison of the second row with the fourth shows that in the former 
case the husband more often than his wife responds that she handles the bills in stead of both, 
while in the latter case she more often reports that she handles them in stead of him or both. 
These differences confirm the different combinations of allocative systems chosen in the 
various cases, i.e. the partner that ascribes more responsibility for household bills to a certain 
person, is also likely to report a household allocative system with more authority for this 
person. So to some extent the reports on allocative systems appear to be caused by a different 
awareness of family authority of partners. But again these effects seem to be very small. 
A first point to note before we discuss table 5.8 is that the rows of fasl and fas2 in table 5.4 
did not show very homogeneous patterns. As in this section both types are aggregated, the 
figures in the first and third row of table 5.8 look quite different from the first two rows of 
table 5.4. 
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Table 5.8: Who is mainly responsible for handling your everyday household spending? (percentages) 
WIFE 
w h 
HUSBAND 
w h 
BOTH 
w h 
w: FAS3 & h: FAS1/2 (112 obs.) 71 65 15 20 14 15 
w: FAS3 & h: FAS4 (202 obs.) 90 92 2 3 8 4 
w: FAS1/2 & h: FAS3 (161 obs.) 71 67 17 16 12 17 
w: FAS4 & h: FAS3 (174 obs.) 97 87 1 2 2 11 
FAS1/2 = wife allowance or husb looks after; FAS3 = jointly; FAS4 = wife looks after 
Once more we find roughly similar patterns for the first and the third row, and also for the 
second and the fourth row. And again the percentages of husbands and wives in every row 
of table 5.8 lie in between the percentages of the corresponding rows of table 5.4. Minor 
differences between the first and the third row, and between the second and the fourth 
confirm the different categories chosen by both partners. However, as the similarities between 
the rows seem much larger than their differences, we conclude that the combination of 
allocative systems reported by partners better indicates the answers on 'everyday household 
spending' than information on which partner chooses which system. 
Table 5.9: If you buy something for yourself costing between £10 and £20 would you usually: ask your 
partner if you could buy it; mention it to your partner; not mention it at all? (percentages) 
ASK TELL TELL NOTH. 
w h w h w h 
w: FAS3 & h: FAS1/2 (112 obs.) 17 13 54 63 28 23 
w: FAS3 & h: FAS4 (202 obs.) 15 19 59 57 26 20 
w: FAS1/2 & h: FAS3 (161 obs.) 17 12 54 60 25 26 
w: FAS4 & h: FAS3 (174 obs.) 14 18 43 59 42 20 
FAS1/2 = wife allowance or husb looks after; FAS3 = jointly; FAS4 = wife looks after 
In table 5.9 the first and third row are very similar, but the fourth row is a bit different from 
the second. Wives report much more often to 'tell nothing' in stead of 'tell' in the last row 
than in the second row. The table shows that in the first and third row the wife more often 
'asks' than her husband, while in the second and fourth row the opposite case holds. 
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We have to be careful with comparing these rows with the ones in table 5.5, as these are very 
much alike amongst themselves and especially the last two columns show no clear pattern 
over the various allocative systems. However, if we limit ourselves to the first column of 
table 5.9, we observe that the percentages of wives and husbands reporting to 'ask' are in 
between the reported percentages in the corresponding rows of table 5.5. 
Summing up, we draw two conclusions from the previous tables. Firstly, the disagreement 
between partners about financial allocative systems may not be as large as they seem. The 
tables showed that partners who 'disagree' on the type of financial allocation do not exhibit 
larger discrepancies on who is responsible for different parts of household finances, in 
comparison with partners who 'agree' on the type of financial allocation. This supports our 
hypothesis that the partners actually agree on their allocative system but that they choose 
different categories to express it, due to, for instance, their system being in between two 
systems listed in the questionnaire4, or both partners weighing the various components of 
household finances differently. Secondly, we do not find any evidence of one of both partners 
being better able to assess the allocative system of the household. More than that, in case of 
disagreement the combination of both partners' reports appears to give us more consistent 
information on how household finances are organised than only wives' reports or only 
husbands'. We therefore conclude that we prefer using both partners' reports about household 
finances to collecting only one family member's perception of financial management. 
5.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter we investigated to what extent household financial allocative systems reflect 
the division of responsibilities in the financial management of households. We found that 
allocative systems most clearly relate to who handles regular household bills (executive 
management), but are also related to who has the final say in big financial decisions, and to 
personal spending of both partners (strategic control). So aspects of both executive 
management and strategic control seem to be incorporated. In our opinion this combination 
of different types of decision-making authority hampers a clear interpretation of allocative 
systems. It therefore seems not justified to use allocative systems as a single indicator of the 
4 see footnote 1 of this chapter. 
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financial management of households. We do believe, however, that they provide useful 
information on the division of decision making, in addition to the other questions on 
household finances discussed. As a consequence, in the following chapter we will use all five 
questions on household finances to further investigate the relation between money and power. 
We also examined the problem of non-corresponding reports on allocative systems by 
two partners. Our results support a hypothesis that partners reporting different systems 
actually agree on the organisation of household finances, but that they simply choose different 
categories to express it. This could indicate that partners have some problems to choose one 
of the five categories; in real life, allocative systems may not correspond exactly with the 
proposed typology. 
The study presented in this chapter was explorative in nature. Our main purpose was 
to understand our data on household financial allocative systems, and to investigate their 
relation with other information on the household's financial management. In the next chapter 
we will concentrate on theoretical models that can explain the financial management of 
households, and test them empirically. 
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6 Financial management, efficiency, and bargaining power 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we will continue our research into the relation between financial management 
and the division of power between partners. While chapter 5 concentrated on the diversity of 
financial management, in this chapter the conceptualization of 'power' will be the central 
theme. 
In most economic research money is only considered at the household or family level. 
Studies on measuring income inequality or poverty usually assume that all household members 
equally share the household's income and that there are no inequalities or different values or 
goals between husbands and wives. Only recently economists have investigated the effect of 
alternative assumptions about sharing within families on income distribution (e.g. Davies and 
Joshi, 1994). This indicates the extent to which ignoring intrahousehold distributional 
considerations may underestimate inequality within households1. Woolley and Marshall 
(1994) examine several measures of inequality and conclude that '(...) accounting for 
intrahousehold inequality provides a more accurate and more comprehensive measure of 
overall economic inequality'. 
In sociology, however, the intrahousehold distribution of money has received ample 
attention. Various studies suggest a significant association between a household's financial 
organization and inequalities between partners in decision making. Most of them refer to the 
'family power'-literature2, which has studied spousal decision making since 1960. For 
instance, Treas (1993) concludes that apart from transaction cost considerations, marital 
power differentials influence a couple's choice between holding joint or separate bank 
accounts. Blumstein and Schwarz (1983) find that'(...) cohabiting women are watchful and 
independent in financial matters, the possible loss of power being the driving force behind 
their caution'. In general, 'power' is conceptualized as the relative decision-making status of 
1 Haddad and Kanbur (1990) were the first to quantify how much of a difference the existence of 
intrahousehold inequality could make. However, they investigated calorie intake of household members, and not 
the distribution of income. 
2 Also denoted 'marital power'. 
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husband and wife in a household as measured by a number of decision-making items. Most 
studies argue that the power balance in a family relates to the comparative resources (like 
income, education and occupational status) of husband and wife, elaborating on Blood and 
Wolfe's (1960) 'resource theory of family power'. Various studies have tested this resource 
theory, both in developed and in developing countries; for an overview of family power 
research, see Safilios-Rothschild (1970), McDonald (1980), and Mizan (1994). However, a 
clear analytical framework to investigate how resources may influence the power balance in 
a household is not provided in these studies. 
In our opinion, an appropriate way to study and explicitly define the distribution of 
power within households is to analyze household decision making within a game theoretic 
framework. A bargaining model of household behaviour allows that both partners differ in 
their preferences to spend available household income. In that case, the distribution of power 
between partners is reflected in the extent to which both partners' preferences are weighed 
in the final household decisions: the most powerful spouse will be better able to realize 
his/her preferences. In section 6.3 we will further discuss the bargaining model of household 
behaviour. 
Although most sociological studies on financial management focus on a possible relation 
with family power, some of them also point at the burden of managing household finances. 
Pahl (1980) finds that in low income households, when financial management is more of a 
'chore' than a source of power, women typically manage the household's money. 
Alternatively, in high income households men appear to be more likely to control finances 
while their wives receive a housekeeping allowance. So control over expenditures not 
necessarily means more power, but may also stand for the arduous task of making ends meet. 
This suggests that (at least) two aspects play a role in the household's choice how to divide 
household finances between both partners. One is the power aspect, based on the assumption 
that the one who controls can influence the final outcome. The other is the efficiency aspect, 
as the division of financial management between partners may be part of an efficient division 
of tasks within the household. 
While we suggested to analyze the power aspect by using a bargaining model of 
household decision making, the efficiency aspect fits a more classical type of models using 
a household production function. Although these models have been used extensively to 
analyze both partners' allocation of time between work in the market, work at home, and 
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leisure (e.g. Becker, 1965; Gronau, 1973 and 1977; Kerkhofs, 1994), as far as we know the 
topic of money management has not yet been examined in this framework. In section 6.2 we 
will specify a household production model to explain the type of financial management used 
by households. Due to data availability this approach considers both partners' time inputs as 
the only characteristic of the household's financial management. 
The bargaining and the household production approach each suggest alternative effects 
of certain household characteristics on the division of finances between partners. As will be 
discussed in section 6.4, empirical estimation of these effects may inform us on what model 
provides the best interpretation of the financial management of households. A complicating 
factor in this respect is that the financial management of households involves a diversity of 
decisions varying in importance, frequency and amounts of money involved. We therefore 
choose to analyze separately five different types of information on financial management, 
based on the same questions as we used in chapter 5: A) the household's financial allocative 
system, or 'who looks after household finances'; B) who has the final say in big financial 
decisions; C) who pays regular household bills; D) who handles everyday household 
spending; and E) do partners ask permission for personal spendings between £10 and £20. 
We already discussed in chapter 5 that these various parts of financial management reflect 
different types of decision-making authority, using Pahl's distinction between strategic control 
and executive management. Vogler and Pahl (1994) suggest that strategic control concerns 
important and infrequent decisions with the labour input being small in relation to resulting 
power, so the power aspect may very well overrule the efficiency argument. Alternatively, 
for executive management, concerning time-consuming and routine-like decisions within 
certain limitations, the efficiency argument is probably more persuasive and the household 
production approach may be most appropriate. 
In sections 6.4 and 6.5 we examine for each part of financial management (A to E) 
whether the power argument or the efficiency argument applies in the division of 
responsibilities between partners. This allows us not only to test to what extent power and 
efficiency considerations play a role in the financial organization within households, but also 
to test Pahl's suggested classification of the five parts into strategic control and executive 
management. Please note that in the following by 'the household's financial management' we 
mean the division between partners of specific elements (from A to E) of managing household 
finances. Although several studies interchangeably use terms like 'decision making power', 
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'authority', 'responsibility', and 'management', we choose to use the last term as we think 
it is the most neutral term. 'Decision making power' may be more associated with strategic 
control and 'financial responsibilities' with executive management. 
In the following two sections we first concentrate on theoretical models that can explain 
the type of financial management used by households. In section 6.2 we analyze the choice 
of a financial management system by a household production model, focusing on the time 
inputs of both partners. In section 6.3 we concentrate on possible power aspects in the 
organization of household finances, and analyze financial management within a bargaining 
framework. Next, section 6.4 discusses how both theoretical models can be tested 
empirically, the results of which are presented in section 6.5. In this analysis the five specific 
elements of financial management are all considered one at a time. Finally, section 6.6 
concludes. 
6.2 A household production model of financial management 
In this section we interprète the management of household finances as a specific form of 
household production. Starting point is that all parts of financial management, varying from 
daily shopping to taking out a mortgage, cost time. We consider both partners' time inputs 
as the only characteristic of the household's financial management, so possible power aspects 
are ignored in this section. We assume the amount of home production (i.e. managing 
household finances, other forms of household production are ignored) to be exogenous, but 
the time inputs of both partners used to realize it can be chosen by the household. Note that 
this assumption distinguishes our approach from traditional analyses of household production, 
in which the household can choose the desired amount of home production as well. This 
distinction results from the nature of home production considered: while most examples in 
literature define home production to include cooking, cleaning, child care, and other services 
for which market alternatives may be or may not be available, we limit our analysis to 
financial management, consisting of activities that can only be done by the household's 
partners themselves. 
The amount of home production resulting from the time inputs of both partners is 
described by a household production function: 
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2 = z(Hm,Hf) (6.1) 
where H m and H f denote the time inputs of the male and the female partner respectively. The 
optimal allocation of both partners' time to home production and other activities results from 
the household maximizing its utility subject to certain time and budget constraints and the 
home production function. We assume that the two-adult household has the following (joint) 
utility function: 
where X is the amount of consumption goods, and L m and Lf are hours of leisure enjoyed by 
the male and female partner respectively. Note that we assume that partners do not derive any 
utility from managing household finances, so home production does not enter the utility 
function. However, we assume that the existence of the household requires an 'amount' of 
financial management Z, such that z(Hm,H f)=Z. The choice of a certain specification for this 
production function will influence the substitutability between both partners time inputs. For 
instance, if we specify Z as: 
the time input of the husband can be substituted by the time input of the wife at a constant 
rate al&. Further on, however, we will show that this specification in most cases will lead 
to corner solutions, i.e. only one partner will participate in home production, while in our 
data we observe both partners participating in financial management very frequently. We 
therefore choose a more general specification, in which corner solutions are less prevalent. 
We assume the production function z to be concave, so z is increasing in both its arguments 
and the matrix of second derivates is negative semi-definite, with H m and H f substitutable at 
diminishing marginal rates. 
Let T be the total time endowment of each partner in a household. Each partner's time 
can be allocated to leisure (Lp), home production (Hp), or working in a paid job (Np), so the 
following time constraint must hold: 
U = u(X,Lm,Lf) (6.2) 
Z = a.Hm + Wf (6.3) 
L P + N P + H P = T> P=mf (6.4) 
Moreover, the household is restricted to the household's budget constraint: 
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X = u + w.N + wfNf (6.5) 
~ m m J J 
where n is the household's non-labour income, and w p is the net wage rate of partner p. 
The household maximizes its joint utility function (6.2) subject to the restrictions given by 
(6.4) and (6.5), the household production function (6.1), and non-negativity constraints on 
X, Lp, Hp, and N p, where p=m,f. We assume that the non-negativity constraints on Lp are 
not binding in an optimal allocation, so both partners have a positive amount of leisure. The 
solution to the household's decision problem can then be characterized by the following 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions (after rewriting): 
-M + i - v . J L = o (6.6) 
dL m dH 
-ÈE + X.- v . A = 0 (6.7) 
.w - + a = 0 (o.o) 
dX m dL P m 
317 dU .wf - — + u, = 0 
dX f dL, f 
*m-Nn> = V-fNf = 0 
XM.H„ — Xr.Hr — 0 
m m f f 
(6.9) 
(6.10) 
(6.11) 
[ipzO, Np>0, XpiO, Hp*0, p=mf. 
where ^ p and Xp are the shadow prices of the inequality constraints on labour time and home 
production time of partner p respectively, and v of the home production restriction. 
In an optimal allocation of time, denoted by (Lm*,Lf*,Nm*,Nf*,Hm*,Hf*), both partners spend 
a positive amount of time in a paid job (i.e. Nm*>0 and N f*>0) if jum=ju f=0, so if 
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BU I BLm wn 
au I 3L, "wl 
(6.13) 
"7 '7 
Alternatively, if the right-hand side exceeds (is lower than) the left-hand side of the equation, 
only the husband (wife) has a paid job. 
In an optimal allocation both partners participate in financial management (i.e. Hm*>0 and 
H f*>0) if X r a = A f = 0 . From (6.5) and (6.6) it then follows that: 
3U/BL dzlBH (6.14) 
(6.15) 
dU I BLf dz I 3Hf 
which, in case both partners participate in the labour market, results in: 
dz I BHj: wf 
Alternatively, if inequality holds in formula (6.14) it is optimal that only one of both partners 
handles financial management. 
Note that the right hand side of (6.14) reflects the substitutability of both partners' time 
inputs in the home production function. If we choose specification (6.2), the substitutability 
will be constant (namely alp~) for all values of H m and H f. The isoquants for this case are 
presented in figure 6.1.a. 
Wm/Wf 
Figure 6.1.a: Isoquants Tor home 
production function Z = aM^ + B. H, 
Figure 6.1.b: Isoquants for concave 
home production function zCH,,,!!,) 
The figure shows that if wm/w f is either smaller or larger (for instance, wm7w f ' in figure 
6.1.a) than a//3, it is optimal that the financial management is handled by one partner. Only 
when wm/w f exactly equals a/0 it does not matter which partner handles financial 
management. However, we assumed the production function z(Hm,Hf) to be concave, in which 
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case both partners' time inputs are substitutable at diminishing marginal rates. Figure 6.1.b 
shows that in this case corner solutions may occur less frequently. 
We are particularly interested in how the optimal distribution of home production over both 
partners relates to both their wages, so if the functions hn, and h f given by: 
are increasing, decreasing or constant in both partners' wage rates. 
Let us first consider the case that in the household's optimal time allocation 
(I^L f\Nm ' ,,N f ' \Hm*,H f*) both partners participate in the labour force and in home production, 
so (6.15) holds. We know that the amount of home production depends only on H m and H f. 
Now what will happen if w m increases? To restore equality in (6.15) (3z/dHJ/(3z/3Hf) must 
increase as well. Figure 6.1.b shows that the household can achieve this by decreasing H m 
in favour of H f. Similarly, if the wife's wage increases, the household will increase H m at the 
expense of H f. 
Up to this point we have only considered interior solutions, namely when both partners 
participate in financial management and have a paid job. Now let us briefly examine what 
happens in case only one of both partners handles financial management (we still assume that 
both have a paid job). First suppose it is entirely handled by the husband, i.e. Hm*>0, 
H f*=0, Xm=0 and Xf>0, so the Kuhn-Tucker conditions lead to: 
dz I cW w ., . 1 > —H (6.17) 
dz I BHf wf 
Then an increase in wm/w f will affect (Hm*,Hf*) only if the increase is high enough to change 
the inequality sign in (6.17) into an equality. The household will then substitute units H m by 
H f until either the marginal rate of substitution equals the wage ratio, or the maximum amount 
of the female's time needed for home production is reached. So in correspondence with the 
case of an interior solution discussed above, a (large enough) rise in wm/w f will cause a fall 
in Hra* and a rise in Hf*. A decrease in wm/w f will have no effect on (Hm*,Hf*), as the 
inequality in (6.17) will still hold: the male will keep providing the maximal amount of his 
time needed for home production. 
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The case where only the wife participates in home production is analyzed analogously. 
Finally, let us briefly mention the relationship between wm/w f and (Hm,H f) in case at least one 
of both partners does not have a paid job. In these cases we have no information on wp for 
the non-participating partner, but we do know that it is lower than the household's marginal 
utility of p's leisure time. Depending on the household's production function and the marginal 
utilities of both partners' leisure time, the household finances are managed by one or by both 
partners. It can be shown that an increase in the wage of one of both partners will either 
decrease this partner's share in home production, or will have no effect at all on the 
distribution of home production between partners. So overall we again expect to find a 
negative relationship between wm/w f and Hm . 
So far we have not discussed any variables other than wages that can influence both partners' 
optimal time inputs in financial management. In addition to this we assume an individual's 
productivity in financial management to increase with his/her level of education, so the male's 
share in managing household finances will increase with his own education level, and 
decrease with the female's education level. 
The main conclusion of this section is that the household production model suggests a 
negative relationship between a partner's wage rate and his participation in financial 
management. Figure 6.2 shows how Hm* and Hf* can relate to wm/w f when the wife is more 
productive in home production than the husband. In section 6.5 we will empirically 
investigate if the suggested relationships between wm/w f and H r a and H f hold. 
management by joint management by 
husband only manag. wife only 
Figure 6.2: Possible relationship between BL^ . 
and wm/w f and between Hf* and wm/w f. 
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6.3 A bargaining model of financial management 
In the previous section we assumed that both partners' time inputs into financial management 
result from an efficient distribution of labour within the household. Alternatively, we will 
now focus exclusively on possible power aspects of the financial management of households. 
In sociological literature several authors have suggested that patterns of financial management 
within the household reflect the division of power in decision-making between partners (e.g. 
Blumberg, 1991; Blumstein and Schwartz, 1983; Hertz, 1992; Vogler and Pahl, 1994; 
Wilson, 1987). Unfortunately, most of these papers do not clearly define what is meant by 
marital power. To define explicitly the division of power between partners we analyze 
household decision making in a bargaining framework. 
A bargaining model of household behaviour allows both partners to have different utility 
functions, so their preferences may differ. We denote the utility functions of both partners 
reflecting their preferences on X, Lm, and Lf by Um(X,Lm,Lf) and U^X.L^Lf) respectively.3 
In case of egoistic agents, the leisure of one spouse does not directly affect the utility of the 
other spouse so the utility functions reduce to U'(X,L;), i=m,f. If partners choose to behave 
noncooperatively, each will maximize his or her own utility function given the behaviour of 
his/her partner and a noncooperative equilibrium (e.g. a Nash or a Stackelberg equilibrium) 
will result. We assume that in this case there is no pooling of resources and no joint 
consumption, and partners attain utility levels and ^ f N (where N stands for Nash). These 
noncooperative outcomes depend on both partners' wages and nonlabour income. 
Alternatively, partners can behave cooperatively by making agreements. As the partner 
who would loose the most in case of disagreement is more likely to make concessions, the 
utility levels in the noncooperative outcome can be interpreted as 'threat points' in the 
bargaining process. The partners will therefore choose an allocation from the set of Pareto-
optimal allocations of the household. These are solutions to the following maximization 
problem: 
3 X, Lm , and L f have the same meaning as in the previous section; X is the amount of consumption goods, 
and Lm and L f are hours of leisure enjoyed by the male and female partner respectively. 
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max Uhk = W(Um(X,Lm,Lf), U\X,Lmty) 
S.t. um(x,Lm,L) * r ^ w / ) ( 6 - 1 8 ) 
Uf(X,Lm,L) * f > K , ^ « ) 
where U h h is the household's utility function, and a denotes all variables (apart from wages) 
that determine the noncooperative outcomes for both partners, like nonwage incomes, human 
capital, or the opportunity cost of being married.4 Note that the greater a spouse's threat 
point, the stronger the relative bargaining power of this spouse will be. 
If patterns of financial management really reflect the division of power in decision-making 
between partners, we would expect to find a relationship between the participation in financial 
management of both partners and their relative bargaining power. A possible explanation for 
such a relation is that if a partner has a larger share in the management of household 
finances, this person can influence household decisions in favour of his/her own utility 
function5. If both partners know that this is the case, their participation in the household's 
financial management will exactly correspond with their bargaining power. The larger a 
partner's relative power, the larger will be his/her share in the management of household 
finances. 
The maximization problem in (6.18) shows that the outcome of the cooperative 
bargaining game depends on both partners' threat points * m N and ¥ f N . Consequently, if we 
know how the threat points of both partners relate to their wage rates, we also know how the 
household's financial management relates to both partners' wage rates. Remember that we 
assume that in case of noncooperative behaviour there is no pooling and no joint consumption 
by partners. We will show that under this assumption a rise in a partner's wage rate implies 
4 McElroy (1990) mentions various so-called extrahousehold environmental parameters (EEPs), that may 
shift the threat points in Nash bargaining models of household demand but do not affect prices and nonwage 
incomes faced by married individuals. Examples are measures of competitiveness in the marriage market, 
parents' wealth, additional nonwage income received in the form of welfare when unmarried, and tax changes 
due to leaving marriage. 
5 For instance, Gray (1979) found that husbands who handed the whole of their wages over to their wives, 
were less likely to work overtime than husbands who gave their wives a fixed housekeeping allowance. In the 
latter case husbands often regard extra earnings as personal spending money and so had a greater incentive to 
do overtime. 
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an increase in his threat point ^ ' N , using the Stone-Geary specification of individual 
preferences. 
In the non-cooperative situation with no pooling and no joint consumption, partner m 
maximizes: 
Vm(Xm£m,Lf) = am l og (L m - Y m ) + « / l ogdy - Y / ) + % ^ë(Xm-yx) (6.19) 
where L, is the (given) amount of leisure enjoyed by partner f, Xm is the amount of goods 
consumed by m, nm is m's non-labour income, and ax = l-am-a f. Similarly, partner f 
maximizes: 
Uf(X^m,L) = ß m l o g ( I m - ô m ) + ßflog(Lf - Ô7) + ß x log^-Ô^) 
s.t. Xf = wf(T - L) + \if 
(6.20) 
with |8X = l-|3m-|8f. Solving the maximization problem (6.19) gives the optimal amount of 
leisure for partner m: 
CT CT CT ' CT 1 -a^ •(
WCTR + "CT ~ W m Y m " Yx) (6.21) 
The utility level associated with this optimal solution is: 
w. 
^lOgJ/y - Y/] 
(6.22) 
+ ax log[(l-a).(wmr +ji r a-w r a Y m-Y x)] 
with a s a m /(l-a f ). The optimal noncooperative outcome for partner f can be derived 
analogously. Making use of the 'Envelope theorem' it follows that: 
> 0 and "
T N 
dWj 
0 , i*j (6.23) 
So if a partner's wage rate increases, the noncooperative Nash-outcome of this partner 
increases as well, while the other partner's outcome remains the same. Note that this result 
depends on our assumption of no pooling and no joint consumption in the noncooperative 
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outcome. In Appendix 6A we show that the effect of a wage increase remains unclear if we 
allow pooling and joint consumption in the noncooperative outcome, in accordance with 
Kooreman and Kapteyn's (1990) model. 
Assuming that our bargaining interpretation of financial management is correct, a rise 
in the male's wage rate implies an increase in his relative bargaining power, which will raise 
his share in household financial management. Alternatively, an increase in the wife's wage 
rate will cause a positive (bargaining) effect on her share of household finances. So in 
contrast with our results in the previous section, in the bargaining framework the wage rate 
of a partner has a positive effect on his/her participation in financial management. 
6.4 Testing the household production model versus the bargaining model 
Both the household production model and the bargaining model can be used to explain the 
financial management of households theoretically. The previous sections show that a crucial 
difference between both approaches is the expected influence of both partners' wage rates. 
While the household production model predicts a negative relationship between an individual's 
wage and his/her share in financial management, the bargaining model implies a positive 
relationship. This difference between both models forms the basis of the method we will 
apply to test both models empirically. 
To investigate how the financial management of households relates to various household 
characteristics, we consider the division between partners of five different parts of household 
finances (in the following also referred to as categories 'A' to 'E'): A) looking after 
household finances, denoted by the household's financial allocative system (as discussed in 
chapter 5); B) having the final say in big financial decisions; C) paying regular household 
bills; D) handling everyday household spending; and E) asking permission for personal 
expenditures between £10 and £20. Each part is likely to reflect a different level of decision-
making authority. A priori, in accordance with Vogler and Pahl (1994), we expect that 
'handling everyday household spending' and 'taking care of regular household bills' are 
examples of executive management, i.e. unimportant and time-consuming decisions within 
limitations. For these parts the efficiency argument seems to be more persuasive than the 
power argument, so they probably best fit the household production model. Alternatively, we 
expect that 'having a final say in big financial decisions' and 'asking permission for small 
personal expenditures' involve strategic control. Consequently, they may better fit the 
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bargaining model. We do not postulate any expectations with respect to 'the household's 
financial allocative system' because of our findings in chapter 5. This variable seemed to be 
related to all the other parts of household finances, and is therefore likely to reflect both 
efficiency and power considerations. The empirical results may give us some hints on if we 
should interprète the various parts of financial management in terms of marital power or as 
the result of an efficient division of duties within the household. 
In the following subsections we further elaborate on how the household production and 
the bargaining model apply to the parts A to E of financial management. In accordance with 
our notation in sections 6.2 and 6.3 we will denote the time spent by partner i on part x of 
financial management by H*. As we have information provided by both partners separately 
on parts A to D, we check if both answers correspond with each other. In our analysis of 
these four parts we only use observations for which both partners have chosen the same 
answering categories. For category E, however, we only have answers of one partner 
available. 
The most crucial explanatory variables in our estimations are both partners' wage rates 
and their education levels. Other possibly influential variables we will consider are the 
number of children present, importance of religion, and the amount of non-labour income of 
the household. These variables were not mentioned in the previous sections as they play no 
particular role in the distinction between the household production and the bargaining 
interpretation of financial management. However, they may very well help to discriminate 
between the various types of financial management used by households. 
6.5 Empirical results 
To be able to investigate empirically the relationship between wages and the various parts of 
financial management we need information on both partners' wage rates, also of individuals 
who do not report to have a job in the survey. We therefore first estimate a wage equation 
for males and females separately, based on the individuals for which we do observe the wage 
rate. We use age, age squared and four dummy variables for level of education as explanatory 
variables. The resulting wage equations are (t-values in parentheses): 
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wm = 0.21 + OASage - 0.002age2 + 0.87ei + 1.64e2 + 3.42e3 + 3.38e4 
(0.21) (3.84) (-3.22) (4.30) (7.34) (10.55) (12.07) 
wf = 1.30 + 0.09age - O.OOlage2 + 0.60ei + 0.84e2 + 2.89e5 + 2.65e4 
(1.90) (2.82) (-2.34) (4.53) (4.63) (12.01) (12.78) 
with R2s of 0.11 and 0.16 respectively6. Using these equations we calculate predicted values 
of wage rates for individuals in our sample that do not participate in the labour force. For all 
other individuals we use observed wage rates in our estimations.7 
6.5.1 The household's financial allocative system 
The question asked to respondents was8: 
'Which of the following methods comes closest to the way your household finances are 
organised?' 
1) Female partner is given a housekeeping allowance 
2) Male partner looks after all household money, except wife's personal money 
3) Both share and manage household finances jointly 
4) Female partner looks after all household money, except husband's personal money 
Other answering categories are excluded in this analysis. The interpretation of the four 
answering categories and their ranking may be different in the bargaining framework than in 
the household production approach. In terms of marital power we would order the four 
systems as indicated above, reflecting an increasing influence of the wife going from 
6 These equations are estimated by OLS. In theory, one should correct for the selection bias caused by using 
only participating individuals in the estimation of the wage equation. However, for the males Heckman's two-
step procedure gives poor results and the implied estimate of p lies outside the (-1,1) range. For the females the 
procedure offers no problems, but the selection bias has no significant effect in the wage equation. 
7 It is not an uncommon procedure to use observed wage rates for workers and predicted wage rates for 
non-workers. See e.g. Kooreman (1986, p.23) and van Soest (1990, p. 102). Note that by using this method 
random variation in wages across individuals is ignored for non-workers. 
8 Slightly reformulated. For the exact formulation see section 5.2. 
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answering category 1 to 4. 9 In order to test if the bargaining approach can explain the 
allocative system used by the household we will estimate an ordered probit model based on 
these four answering categories. In this model a latent variable, say z, is defined, which 
represents the wife's share in managing household finances. When we denote the financial 
allocative system reported by the couple by y, the ordered probit model defines the following 
relationship between z and y: 
z = P'x + € € ~ JV(0,1) 
= 2 if u 0 < z , <6'26) 
= 3 if u-j < z * k4 
= 4 if z > u 2 
We normalize ju0 to zero. Assuming that the bargaining interpretation is correct, this method 
offers us an opportunity to test if the ordering of the allocative systems as we proposed indeed 
reflects an increasing influence of the wife for higher codes. If this is not the case, the 
estimated n's will not be of increasing order (i.e. H0<II1<IM2). Furthermore, we will discuss 
if the estimated 0, reflecting the relationship between the distribution of financial management 
between partners (z) and a number of socio-economic characteristics of the household, 
supports the bargaining model of section 6.3 or not. 
In the household production model only the time inputs of both partners matter. In that 
case the 'household allowance' system (answering category 1) is somewhat difficult to 
interprète, as both partners spend some time on managing household finances but each 
operates at his/her own level of authority. As we do not want to aggregate this category with 
answering category 3 (shared management), we leave it out of our analysis so that three 
categories remain: 2, 3 and 4. We analyse the household's choice between these three 
categories by estimating two probit equations: one concentrating on the choice between 
category 4 (Hm A=0) versus 2 and 3 (H m A >0), and one on the choice between category 2 
(H f A=0) versus 3 and 4 (H f a>0). In words: the first probit equation examines if the husband 
participates or not, and the second examines participation or not for the wife. We prefer to 
9 One could argue that the mutual ordering of 1 and 2 is unclear and perhaps should be reversed. But since 
the second category explicitly excludes the wife's personal spending money from the household money looked 
after, we associate it with a more equal distribution of power between partners than the first category. In the 
following we will test the ordering of allocative systems empirically. 
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estimate two probit equations in stead of one ordered probit on the three answering 
categories. This enables us to investigate if the participation of the wife relates to the same 
extent to certain variables as the participation of the husband. If this is the case both probits 
will give exactly the same results, also similar to the results from one ordered probit. 
We thus estimate three probit equations, in which the following dummies are used as 
dependent variables: 
(Al) 0 = Wife is given a household allowance (160 obs) 
1 = Husb. looks after all household finances (147 obs) 
2 = Both share household finances (1055 obs) 
3 = Wife looks after all household finances (491 obs) 
(A2) 0 = Husb. looks after all household finances or both share household finances (H m A >0) 
1 = Wife looks after all household finances (H m A =0) 
(A3) 0 = Wife looks after all household finances or both share household finances (H f A >0) 
1 = Husband looks after all household finances (H f A=0) 
The first is based on possible power aspects of various household financial allocative systems 
and the last two concentrate on both partners time inputs. Note that a majority of households 
(57 per cent) reports to share household finances. 
As explanatory variables we include the variables mentioned in the previous section with 
the wage rates of both partners being the crucial ones to distinguish between the two 
suggested theoretical models. Remember that in the model discussed in section 6.2 the ratio 
wm/w f plays a role. We therefore include the logarithms of both wage rates; if it really is their 
ratio that is of importance, we will then find that both coefficients are of equal magnitude and 
have opposite signs. The signs of the estimated coefficients may inform us on what approach 
is the most appropriate: the one discussed in section 6.2 or the one in section 6.3. 
The empirical results are presented in table 6.1. The ordered probit presented in the 
first column is based on a ranking of the financial allocative systems according to increasing 
power for the female partner. The results show that a lower male wage rate results in a 
higher share of the female in the management of household finances, which strongly supports 
the bargaining model. The female's share is also increased by a lower education level of the 
male and a lower household non-labour income. Note that the mu's are estimated without any 
difficulties. An alternative model in which the order of 'wife is given an allowance and 
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'husband looks after' were reversed could not be estimated.10 This finding confirms our 
assumption that the household allocative systems should be ordered as suggested above. 
Table 6.1: Probit analyses of financial allocative systems (t-values in parentheses) 
variables Al A2 A3 
constant 1.741 (12.49)" -0.157 (-1.03) -1.434 (-7.26)" 
-0.215 (-3.75)" -0.159 (-2.13)" 0.169 ( 1.67)' 
ln(wf) 0.140 ( 1.60) 0.085 ( 0.84) -0.263 (-1.97)" 
education male -0.123 (-4.64)" -0.172 (-5.04)" 0.054 ( 1.26) 
education female 0.039 ( 1.27) -0.045 (-1.22) -0.040 (-0.82) 
# children -0.006 (-0.25) 0.072 ( 2.25)" 0.017 ( 0.40) 
non-labour income -0.030 (-4.28)" -0.033 (-3.50)" 0.034 ( 3.49)" 
religion important 0.063 ( 0.99) 0.019 ( 0.23) -0.070 (-0.66) 
mu(l) 0.401 (12.80)" 
mu(2) 2.043 (42.07)" 
The last two columns of table 6.1 show that the signs of the coefficients for InOv) and ln(wf) 
do not correspond with the household production model: both partners' time inputs in 
financial management increase with their own wage rate. For instance, the probability that 
the wife's time input is zero decreases with her wage (see third column). Apart from these 
'own wage'-effects, the probability of 'husband looks after' is negatively related with his 
partner's wage, which contradicts the household production model. 
We also find that a higher non-labour income increases the male's share and decreases 
the female's share in the management of household finances. This appears to be similar to 
Pahl's (1980) finding that in high income households men are more likely to control finances 
(while their wives receive a housekeeping allowance) than in low incomes. However, in 
contrast with Pahl the result does not concern total income but only non-labour income, so 
wage incomes of both partners do not account for the effect. Furthermore, the probability of 
'wife looks after' increases with the number of children, and decreases with the education 
level of her partner. The latter effect can be explained, within the household production 
context, by our assumption that the male's productivity in financial management increases 
with his education level. 
92 
The estimation algorithm stops as the calculated /is turn out not to be of increasing order. 
6.5.2 The final say in big financial decisions 
The second part of financial management investigated by us is based on the following 
question: 
'In your household who has the final say in big financial decisions?' 
1) husband 
2) equal say 
3) wife 
An interpretation of these answering categories in the bargaining framework is 
straightforward: the power of the female partner increases with higher answering codes. An 
interpretation in terms of time inputs involved is less trivial; the time spent on the final say 
may be small in comparison with the search for information preceding the final say, and 
possibly these two stages concern different partners. However, we assume that if a partner 
has the final say, he or she is the only person spending time on making the final decision. 
Actually, as in our probit equations only differences in time inputs between the various 
answering categories matter, the exact assumption of time spent on an activity is not 
important. Instead, the assumption that a partner's time input is higher or lower than the other 
partner's time input in one answering category compared to another category is crucial. 
To analyze the information provided by this question we estimate two probit equations, taking 
the following two dummy variables as a starting point: 
(Bl) 0 = Husband or both have final say in big financial decisions (H m B >0) (1826 obs) 
1 = Wife has final say in big financial decisions (H m B =0). (106 obs) 
(B2) 0 = Wife or both have final say in big financial decisions (H f B>0) (1538 obs) 
1 = Husband has final say in big financial decisions (H B =0). (394 obs) 
In a majority of households both partners have a final say in big financial decisions. In 5 per 
cent of the households the wife has a final say, and in 20 per cent the husband has. Table 6.2 
presents the results of both probit estimations. The first column shows insignificant 
coefficients for ln(wj and ln(wf), and for most other variables. Alternatively, in the second 
column a rise in the husband's wage increases the probability that he has the final say in big 
financial decisions. A possible explanation is that the wage differences between households 
reporting 'both have final say' and 'wife has final say' (analyzed in Bl) are smaller than wage 
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differences between households reporting 'both have final say' and 'husband has final say' 
(analyzed in B2). Another explanation for the poor results in column one may be the small 
number of observations (about 5 per cent) where the dependent variable takes the value one. 
Note, however, that the signs of the wage coefficients in the second column point to the 
bargaining model. 
A higher education level of the female appears to decrease the probability that the 
husband has the final say in big financial decisions. Alternatively, a larger number of children 
increases the probability that the husband has the final say. The latter result may also point 
at the bargaining model; Ott (1992) shows, considering fertility as a prisoner's dilemma, that 
childbearing decreases the bargaining position of the wife. We also find that importance of 
religion significantly reduces the probability of the wife having the final say. Probably, 
religion leads to a more traditional division in final say, in which either the husband or both 
partners have a final say in big financial decisions. 
Table 6.2: Probit analyses of final say in big financial decisions (t-values in parentheses) 
variables Bl B2 
constant -1.179 (-5.71)" -1.089 (-6.84)" 
ln(wj -0.134 (-1.25) 0.194(2.61)" 
ln(wf) -0.109 (-0.77) -0.060 (-0.57) 
education male -0.078 (-1.56) 0.042 ( 1.30) 
education female -0.006 (-0.11) -0.168 (-4.42)" 
# children -0.025 (-0.50) 0.119 ( 3.73)" 
non-labour income 0.017 ( 1.41) 0.008 ( 0.92) 
religion important -0.247 (-2.05)" 0.081 ( 1.05) 
6.5.3 Everyday household spending 
A third question asked concerns everyday household spending. 
'Who is mainly responsible for handling your everyday household spending? I mean 
things like food, household necessities and other items of general housekeeping?' 
1) mainly husband 
2) both 
3) mainly wife 
This question is expected to concern executive management. Deriving the time inputs of 
partners is again not straightforward because of the use of the word 'mainly'. We assume, 
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however, that if the responsibility lays mainly with one partner, the time spent by the other 
partner can be neglected. Coir interpretation of the answering categories in terms of power 
is that power rises with a higher involvement of a partner. So in category 3 both the time 
input and the share in family power of the female partner is higher than in category 1. 
Again two probit equations are estimated, the results of which are presented in table 6.3. The 
dummy variables analyzed are defined as follows: 
(Cl) 0 = Husband or both handle everyday household spending (H m c >0) (352 obs) 
1 = Wife handles everyday household spending (H m c =0) (1865 obs) 
(C2) 0 = Wife or both handle everyday household spending (H f c >0) (2106 obs) 
1 = Husband handles everyday household spending (H f c =0) (111 obs) 
Table 6.3: Probit analyses of handling everyday household spending (t-values in parentheses) 
variables Cl C2 
constant 1.007 ( 6.80)" -1.871 (-8.84)" 
0.110 ( 1.51) -0.064 (-0.61) 
ln(wf) -0.012 (-0.12) 0.133 (0.90) 
education male -0.074 (-2.39)" 0.032 ( 0.74) 
education female -0.119 (-3.42)" 0.017 ( 0.33) 
# children 0.145 ( 4.25)" -0.107 (-2.06)" 
non-labour income -0.019 (-2.52)" 0.041 (4.55)" 
religion important 0.042 ( 0.55) -0.035 (-0.33) 
In 84 per cent of households the wife handles everyday household spending, while in only 
5 per cent it is exclusively the husband's responsibility. Although the estimated coefficients 
of both partners' wage rates are not significant, their signs correspond with the household 
production approach; for both partners an increasing wage rate increases the probability that 
his/her partner handles everyday household spending. A larger number of children and a 
lower non-labour income increase the probability that the wife handles everyday household 
spending and decrease the probability that the husband handles everyday household spending. 
Moreover, a lower education level for both partners increases the probability of the wife 
handling everyday household spending on her own. Overall, the results appear to provide no 
evidence in favour of either one of the theoretical models. 
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6.5.4 Regular household bills 
A fourth part of managing household finances is handling regular bills. The exact formulation 
of the question asked to respondents is: 
'In your household who makes sure that regular household bills are paid, I mean things 
like the bills for the gas, electricity, telephone?' 
1) mainly husband 
2) both 
3) mainly wife 
This question is also expected to concern executive management. The interpretation of the 
answers in terms of time inputs and power is similar to that of the previous question: in 
category 3 both the time input and the share in family power of the female partner is higher 
than in category 1. 
The probit equations concerning regular household bills are based on the following dummy 
variables: 
(Dl) 0 = Husband or both take care of regular household bills (H m D >0) (1073 obs) 
1 = Wife takes care of regular household bills (H m D =0) (1051 obs) 
(D2) 0 = Wife or both take care of regular household bills (H f D >0) (1311 obs) 
1 = Husband takes care of regular household bills (H f D=0) (813 obs) 
Regular household bills are mostly taken care of by only one partner: in 49 per cent of 
households the wife takes care of them, and in 38 per cent of households the husband does. 
Table 6.4 shows that the signs of the coefficients for both partners' wage rates correspond 
with the bargaining interpretation: a rise in a partner's wage rate increases the probability that 
this person will take care of regular household bills. This contradicts our suggestion (and 
Vogler and Pahl's) that this part of financial management reflects executive management and 
should have little to do with power. Apparently, the labour intensity of paying regular 
household bills is small in relation to power gains associated with it. 
The share of the husband in taking care of regular household bills also increases with 
his level of education, the amount of non-labour income and the importance of religion. The 
number of children seems to slightly increase the probability that the wife takes care of 
regular household bills. 
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Table 6.4: Probit analyses of taking care of regular household bills (t-values in parentheses) 
variables Dl D2 
constant 0.456 ( 3.47)" -0.943 (-6.96)" 
m(wj -0.177 (-2.81)" 0.349 ( 5.34)" 
ln(wf) 0.100 ( 1.19) -0.193 (-2.23)" 
education male -0.154 (-5.64)" 0.147 (5.37)" 
education female 0.038 ( 1.25) -0.042 (-1.38) 
# children 0.051 ( 1.87)* -0.008 (-0.29) 
non-labour income -0.057 (-7.38)" 0.057 ( 7.63)" 
religion important -0.139 (-2.12)" 0.122 ( 1.84)' 
Before we go on to discuss part E of financial management we want to make some general 
comments on the empirical results of parts A to D. As the reader may recall, we preferred 
to estimate two probit equations on every part in stead of one ordered probit, so that we could 
investigate if the participation of the wife relates to the same extent to certain variables as the 
participation of the husband. If the coefficients of both probits have opposite signs, this would 
mean that the corresponding variables shift the participation from one partner to the other. 
Both the household production and the bargaining model suggest such a relationship. If, 
however, coefficients in both probits have the same sign, the corresponding variables cause 
a shift between the two 'solo' cases (i.e. only one of both partners participates) and the case 
of joint participation. In tables 6.3 and 6.4 all estimated coefficients have opposite signs in 
the two columns, although the opposite coefficients are not always both significant. In tables 
6.1 and 6.2 we find equal signs in both columns in only four cases11, but in all of these 
cases at least one of both coefficients is not significantly different from zero. Overall we 
conclude that the influence of variables appears to be symmetric. Note that the significance 
of the estimated coefficients is influenced by the number of observations in the answering 
categories of the probit equation. 
A second remark concerns the coefficients for the wages of both partners. Remember 
that in the theoretical model discussed in section 6.2 the ratio wm/w f plays a role. We 
therefore included the logarithms of both wage rates; if it really is their ratio that is of 
importance, we will then find that both coefficients are of equal magnitude and have opposite 
signs. The estimation results show that both partners' wage rates mostly have opposite signs: 
only in probit Bl both coefficients are negative albeit insignificant. For all four parts of 
The constant term is not considered. 
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financial management Likelihood Ratio tests do not reject the hypothesis that both coefficients 
are of equal magnitude with opposite signs. 
6.5.5 Asking permission for personal expenditures 
A final question from the BHPS investigated by us is: 
'If you buy something for yourself costing between £10 and £20 would you usually: 
1) ask your partner if you could buy it 
2) tell your partner 
3) not mention it at all.' 
Our analysis of this part of financial management is somewhat different from the rest. In the 
first place, a household production interpretation does not seem plausible as no time inputs 
are involved in this question. We therefore concentrate exclusively on possible power aspects 
of the extent to which partners feel inclined to ask permission for personal spending. 
Secondly, in categories A to D we have answers of both partners to the same question 
available, and we select only observations for which both partners provide the same answer. 
However, in category E respondents are only asked if they themselves ask permission for 
personal expenditures between £10 and £20, and not if their partners ask them for permission. 
So in this section we cannot check if the answers of both partners correspond with each other. 
We will start our analysis by examining both partners' answers separately. We estimate 
ordered probit equations on the following dummy variables, reflecting the answers provided 
by wives (El) and husbands (E2) respectively. 
(El) 0 = Wife reports that she asks permission (382 obs) 
1 = Wife reports that she only tells partner (1357 obs) 
2 = Wife reports that she does not mention it (767 obs) 
(E2) 0 = Husband reports that he asks permission (400 obs) 
1 = Husband reports that he only tells partner (1539 obs) 
2 = Husband reports that he does not mention it (567 obs) 
A majority of respondents only tells his or her partner about personal expenditures between 
£10 and £20: 54 per cent of wives and 61 per cent of husbands. Moreover, 15 per cent of 
wives and 16 per cent of husbands say they ask their partner for permission. However, it is 
not clear if this information can be interpreted in terms of power. The extent to which 
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partners ask permission may be mainly determined by the total amount of household income 
available: a very low household income may require more control of both partners, than an 
abundant household income. If this is the case, each partner's answer on asking permission 
may be more related to poverty than to power. Alternatively, it may be informative to 
examine differences in the responses of partners. Irrespective of the amount of household 
income, one partner may feel more inclined to ask permission than the other. To investigate 
this we create a new variable E3, which is defined as follows:12 
(E3) 0 = Wife gives more account to husband than vice versa (442 obs) 
1 = Wife and husband choose the same answering category (1429 obs) 
2 = Wife gives less account to husband than vice versa (635 obs) 
This variable may reflect any differences between partners in the extent to which they feel 
free to use household income for personal expenditures. In 18 per cent of households the 
husband gives less account to his wife than she to him, while in 25 per cent of households 
the opposite holds. Estimating an ordered probit on E3 may inform us on what variables 
influence these differences between partners. 
The results of all three ordered probits are presented in table 6.5. The first column 
shows that the wife becomes less likely to ask permission for personal expenditures if both 
her own and her partner's wage rate increases, and if the number of children is smaller. This 
may confirm our suggestion that the asking of permission has more to do with poverty and 
'making ends meet' than with power. We also find that wives with higher education levels 
feel less inclined to ask permission. The second column shows that the husband is less likely 
to ask permission if his own wage rate increases and if he has a lower number of children; 
his partner's wage rate has no significant influence. A rise in his partner's education level, 
however, makes him less likely to ask permission. Again, these results are a bit difficult to 
interprète in terms of power. 
The variable analyzed in the third column may be more related to power. We find that 
a higher value of the wife's wage rate results in a higher value of E3. So wives with a higher 
The value of E3 follows from the difference between the values of El and E2: 
If: El < E2, then E3 equals 0; 
El = E2, then E3 equals 1 ; 
El > E2, then E3 equals 2. 
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wage rate are more likely to give less account to their husbands than their husbands to them, 
than wives with lower wage rates. This suggests that the extent to which partners feel free 
to spend household income on personal expenditures increases with the amount of money 
brought in monthly by themselves. This confirms the bargaining model, in which the access 
of both partners to common household income depends on their wage rates. Further note that 
only the wife's wage rate is significant. Perhaps, her contribution to the household's income 
is more important in this respect than the traditionally 'taken for granted' contribution of the 
male. 
Table 6.5: Probit analyses of asking permission for personal spending (t-values in parentheses) 
variables El E2 E3 
constant 0.427 ( 4.04)" 0.536 ( 5.30)" 0.751 ( 7.03)" 
ln(wj 0.197 ( 3.86)" 0.283 ( 5.86)" -0.068 (-1.28) 
ln(wf) 0.290 ( 4.04)" 0.051 ( 0.78) 0.222 ( 3.33)" 
education male 0.010 ( 0.42) -0.001 (-0.06) 0.019 (0.85) 
education female 0.066 ( 2.48)" 0.054 ( 2.09)" 0.017 ( 0.68) 
i children -0.090 (-4.16)" -0.042 (-2.01)" -0.037 (-1.77)" 
non-labour income -0.009 (-1.46) -0.004 (-0.72) -0.003 (-0.55) 
religion important -0.082 (-1.47) -0.091 (-1.63) 0.011 (0.19) 
mu(l) 1.572 (44.32)" 1.775 (48.51)" 1.602 (46.41)" 
6.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we investigated what determines a household's choice of financial 
management. We specified two models to explain the division of financial management 
between partners. We first ignored any power aspects and concentrated on an efficient 
division of management activities between partners. The most crucial characteristics of 
financial management in that case are both partners' time inputs, and these are analysed in 
a household production model. Next, we specified a bargaining model to derive an 
interpretation of financial management in terms of power. 
The empirical results show that the household production model does not very well in 
explaining various management systems: only for part C (everyday household spending) we 
find coefficients with signs corresponding with this model, but the coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero. This part of financial management is considered as executive 
management, with the possible power gains being small in relation to the labour input 
involved. For all other parts the estimated effects of wage rates point at the bargaining 
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interpretation. Even for 'who makes sure regular hh bills are paid' the results correspond to 
this model. Probably, the power gains of managing this part are larger than we (and Vogler 
and Pahl) expected. We also find, in accordance with earlier results of Pahl, that the 
participation of wives in financial management is higher in low income households than in 
high income households. For future research, it would be interesting to investigate if 
efficiency aspects play a larger role in low income households than in high income 
households; the estimates of the previous section can provide no answer to this question. 
In the analysis of this chapter we have considered both alternative models separately. 
Probably, however, both efficiency and power aspects play a role simultaneously. The 
opposite wage effects will then cancel out to some extent. For instance, the insignificant wage 
coefficients in part C of financial management may be caused by opposite bargaining and 
efficiency effects of equal magnitude. Alternatively, the bargaining effects found in parts A, 
B, D, and E do not exclude that efficiency considerations apply as well, albeit to a 
(significantly) smaller extent. 
Our overall conclusion is that power aspects do play a role in the organization of 
household finances. Consequently, information on financial management may contribute to 
current research on modelling household decisions in a bargaining framework. For instance, 
measures of financial management of households can be used to parametrize the distribution 
of bargaining power in game theoretic models of household labour supply. In our opinion, 
this is an interesting suggestion for future research. 
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Appendix 6A: An alternative noncooperative outcome in the bargaining model 
In section 6.3 we assumed that in the noncooperative outcome there is no pooling of 
resources and no joint consumption by partners. Under this assumption we derived that the 
noncooperative Nash-outcome of a partner increases with his/her wage rate. We will now 
show that if we allow for pooling of resources and joint consumption in the noncooperative 
outcome, which is, for instance, assumed by Kooreman and Kapteyn (1990), the effect of a 
wage increase remains unclear. 
In the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium analyzed in Kooreman and Kapteyn, partner m 
maximizes: 
Um(X£mjLf) = am log(Im - Y J + a, log(Lf - Y / ) + « x log(X - Yx) 
s.t. X = wm (T - L J + wf (T - Lf) + u 
(A.1) 
where ax = l-am-a f, Li is the amount of leisure enjoyed by partner i, X is the amount of 
goods consumed by the household, and p is the household's non-labour income. Similarly, 
partner f maximizes: 
Uf(X,Lm,L) = p m log(Lm - 8 J + p^ logCZy - 6f) + P x log(X - 8X) 
s.t. X = wm (T - LJ +wf(T- L) + ^ 
(A.2) 
with /3X = l-j3m-j8f. For convenience's sake we take ^=5—0, i=m,f,X. Solving the 
maximization problem of partner i given the leisure of partner j gives the following 
conditional demand equations for both partners' leisure: 
m m l -o. 
(A.3) 
W / L / = ( P/
 X 
with Y = wm.T + wfT + u 
(A.4) 
From (A.3) and (A.4) the leisure demand equations for both partners corresponding to the 
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Nash equilibrium can be derived, and the amount of goods consumed by the household: 
m m { i-«p 
1-ap 
(A.7) 
1-a-P+aP 
, 1-«P 
(A.8) 
with a=- and p=— 
The indirect utility level of partner m associated with this Nash solution is: 
= a m log 1-aP w 
a/log 
my 
' pq -« ) Z v 
(A.10) 
It can be shown that: 
l-ct-p+ctp 
1-aP 
.Y 
^ = ! - _» and 
9wm y w_ dw. 
jar 
wt 
Expressions for the noncooperative outcome for partner f can be derived analogously. These 
expressions show, as depends not only on w; but also on w j ( that it is not clear if partner 
j gets relatively more power if W j increases. It is also possible that partner i benefits more 
from an increase in j ' s wage than partner j himself/herself. 
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7 Conclusions and discussion 
In this thesis we investigated consumption and decision making of households, with a special 
interest in the individual members involved. In the first chapter we sketched an overview of 
literature on intrahousehold allocation of resources, and more generally on household 
economics. Studies that have shown the social and academic importance of this research topic 
are briefly summarized, and various approaches to modelling household decisions are 
discussed. In the other chapters we presented our own empirical work. We specified and 
estimated microeconomic models of household behaviour, addressing three different themes 
related to intrahousehold allocation of resources: boy-girl discrimination in the intrahousehold 
allocation of food (chapter 2), parental preferences for the sex of their children (chapters 3 
and 4), and the intrahousehold organisation of money (chapters 5 and 6). 
Chapter 2 addressed a major problem of investigating intrahousehold allocation, namely 
that most available data sets only report information at the household level, and not 'who gets 
what' in the household. Nevertheless, to some extent household-level data can be used to 
examine the impact of children of different sex and age groups on household expenditures. 
We applied a method to investigate boy-girl discrimination in Peru using household-level 
expenditures on food consumed exclusively by adults. We estimated rank three Engel curves 
for the expenditure shares of 30 food categories, and included various dummies for the 
presence of children of certain age and sex categories. 
Although boys and girls showed to have different effects on expenditures on some food 
categories, we found no significant differences between the impact of boys and girls on 
expenditures on the only adult good 'alcoholic beverages'. We thus concluded that this 
particular data set showed no evidence of boy-girl discrimination. Another result of our 
analysis was that the inclusion of a quadratic logarithmic expenditure term in the traditional 
Working/Leser curves significantly improved the specification for most food categories. Most 
foods appeared to change from a luxury at low levels of total expenditure to necessities or 
inferior goods as the total expenditure level increased. 
The analysis was based on an assumption of exogeneity of total food expenditures. An 
improvement of the study could be to investigate possible endogeneity of total expenditures, 
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and to deal with this by using appropriate instruments. However, although this may improve 
the specification of the model, we feel that it is unlikely that it will seriously alter the results 
on boy-girl discrimination. 
The fact that we find no significant boy-girl discrimination may result from considering 
only one adult good: alcoholic beverages. Investigation of other adult goods might show 
different results. The only way to find out is to extend the research to other goods, but this 
requires detailed information on the household's expenditures on various other consumption 
goods than food. 
A different part of the Peruvian LSMS dataset that may shed light on possible boy-girl 
discrimination within the family are data on individual education levels. In a preliminary 
study (Niemansverdriet, 1993) we used these data to investigate factors that influence partici-
pation in education of both sexes in Peru. In accordance with Tansel's (1992) results for Cote 
dTvoire and Ghana, we found that in general men participate more in education than women, 
and that maternal education specifically influences girls' education. An interesting question 
for future research would be if the different education levels of boys and girls are caused by 
discrimination or by efficiency considerations (e.g. Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982). 
Moreover, we would like to investigate if the specific effect of maternal education, and 
perhaps also of other characteristics of the mother, can be interpreted as evidence in favour 
of the bargaining model of household behaviour. This would suggest a study similar in spirit 
to Thomas (1990), who concluded that mothers tend to allocate more to daughters, and 
fathers to sons. 
A second theme of this thesis concerned a question related to boy-girl discrimination and 
intrahousehold allocation of resources, namely if parents have an overall preference for the 
gender of their children. Literature suggests that the existence of parental sex preferences 
could provide an explanation for boy-girl differences in the intrahousehold allocation of 
goods. 
The main interest in both chapters 3 and 4 is in the methodology used to investigate sex 
preferences, as well as in possible policy implications. In chapter 3 we applied and discussed 
three reduced form methods to investigate sex preferences. Alternatively, in chapter 4 we 
specified and estimated a simple structural model of parental preferences for both number and 
sex of children. For the empirical analyses we used a Dutch dataset, both to stress that sex 
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preferences are not restricted to developing countries and to link up with a recent discussion 
on sex preferences raised by the opening of a 'gender clinic' in the Netherlands. 
The first method used in chapter 3 was based on Parity Progression Ratios (PPRs), 
using number and sex of children from past births to investigate additional births. Due to the 
problem of right censoring and the resulting inaccurate calculation of the 'true PPR', we 
concluded that this method was less useful for our purposes. Next, we applied a Cox 
proportional hazard analysis on birth intervals, a method that explicitly controls for right 
censoring. It assumes that couples who are less satisfied at a certain parity will tend to have 
shorter subsequent birth intervals than couples who are more satisfied. We found that couples 
with exactly two sons or two daughters were more likely to have a third child than couples 
who had a son and a daughter. So parents appeared to have a preference for at least one child 
of each sex. Thirdly, we investigated information about sterilization decisions of respondents, 
which is not very common in literature. The assumption underlying this method is that people 
only choose for a sterilization if they are satisfied with their actual household composition. 
While an initial probit analysis of this information gave somewhat unconvincing results, a 
2SLS estimation, that dealt with the possible endogeneity of the explanatory variable 'number 
of children', showed that couples with children of both sexes are more likely to have a 
sterilization than other couples. 
Although the reduced form methods provided evidence for a preference for a mixture 
of sexes in the Netherlands, they do not clarify how parents weigh a sex preference against 
a preferred number of children. Consequently, they do not enable us to investigate how 
fertility will change if parents obtain the possibility of choosing the sex of their children. This 
requires estimation of preference parameters in a structural fertility model, which is carried 
out in chapter 4. With this model the interrelationship between preferences for both number 
and sex of children can be examined more explicitly. Using a Maximum Likelihood procedure 
we estimated the effect of various household characteristics and the sex of the household's 
children on the probability that a couple obtains a certain number of children. To achieve 
identification in our empirical model we used information on both the number of past births 
and on sterilization decisions and the age of respondents. We found that parental preferences 
for number of children and for a 'mixture of sexes' are substitutes. 
Using the estimates of the structural model we analyzed possible effects of introducing 
sex preselection techniques on fertility. We found two opposite effects, namely an increase 
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in first and second order births and a decrease in third and higher order births. The total 
resulting effect was a rise in fertility of about 1 per cent. In other countries, however, the 
introduction of sex preselection techniques may very well lead to a decline in total fertility, 
due to more third and higher order births, or due to a different sex preference. 
Our analysis of sex preferences can be improved in various ways. Firstly, if we had 
richer data available, we could use time varying covariates in our estimations. For instance, 
we now only use income and type of job of the respondent at the moment of interview, while 
it would be more interesting to use information on these variables at different moments in 
time. This would enable us to estimate a dynamic model of fertility, investigating the effects 
of life-cycle variations in parents' income and other variables on the timing of births. Another 
possible improvement is to allow for unobserved heterogeneity of couples. For instance, 
Heckman et al. (1985) conclude that controlling for unobservables affects the sign and the 
statistical significance of the impact of several variables on fertility. All these possible 
improvements are not easily incorporated in our structural model. They require a much more 
complicated dynamic model, analyzing all available birth intervals of couples simultaneously; 
such a model is used in Heckman et al. (1985) and in Leung (1988). Unfortunately, such a 
comprehensive analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
It will be interesting to follow future practices of the 'gender clinic' recently opened in 
the Netherlands. It may reveal useful information on which parents choose to select a certain 
sex and why. Anyway, in a recent interview in a daily journal (Trouw, October 17th 1995) 
the chief executive of the 'gender clinic' stated that most of the parents at their waiting list 
already had two boys and now wanted a girl. His remark supports our findings in chapters 
3 and 4. 
In the third and last part of this thesis we empirically investigated the organization of money 
within the household. We explicitly concentrated on how various financial tasks are divided 
between both partners, and if this influences the access of both partners to household income. 
Although our main interest was to investigate a possible relation between the financial 
management of households and power, we first concentrated (in chapter 5) on the diversity 
of financial management itself. We examined information on the 'financial allocative system' 
of households, a concept introduced by Pahl to provide an overall indicator of how partners 
manage household finances. We investigated how specific parts of financial management are 
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divided between partners, and how these relate to the 'financial allocative system' of the 
household. Furthermore, we examined differences in both partners' reports on questions 
concerning financial management. Our findings convince us that for a good insight in the 
household's financial management, we should consider information on all various parts of 
financial management and not just on allocative systems, and that we should use information 
based on both partners' answers in stead of relying on one partner's perception. 
Next, in chapter 6, we specified two alternative models that may explain the 
intrahousehold organization of finances. The first model considered was a home production 
model, in which the financial management results from an efficient distribution of both 
partners' time inputs. The other model was a bargaining model, assuming that the one who 
manages household finances can influence the final decision of the household. These two 
alternative models impy different effects for certain variables on the financial management 
of the household, which enable us to investigate empirically which model best fits the 
available data. We estimated various probit equations, representing the division between 
partners of five different parts of household finances. The results showed that the household 
production model does not perform very well in explaining various types of financial 
management. Several estimates, however, correspond with the bargaining interpretation of 
financial management. We therefore conclude that power aspects play a more dominant role 
in the organization of household finances than considerations related to an efficient division 
of tasks. 
One could discuss that it would be more practical to create one single measure of 
financial management in stead of considering all five parts separately as we did in chapter 6. 
For instance, Woolley and Marshall (1994) construct a measure of female influence by simply 
averaging the female influence score across all household decisions included in a 
questionnaire. However, some important disadvantages of such a procedure should be noted. 
Firstly, it will be very difficult to decide on a sensible weighing of the various decisions into 
one measure; it is far from obvious why one would equally weigh all decisions, as done by 
Woolley and Marshall. Secondly, such a measure will always reflect the type of financial 
decisions it includes. For instance, an additional question on food expenses would affect the 
measure in a different way than an extra question on mortgages. And finally, one will always 
loose information when taking an average of various items. 
Another point for future research is the possible use of information on financial 
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management in bargaining models of household decisions. For instance, in Kooreman and 
Kapteyn's (1990) model of household labour supply a parameter X incorporates the relative 
bargaining power of both partners. If the household's financial management is related to the 
distribution of bargaining power within households, the financial management could inform 
us on what bargaining solution applies to certain households. In a similar way as Barmby 
(1994) makes X a function of household specific wage rates of both partners, we suggest to 
parametrize X using information on the household's financial management. 
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
Lange tijd is het huishouden door economen als een homogene eenheid beschouwd. In 
economische modellen die het gedrag van huishoudens beschreven werd geen aandacht 
besteed aan de verdeling van beschikbare middelen hissen de diverse leden van het 
huishouden. Echter, gedurende de laatste decennia hebben diverse onderzoeken aangetoond 
dat er verschillen tussen leden kunnen bestaan voor wat betreft voedselconsumptie, toegang 
tot onderwijs en gezondheidszorg, sterfte-risico's, tijdsbestedingspatronen en het kunnen 
beschikken over geld. 
Dit proefschrift rieht zieh op de besluitvorming en consumptie van huishoudens, met 
speciale aandacht voor de individuele leden van een huishouden. De nadruk ligt op het 
formuleren en empirisch toetsen van micro-economische modellen die de allocatie van 
goederen binnen huishoudens kunnen beschrijven en verklaren. In hoofdstuk 1 wordt eerst 
een kort overzicht gegeven van onderzoek op dit terrein. We bespreken een aantal studies die 
verschillen in consumptie tussen huishoudleden op basis van geslacht of op basis van leeftijd 
hebben onderzocht. Daarnaast schetsen we de ontwikkeling in modellen waarmee het gedrag 
van huishoudens is beschreven en geanalyseerd, en de problemen rond de beschikbaarheid van 
gegevens om allocatie binnen huishoudens empirisch te kunnen onderzoeken. In de overige 
hoofdstukken worden achtereenvolgens de volgende thema's behandeld: het onderzoeken, op 
basis van bestedingen van huishoudens, van een mogelijk verschallende behandeling van zonen 
en dochters, voorkeuren van ouders voor kinderen van een bepaald geslacht, en de organisatie 
van financien binnen huishoudens. 
In hoofdstuk 2 analyseren we bestedingen van huishoudens in Peru aan diverse 
voedselcategorieen. Deze analyse biedt ons de mogelijkheid te onderzoeken of er sprake is 
van een verschillende behandeling van jongens en meisjes binnen het huishouden. Met name 
de invloed van de aanwezigheid van kinderen op voedselcategorieen die uitsluitend door 
ouders geconsumeerd worden, zogenaamde 'adult goods', kan ons informatie geven over 
mogelijk verschillende bestedingen aan zonen en dochters. We schatten Engelcurves voor 
dertig verschillende voedselcategorieen, waarbij we dummies opnemen voor de aanwezigheid 
van kinderen van een bepaalde leeftijd en geslacht. Hoewel uit onze resultaten blijkt dat 
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jongens en meisjes de uitgaven aan een aantal voedselcategorieën verschillend bei'nvloeden, 
vinden we geen significante verschillen tussen hun effect op uitgaven aan 'adult goods'. We 
beredeneren dat Meruit geconcludeerd kan worden dat de betreffende dataset geen 
verschillende behandeling tussen zonen en dochters toont. Een andere conclusie van onze 
analyse is dat het opnemen van een kwadratische term van de totale voedselbestedingen in de 
Engelcurves de specificatie voor de verscMllende voedselcategorieën significant verbetert. De 
meeste categorieën blijken als 'luxe' goed te kunnen worden aangeduid bij een laag 
voedselbudget, en als noodzakelijke of inférieure goederen bij hogere voedselbudgetten. 
In de hoofdstukken 3 en 4 onderzoeken we een onderwerp dat sterk verbonden is met 
een verscMllende behandeling van jongens en meisjes binnen huishoudens, namelijk de vraag 
of ouders een voorkeur hebben voor kinderen van een bepaald geslacht. In de literatuur wordt 
gesuggereerd dat dergelijke voorkeuren een Verklarung zouden kunnen bieden voor een 
ongelijke verdeling van goederen binnen huishoudens tussen zonen en dochters. In hoofdstuk 
3 bespreken we verschillende methoden om geslachtsvoorkeuren van ouders te onderzoeken, 
die gebruik maken van verscMllende typen gegevens over de vruchtbaarheid van huishoudens. 
Voor de empirische analyses maken we gebruik van een Nederlandse dataset, om te 
benadrukken dat geslachtsvoorkeuren met uitsluitend in ontwikkelingslanden voorkomen. De 
analyse heeft implicaties voor de récente discussie in Nederland rond de mogelijkheid om het 
geslacht van kinderen te bei'nvloeden. 
Als eerste passen we een aangepaste versie van de Parity Progression Ratio (PPR)-
methode toe, welke gebaseerd is op het aantal kinderen dat ouders reeds hebben gekregen. 
Echter, vanwege zogenaamde cmson/zg-problemen en de Meruit voortvloeiende 
onnauwkeurigheid van de berekende PPR concluderen we dat deze méthode minder geschürt 
is voor onze doeleinden. Vervolgens analyseren we tijdsintervallen tussen opeenvolgende 
(mogelijke) geboortes door middel van een Cox proportional hazard model, welke expliciet 
rekening houdt met het censoring-probleem. Uit deze analyse blijkt dat ouders met twee 
zonen of twee dochters een grotere waarschijnlijkheid hebben om een derde kind te krijgen 
dan ouders die een zoon en een dochter hebben, hetgeen duidt op een voorkeur voor minstens 
een kind van elk geslacht. Tevens schatten we een probit- en een 2SLS~vergelijking van de 
beslissing van ouders zieh te laten steriliseren. De probit analyse geeft onbevredigende 
resultaten, mogelijk als gevolg van de endogemteit van een van de verklärende variabelen. 
De 2SUS~schatting die hiervoor corrigeert, toont dat paren met zowel een zoon als een 
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